Doctor’s Oral Promise to Retire in Future Not Enough To Sustain Healthcare Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims

In Heartland Women’s Healthcare, Ltd. v. Simonton-Smith, 2021 IL App (5th) 200135-U, the appeals court affirmed summary judgment for an obstetrician sued for fraud based on her alleged verbal promise to retire from her practice at the end of a three-year employment term.

The plaintiff claimed the defendant tricked it into buying her practice by promising to retire. The written agreement resulting from the parties’ negotiations contained neither a non-compete term nor a recital that defendant intended to retire at the agreement’s conclusion.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.  Plaintiff appealed.

Affirming, the Fifth District found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to support its misrepresentation claims and specifically, to show defendant hatched a “scheme to defraud” the plaintiff.

In Illinois, to state a colorable fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false statement of material facts, (2) known or believed to be false by the person making it, (3) an intent to induce a plaintiff to act, (4) action by the plaintiff in justifiable reliance on the truth of the statement, and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from the reliance.

A negligent misrepresentation plaintiff must also establish these elements but instead of showing a knowingly false statement, must prove the defendant (i) was careless or negligent in ascertaining the truth of the statement and (ii) owed a duty to the plaintiff to impart accurate information.

In both a fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claim, the statement must be of an existing or past fact and not merely a promise to do something in the future.  The alleged fraud must also be complete at the time of the challenged statement as opposed to an intention to commit a future fraud.

The ‘Scheme to Defraud’ Exception

Where the false representation of future conduct is the scheme or device employed to accomplish the fraud, a court can restore the parties to the positions they occupied before the fraud was committed.  And while courts make clear that something beyond a lone broken promise is usually required to trigger the scheme exception, that “plus-factor” is still elusive.

Some courts require a plaintiff to allege a sustained pattern of repeated false representations [see HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145 (1989)] while others [Roda v. Berko (401 Ill.335 (1948), Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill.App.3d 1105 (1980)] have held that a single promise can trigger the scheme exception.

In cases that have recognized the exception in the single broken promise setting, the plaintiff must generally produce evidence of a  defendant’s contemporaneous intention not to follow through on the promise.   The cases also make clear that whether a plaintiff is proceeding on a course of conduct scheme theory or one that involves only one promise, it must show the defendant’s fraudulent intent existed at or before the time of the promise. [25]

Here, the plaintiff could not prove the defendant promised to retire while, at the same time, never intending to fulfill that promise at the outset.  For support, the Court quoted both plaintiff’s agent’s and defendant’s deposition testimony.  Both testified that while the defendant’s future retirement was discussed prior to inking the three-year pact, it was never reduced to writing.  The plaintiff also could not pinpoint a definite promise by the defendant to retire when the employment contract lapsed.

As further proof that the defendant never unequivocally promised to retire, the plaintiff’s agent testified he even asked the defendant not to retire and that defendant stay beyondthe employment contract’s end date.  In the end, Plaintiff’s evidence did not go far enough to establish either an oral promise to retire at the agreement’s conclusion or the defendant’s intention not to fulfill that promise.

Afterwords:

In finding for the doctor defendant, the Heartland Women’s Healthcare Court was careful to respect the boundary between contract and tort law damages – a delineation that, in theory at least, prevents every broken promise from undergirding a fraud claim.

And while the content and outer reaches of the scheme to defraud exception [to the rule that a false promise is not actionable fraud] is still murky, it seems that something beyond a one-off broken promise is generally required.  A plaintiff invoking the scheme exception has a better chance of surviving a pleadings motion or summary judgment where it can show a defendant’s pattern of repeated broken promises.

Here, the plaintiff alleged only a single misstatement – defendant’s supposed oral promise to retire at the conclusion of the employment contract.  Without evidence of defendant’s contemporaneous intent not to uphold her promise, there wasn’t enough evidence of a scheme to defraud to survive summary judgment.

