Tag: promissory note

Lender’s Reliance on Predecessor Bank’s Loan Documents Satisfies Business Records Hearsay Rule – IL First Dist.

A commercial guaranty dispute provides the background for the First District’s recent discussion of some signature litigation issues including the voluntary (versus compulsory) payment rule and how that impacts an appeal, the business records hearsay exception, and governing standards for the recovery of attorneys fees.

The lender plaintiff in Northbrook Bank & Trust Co. v. Abbas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162972 sued commercial loan guarantors for about $2M after a loan default involving four properties.
On appeal, the lender argued that the guarantors’ appeal was moot since they paid the judgment. Under the mootness doctrine, courts will not review cases simply to establish precedent or guide future litigation. This rule ensures that an actual controversy exists and that a court can grant effective relief.

A debtor’s voluntary payment of a money judgment prevents the paying party from pursuing an appeal. Compulsory payment, however, will not moot an appeal.
The court found the guarantors’ payment compulsory in view of the lender’s aggressive post-judgment efforts including issuing multiple citations and a wage garnishment and moving to compel the guarantors’ production of documents in the citation proceeding. Faced with these post-judgment maneuvers, the Court found the payment compulsory and refused to void the appeal. (⁋⁋ 24-27)

The First District then affirmed the trial court’s admission of the lender’s business records into evidence over the defendant’s hearsay objection.  To admit business records into evidence, the proponent (here, the plaintiff) must lay a proper foundation by showing the records were made (1) in the regular course of business, and (2) at or near the time of the event or occurrence. Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) allows “records of regularly conducted activity” into evidence where (I) a record is made at or near the time, (ii) by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (iii) if kept in the regular course of business and (iv) where it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the record as shown by the custodian’s or other qualified witness’s testimony.

The theory on which business records are generally admissible is that their purpose is to aid in the proper transaction of business and the records are useless unless accurate. Because the accuracy of business records is vital to any functioning commercial enterprise, “the motive for following a routine of accuracy is great and motive to falsify nonexistent.” [¶¶ 47-48]

With computer-generated business records, the evidence’s proponent must establish (i) the equipment used is industry standard, (ii) the entries were made in the regular course of business, (iii) at or near the time of the transaction, and (iv) the sources of information, method and time of preparation indicate the entries’ trustworthiness. Significantly, the person offering the business records into evidence (either at trial or via affidavit) isn’t required to have personally entered the data into the computer or even learn of the records before the litigation started. A witness’s lack of personal knowledge concerning the creation of business records affects the weight of the evidence; not its admissibility. [¶ 50]

Here, the plaintiff’s loan officer testified he oversaw defendants’ account, that he personally reviewed the entire loan history as part of his job duties and authenticated copies of the subject loan records. In its totality, the Court viewed the bank officer’s testimony as sufficient to admit the loan records into evidence.

Next, the Court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the lender plaintiff. Illinois follows the ‘American rule’: each party pays its own fees unless there is a contract or statutory provision providing for fee-shifting. If contractual fee language is unambiguous, the Court will enforce it as written.

A trial court’s attorneys’ fee award must be reasonable based on, among other things, (i) the nature and complexity of the case, (ii) an attorney’s skill and standing, (iii) degree of responsibility required, (iv) customary attorney charges in the locale of the petitioning party, and (v) nexus between litigation and fees charged. As long as the petitioner presents a detailed breakdown of fees and expenses, the opponent has a chance to present counter-evidence, and the court can make a reasonableness determination, an evidentiary hearing isn’t required.

Afterwords:

Abbas presents a useful, straightforward summary of the business records hearsay exception, attorneys’ fees standards and how payment of a judgment impacts a later right to appeal that judgment.

The case also illustrates how vital getting documents into evidence in breach of contract cases and the paramount importance of clear prevailing party fee provisions in written agreements.

 

Appeals Court Gives Teeth to “Good Faith” Requirement of Accord and Satisfaction Defense

A common cautionary tale recounted in 1L contracts classes involves the crafty debtor who secretly short-pays a creditor by noting  “payment in full” on his check. According to the classic “gotcha” vignette, the debtor’s devious conduct forever bars the unwitting creditor from suing the debtor.

Whether apocryphal or not (like the one about the newly minted lawyer who accidentally brought weed into the courthouse and forever lost his license after less than 3 hours of practice) the fact pattern neatly illustrates the accord and satisfaction rule.

Accord and satisfaction applies where a creditor and debtor have a legitimate dispute over amounts owed on a note (or other payment document) and the parties agree on an amount (the “accord”) the debtor can pay (the “satisfaction”) to resolve the disputed claim.

Piney Ridge Associates v. Ellington, 2017 IL App (3d) 160764-U reads like a first year contracts “hypo” come to life as it reflects the perils of creditor’s accepting partial payments where the payor recites “payment in full” on a check.

Piney Ridge’s plaintiff note buyer sued the defendant for defaulting on a 1993 promissory note. The defendant moved to dismiss because he wrote “payment in full” under the check endorsement line. The trial court agreed with the defendant that plaintiff’s acceptance of the check was an accord and satisfaction that defeated plaintiff’s suit.

