R. Kelly’s Royalty Account Nabbed by Sex Assault Judgment Creditor

Midwest Commercial Funding, LLC v. Kelly, 2022 IL App (1st) 210644 shows the harsh results that can flow from the failure to follow a statute’s service requirements to the letter.

There, dueling creditors fought over song royalties paid to disgraced R&B singer R. Kelly. Heather Williams sued the singer for sexual abuse and obtained a $4M default judgment against him in March 2020. About four months later, Midwest Commercial Funding, LLC (“MCF”), a commercial landlord, was awarded a $3.5M judgment for unpaid rent under a commercial lease against the singer.

Both creditors issued supplementary proceedings to enforce their respective judgments.

The Chronology

On August 17, 2020, Williams mailed a citation to discover assets to Sony – the music company that held a royalty account for the singer. Two days later, MCF sent its own citation by both regular mail and e-mail. MCF e-mailed the citation to one of Sony’s in-house lawyers with whom MCF had prior dealings.

On August 24, 2020, Sony’s in-house lawyer acknowledged receipt of MCF’s citation. (The record is unclear whether Sony’s counsel meant the August 19, 2020 e-mailed or regularly mailed citation.) August 24, 2020 is also the date that Williams mailed citation was delivered to Sony.

When MCF and Williams learned they had served simultaneous citations, they each filed adverse claims in their respective cases: Williams’s personal injury case and MCF’s lease breach action.

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court found that based on Supreme Court Rule 12(c), MCF’s electronic service was complete on day of transmission (August 19, 2020) while William’s “snail-mail” service was complete August 21, 2020 – four days after mailing. Because of this, the supplementary proceedings court found that MCF’s citation lien took precedence over Williams’s and ordered Sony to pay MCF (to the exclusion of Williams) until the judgment was satisfied.

The First District’s Reversal

Williams’s key argument on appeal was that she had a superior lien to Kelly’s royalty account as plaintiff’s e-mail citation did not perfect service under the law.

Reversing the trial court, the First District noted that once a citation is served on a judgment debtor, a judgment lien is perfected on all assets of the debtor that are not otherwise exempt under the law. The Court then wrote that when a citation is served on a third party, the judgment liens all assets of the debtor in the third party’s possession or control. A perfected lien is superior to any later-attaching lien. [Para 7]

The Court rejected MCF’s argument that Williams lacked standing to challenge service of MCF’s citation on Sony. It found Williams was not trying to vicariously assert Sony’s right to proper notice of the citations. Instead, Williams was asserting her prior interest in Kelly’s royalty account because Plaintiff’s e-mailed citation did not perfect service of its citation under Illinois law. The Court added that a contrary ruling would deprive any creditor of a chance to assert a paramount lien upon assets in a third-party respondent’s possession and allow a citation respondent to arbitrarily decide priority among competing creditors. [¶ 14]

The Court then analyzed Supreme Court Rule 11’s text to determine if e-mail service can perfect a citation lien. Under a plain reading of the Rule – titled “Manner of Serving Documents Other Than Process and Complaint on Parties Not in Default in the Trial and Reviewing Courts” – the Court found it contemplates e-mail service of documents only after a party has appeared. As a result, Rule 11 does not provide for e-mail service of documents on a party who has not appeared in the case before the court. Here, Sony had not appeared in either underlying case. [¶ 19]

Looking to Black’s Law Dictionary for guidance, the Court defined the “process” referenced in Rule 11’s title as an initiating case document, like a summons or writ, which triggers a party’s duty to respond.

The Court likened a third-party citation to discover assets to a summons. It held that “absent service of the citation, such party has no duty to appear, nor could the court subject such party to the sanctions provided in Section 2-1402 for noncompliance.”

Since the failure to respond to a third-party citation subjects a respondent to the threat of contempt and sanctions, the Court found that supplementary proceedings against a third party like Sony must be accompanied by service of process and statutory special notices. [¶ 20] As a result, MCF’s e-mailed citation was not proper service under Illinois law and did not lien the royalty account. Since Williams mailed her citation to Sony two days before MCF mailed its citation, Williams’s lien on the account trumped MCF’s.

Conclusion

This case illustrates in sharp relief how a judgment creditor plays with proverbial fire by not personally serving a citation (or at least serving it by certified mail – return receipt requested)

Since a citation to discover assets is the opening, operative document that first activates a recipient’s duty to respond, the citation is tantamount to a summons or writ and beyond the scope of Rule 11’s e-mail service provisions.