In hindsight, the Plaintiff should have negotiated and codified both a non-compete provision and defendant’s imminent retirement as material terms of the contract.

 

 

Business Expectancy Not A Transferrable ‘Asset’ Under IL Fraudulent Transfer Statute [Deconstructing Andersen Law LLC v. 3 Build Construction LLC]

Andersen Law LLC v. 3 Build Construction, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 181575-U, the subject of my most recent post, here , examines the nature and reach of Illinois’s Fraudulent Transfer Act, 740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. [“IFTA”] and the ‘continuation’ exception to the successor liability rule.

The Plaintiffs’ IFTA claims were based on allegations that former members of the LLC debtors’ systematically raided company bank accounts and formed a new business entity to evade a money judgment.

A colorable IFTA claim – whether it sounds in actual or constructive fraud – requires a creditor-debtor relationship.  It also requires the plaintiff to allege a transfer of an identifiable asset.

Here, the Court found the Plaintiffs failed to allege either a debtor-creditor relationship between the judgment creditor and the individual LLC members or a transfer of debtor assets.  The Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the debtor made transfers without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer also doomed their constructive fraud complaint count.

Next, the Court jettisoned the Plaintiffs’ actual fraud claims under IFTA Section 5(a)(1).  In an actual fraud claim, the plaintiff must show a specific intent to defraud a creditor. This Section goes on to list some eleven (11) “badges” of fraud ranging from whether the transfer was concealed, to whether the transferee was a corporate insider to whether a transfer encompassed the bulk of a debtor’s assets.  740 ILCS 160/5(b)

The Plaintiffs’ allegation that the transfers were fraudulent because they occurred within a year of the judgment or went to pay members’ personal expenses were deemed too conclusory to satisfy the pleading requirements for an IFTA actual fraud claim.

The Court then rejected the Plaintiffs’ IFTA Section 6(a) [which governs claims arising before a transfer] claim based on the debtors forming a new corporation and diverting debtors’ business opportunities to that new entity.

An IFTA claim requires a transfer.  “Transfer” is defined as “every mode….of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset…” 740 ILCS 160/2(l).

“Asset” is defined as “property of a debtor” while “property,” in turn, means anything that may be the subject of ownership.  740 ILCS 160/2(b), (j) [¶ 84]

But a transfer is not made until the debtor acquires rights in the asset transferred.

The Court held the plaintiffs did not allege an asset or a transfer under the IFTA.  Following Illinois case precedent, the Court found that unfulfilled business opportunities were not transferrable assets under the statute.  [¶¶ 84-85]

Finally, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ successor liability claim.  The Plaintiffs alleged the debtors’ members formed a new business entity for the purpose of avoiding the judgment.

The general rule is that a corporation that purchases the assets of another business is not liable for the debts or liabilities of the purchased corporation.  An exception to this rule applies where the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller. [¶ 95]

To invoke the continuation exception, the plaintiff must show the purchasing corporation maintains the same or similar management and ownership as the purchased entity.

The test is whether there is a continuation of the selling business’s entity; not merely a continuation of the seller’s business.  A commonality among the seller and buyer businesses’ officers, directors, and stock are the key ingredients of a continuation. [¶ 97]

The Court found the plaintiffs’ continuation exception arguments lacking.  The plaintiffs failed to allege a purchase or transfer of the corporate debtors’ assets or stock by/to the new entity.  And while the plaintiffs did allege some common management between the corporate debtors and the new entity, the plaintiffs failed to allege a commonality of stock between the companies.

Afterwords:

A conjectural business expectancy is not tangible enough to constitute a transferable asset under IFTA;

A creditor’s attempt to impute a corporate judgment to individual shareholders is improper in a post-judgment fraudulent transfer case.  Instead, the creditor should file separate action against the individual shareholder(s) for breach of fiduciary duty, usurpation of corporate opportunities, piercing the corporate veil or similar theories;

An identify of ownership between former and successor corporation is key element to invoke continuation exception to rule of no successor liability.