The 3rd District appeals court reversed; it stressed that a debtor’s duplicitous conduct won’t support an accord and satisfaction defense.

Under Illinois law, an accord and satisfaction is a contractual method of discharging a debt: the accord is the parties’ agreement; the satisfaction is the execution of the agreement.

In deciding whether a transaction amounts to an accord and satisfaction, the court focuses on the parties’ intent.

Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (which applies to negotiable instruments) a debtor who relies on the accord and satisfaction defense must prove (1) he/she tendered payment in good faith as full satisfaction of a claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute; and (3) the claimant obtained payment from the debtor. 810 ILCS 5/3-311(a).

Good faith means honesty in fact and observing “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The debtor must also provide the creditor with a conspicuous statement that the debtor’s payment is tendered in full satisfaction of a claim. (⁋12)(810 ILCS 5/3-311(a), (b)). Without an honest dispute, there is no accord and satisfaction. (⁋ 14)

A debtor who fails to act in good faith cannot bind a creditor to an accord and satisfaction. Case examples of a court refusing to find an accord and satisfaction include defendants who, despite clearly marking their payment as “in full”, paid less than 10% of a workers’ compensation lien in one case, and in another, paid less than half the plaintiff’s total invoice amount and lied to the plaintiff’s agent about past payments. (⁋⁋ 13, 14)(citing to Fremarek v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 272 Ill.App.3d 1067 (1995); and McMahon Food Corp. v. Burger Dairy Co., 103 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996).

Applying this good faith requirement, the Court noted that the defendant paid $354 to the plaintiff at the time the defendant admittedly owed over $10,000 (defendant sent a pre-suit letter to the prior noteholder conceding he owed $10,000 on the note). The Court held that this approximately $7,600 shortfall clearly did not meet accord and satisfaction’s good faith component.

Bullet-points:

  • Accord and satisfaction requires good faith on the payor’s part and a court won’t validate debtor subterfuge.
  • Where the amount paid “in full” is dwarfed by the uncontested claim amount, the Court won’t find an accord and satisfaction.
  • Where there is no legitimate dispute concerning a debt’s existence and amount, there can be no accord and satisfaction.

 

 

Ten-Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Demand Promissory Note: Three-Year ‘SOL’ For Negotiable Instruments Does Not

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Advanced Credit, Inc. v. Linares, 2012 IL App (1st) 121574-U is a fairly recent case illustration of what happens when two statutes of limitation with widely varying time lengths potentially govern the same case.

The defendant in Linares signed a promissory note in 2002 that was payable to the defendant “upon demand.”

The plaintiff payee of the note made a demand for payment in 2004 which the defendant ignored.  Plaintiff sued six years later (in 2010) to recover on the note and sought interest, fees and costs.

Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the three-year limitations period  governing negotiable instruments time-barred the complaint. (See 810 ILCS 5/3-104, 3-118.)  The plaintiff argued that the ten-year time to sue on demand promissory notes (735 ILCS 5/13-206) applied and so the suit was timely.  The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the suit.  The plaintiff payee appealed.

Held: Reversed.  The ten-year statute, not the three-year one, applies to the demand promissory note.

Rules/Reasoning:

A note that is “payable on demand” is a demand note and is due and payable immediately upon execution.  810 ILCS 5/3-108.  A claim against the maker of a demand note accrues on the date the note is issued.

Code Section 13-206 provides for a ten-year limitations period for promissory notes and for demand notes.  Under this statute, a demand note plaintiff is barred if the note maker pays no note interest or principal for a period of 10 continuous years and no demand is made during that time.

Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-118(g) applies a 3-year limitations period for actions based on, among other things, negotiable instruments (example: a check).

Section 3-104(a) of the UCC defines a negotiable instrument as

(i) an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money;

(ii) that’s  payable to order or to bearer at the time it (the instrument) is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(iii) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(iv) states no undertakings or instructions other than the payment of money.

Where two limitations period govern the same subject matter, the more specific one applies.  Here, since Code Section 13-206 specifically references “demand promissory notes” and UCC Section 3-104 doesn’t, the 10-year statute of limitations (“SOL”) governs.

The Note accrual date was 2004 when the plaintiff made demand for payment.  Since the plaintiff sued in 2010 – some six years later – it was within the 10-year limitations period for demand promissory notes under Section 13-206.

Afterwords:

A pretty straightforward application of conflicting limitations period rules.  The ten-year period for demand notes more specifically applied over the UCC’s three-year catchall provision.

When defending a promissory note case, I look for earmarks of negotiability (payable to order, at specific time, for specific amount) so I can argue the shorter three-year limitations period (of 3-118) applies.  When representing the note plaintiff/payee, I try to show the 10-year SOL applies and particularly look for any reference to “on demand” or “upon demand” in the text of the note.  This language will signal that a demand note is involved and mean the longer SOL governs.