 

 

When The Unconscionability Doctrine Can Void A Contractual Provision – Illinois Law

I recently litigated the enforceability of a contractual arbitration provision contained in an electrical subcontract for work on a high-end residential project in the Chicago suburbs.  The subcontractor fighting arbitration argued that the clause, drafted by the general contractor, was so one-sided against it, that it was unconscionable under Illinois law. [Among other things, the arbitration provision shifted all costs exclusively to the subcontractor.]. The Court disagreed and found that the challenged clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.

Two cases – one in Illinois, the other in Arizona [and discussed at length in the Illinois case] – figured prominently in the Court’s granting our motion to enforce the arbitration provision and compel arbitration.  Together, the cases (Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 223 Ill.2d 1 (2006), Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) provide a useful gloss on what constitutes procedural and substantive unconscionability in the context of a business-to-business contract.

How many Factors: One, Two or ‘Sliding Scale?’

Earlier case law on unconscionability found that a party had to show both procedural and unconscionability in order to void a contract term.  Other cases apply a “sliding scale” approach – where if a contract term is heavy on substantive unconscionability, it can be light on procedural unconscionability and vice versa.  Kinkel makes clear that either procedural or substantive unconscionability can defeat a given clause.  [The case is silent on whether the sliding scale test is still viable.]

Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural unconscionability question turns on whether the challenged term is so difficult to find or read that the party is essentially unaware of it.  To determine procedural unconscionability, the Court considers, among other things, the disparity in bargaining power between the drafter of the contract and the party contesting a given term, the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract and whether a clause is “hidden in a maze of fine print.” [Kinkel at 23 citing to Frank’s Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill.App.3d 980, 989-90 (1stDist. 1980)]

A court’s procedural unconscionability calculus also looks at the conspicuousness of the challenged clause, the negotiations relating to the contract, and whether the parties had an opportunity to understand the terms of the contract.

In our case, the Court found that the Subcontract’s arbitration clause was not hard to find, read or understand and appeared prominently in the contract’s text.  As a result, the Court found ruled that the arbitration clause was not procedurally infirm.

Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability occurs where the cost of vindicating a claim is so steep that a plaintiff’s only reasonable cost-effective means of obtaining legal relief is as a member of a class action.  The Court’s substantive unconscionability analysis considers [a] the relative fairness of the obligations assumed, [b] whether terms are so one-sided “as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party,” [c] whether there is “an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and [d] a significant cost-price disparity.” [Kinkel at 24]

When determining substantive unconscionability, Illinois courts also looks to the secrecy of a contractual arbitration term – that is,  can parties disclose the existence or result of an arbitration proceeding?  Where a party is contractually obligated to keep arbitration results private, it tips the scale towards substantive unconscionability since this ensures that the pro-arbitration litigant can deny its opponents access to precedent.

In addition, courts are more likely to find unconscionability where a consumer is involved, there is a disparity in bargaining power, and the clause is on a pre-printed form.  Moreover, where a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration provision on the ground that the arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party has the burden to show the likelihood of incurring those costs.

According to the Seventh Circuit, to meet her burden, the party contesting arbitration must provide some individualized evidence to show she will face prohibitive costs in the arbitration and is financially incapable of meeting those costs. [Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir.2003)]

In our case, the Court did find that the arbitration provision in question was one-sided in our favor and against the opponent. [I disagreed; there were multiple pro-subcontractor provisions in the contract as it was exhaustively negotiated prior to its consummation.]  The Court even said that it would never advise a client to agree to it or even itself assent to it. However, the Court quickly [and rightly] noted that its subjective opinion that a contractual clause is perhaps unwise or risky was not the test for substantive unconscionability.

Instead, the crucial question was whether the provision was oppressive, unfairly surprising to the party contesting the term, portrayed an imbalance in obligations and rights or was cost-prohibitive to enforce.  The Court did not find that any of these substantive unconscionability hallmarks applied and granted our motion to compel arbitration. [The subcontractor’s Motion to Reconsider is pending.]

Still another factor leading the court to reject our adversary’s substantive unconscionability argument was the freely bargained-for nature of the arbitration clause.  This was illustrated by the Subcontract’s multiple line-outs and handwritten notes.  The presence of multiple, manual changes revealed that the parties heavily negotiated the terms of the contract.

Take-aways:

Kinkel and the cases it relies on – including Maxwell’s substantive unconscionability formulation, collectively stand for the proposition that a party claiming a contract provision is procedurally or substantively unconscionable bears the burden of establishing the existence of either or both.

Where the parties stand on an equal bargaining footing and there is no consumer nexus to the underlying contract, it is all the more difficult for the party challenging a contract term on the basis of unconscionability.