 

 

 

 

High-Tech Sports Co.’s Warranty Claims Too Late Says Seventh Circuit (Newspin v. Arrow Electronics – Part I of II)

Newspin Sports, LLC v. Arrow Electronics, Inc., 2018 WL 6295272 (7th Cir. 2018), analyzes the goods-versus-services dichotomy under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and how that difference informs the applicable statute of limitations.

The defendant supplied electronic sensor components for plaintiff’s use in its high-tech sports performance products.  Plaintiff sued when most of the parts were faulty and didn’t meet Plaintiff’s verbal and written requirements.  Plaintiff brought both contract- and tort-based claims against the Plaintiff.

The Breach of Contract Claims

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims on the basis they were time-barred under the UCC’s four-year limitations period for the sale of goods.

In Illinois, a breach of written contract claimant has ten years to sue measured from when its claim accrues. 735 ILCS 5/13-206.  A claim accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the non-breaching party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.  For a contract involving the sale of “goods,” a shortened 4-year limitations period applies. 810 ILCS 5/2-102 (goods df.), 810 ILCS 5/2-725(2)(4-year limitations period).

With a mixed contract (an agreement involving the supply of goods and services), Illinois looks at the contract’s “predominant purpose” to determine whether the 10-year or the compressed 4-year limitations period governs.

To apply the predominant purpose test, the court looks at the contract terms and the proportion of goods to services provided for under the contract.  The court then decides whether the contract is mainly for goods with services being incidental or if its principally for services with goods being incidental.

Here, the Court noted the Agreement was a mixed bag: the defendant promised to provide both goods and services.  But various parts of the contract made it clear that the defendant was hired to first provide a prototype product and later, to furnish components pursuant to plaintiff’s purchase orders.  The court found that any services referenced in the agreement were purely tangential to the main thrust of the contract – defendant’s furnishing electronic sensors for plaintiff to attach to its client’s golf clubs.  Support for this finding lay in the fact that the Agreement set out specific quantity and price terms for the goods (the components) but did not so specify for the referenced assembly, manufacturing and procurement services.

Other Agreement features that led to the court ruling the Agreement was one for goods included its warranty, sales tax, “F.O.B. and title passing provisions. The court noted that the warranty only applied to the manufactured products and not to any services and the contract’s sales tax provision – making Plaintiff responsible for sales taxes –  typically applied in goods contracts, not services ones.

Additionally, the Agreement’s F.O.B. (“free on board”) and title passage terms both signaled this was a goods (not a services) deal. See 810 ILCS 5/2-106(1)(sale consists in passing title from seller to buyer for a price). [*5]

Since the plaintiff didn’t sue until more than five years elapsed from the breach date, the Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of warranty claims.

The Negligent Misrepresentation Claim

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim. Under New York law (the contract had a NY choice-of-law provision), a plaintiff alleging negligent misrepresentation must establish (1) a special, privity-like relationship that imposes a duty on the defendant to impart accurate information to the plaintiff, (2) information that was in fact incorrect, and (3) plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on the information.

Like Illinois, New York applies the economic loss rule. This precludes a plaintiff from recovering economic losses under a tort theory. And since the plaintiff’s claimed negligent misrepresentation damages – money it lost based on the component defects – mirrored its breach of contract damages, the economic loss rule defeated plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation count. [*10]

Afterwords:

The case presents a useful summary of the dispositive factors a court looks at when deciding whether a contract’s primary purpose is for goods or services.  Besides looking at an agreement’s end product (or service), certain terms like F.O.B., title-shifting and sales tax provisions are strong indicators of contracts for the sale of goods.

The case also demonstrates the continuing viability of the economic loss rule.  Where a plaintiff’s breach of contract damages are identical to its tort damages, the economic loss rule will likely foreclose a plaintiff’s tort claim.