In the business-to-business setting, assuming the contract at issue isn’t hard to find or understand [and therefore not procedurally unconscionable], the best chance a litigant has of vitiating a contractual arbitration provision is to argue substantive unconscionability: that the term is so one-sided in that it portrays a stark imbalance in rights and obligations and is cost-prohibitive for the party challenging to term to enforce it.  An additional plus-factor is where the arbitration clause is subject to non-disclosure such that neither party can reveal the results of arbitration –  depriving future litigants from accessing precedent.

 

Doctor’s Oral Promise to Retire in Future Not Enough To Sustain Healthcare Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims

In Heartland Women’s Healthcare, Ltd. v. Simonton-Smith, 2021 IL App (5th) 200135-U, the appeals court affirmed summary judgment for an obstetrician sued for fraud based on her alleged verbal promise to retire from her practice at the end of a three-year employment term.

The plaintiff claimed the defendant tricked it into buying her practice by promising to retire. The written agreement resulting from the parties’ negotiations contained neither a non-compete term nor a recital that defendant intended to retire at the agreement’s conclusion.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.  Plaintiff appealed.

Affirming, the Fifth District found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to support its misrepresentation claims and specifically, to show defendant hatched a “scheme to defraud” the plaintiff.

In Illinois, to state a colorable fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false statement of material facts, (2) known or believed to be false by the person making it, (3) an intent to induce a plaintiff to act, (4) action by the plaintiff in justifiable reliance on the truth of the statement, and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from the reliance.

A negligent misrepresentation plaintiff must also establish these elements but instead of showing a knowingly false statement, must prove the defendant (i) was careless or negligent in ascertaining the truth of the statement and (ii) owed a duty to the plaintiff to impart accurate information.

In both a fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claim, the statement must be of an existing or past fact and not merely a promise to do something in the future.  The alleged fraud must also be complete at the time of the challenged statement as opposed to an intention to commit a future fraud.

The ‘Scheme to Defraud’ Exception

Where the false representation of future conduct is the scheme or device employed to accomplish the fraud, a court can restore the parties to the positions they occupied before the fraud was committed.  And while courts make clear that something beyond a lone broken promise is usually required to trigger the scheme exception, that “plus-factor” is still elusive.

Some courts require a plaintiff to allege a sustained pattern of repeated false representations [see HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145 (1989)] while others [Roda v. Berko (401 Ill.335 (1948), Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill.App.3d 1105 (1980)] have held that a single promise can trigger the scheme exception.

In cases that have recognized the exception in the single broken promise setting, the plaintiff must generally produce evidence of a  defendant’s contemporaneous intention not to follow through on the promise.   The cases also make clear that whether a plaintiff is proceeding on a course of conduct scheme theory or one that involves only one promise, it must show the defendant’s fraudulent intent existed at or before the time of the promise. [25]

Here, the plaintiff could not prove the defendant promised to retire while, at the same time, never intending to fulfill that promise at the outset.  For support, the Court quoted both plaintiff’s agent’s and defendant’s deposition testimony.  Both testified that while the defendant’s future retirement was discussed prior to inking the three-year pact, it was never reduced to writing.  The plaintiff also could not pinpoint a definite promise by the defendant to retire when the employment contract lapsed.

As further proof that the defendant never unequivocally promised to retire, the plaintiff’s agent testified he even asked the defendant not to retire and that defendant stay beyondthe employment contract’s end date.  In the end, Plaintiff’s evidence did not go far enough to establish either an oral promise to retire at the agreement’s conclusion or the defendant’s intention not to fulfill that promise.

Afterwords:

In finding for the doctor defendant, the Heartland Women’s Healthcare Court was careful to respect the boundary between contract and tort law damages – a delineation that, in theory at least, prevents every broken promise from undergirding a fraud claim.

And while the content and outer reaches of the scheme to defraud exception [to the rule that a false promise is not actionable fraud] is still murky, it seems that something beyond a one-off broken promise is generally required.  A plaintiff invoking the scheme exception has a better chance of surviving a pleadings motion or summary judgment where it can show a defendant’s pattern of repeated broken promises.

Here, the plaintiff alleged only a single misstatement – defendant’s supposed oral promise to retire at the conclusion of the employment contract.  Without evidence of defendant’s contemporaneous intent not to uphold her promise, there wasn’t enough evidence of a scheme to defraud to survive summary judgment.

In hindsight, the Plaintiff should have negotiated and codified both a non-compete provision and defendant’s imminent retirement as material terms of the contract.