Mechanics’ Lien Claim Defeated Where Contractor Fails to Provide Proper Contractor Affidavit

Pyramid Development, LLC v. DuKane Precast, 2014 IL App (2d) 131131, vividly illustrates the importance of diligent record-keeping practices on construction projects and the dire financial consequences that can flow from a failure to do so.  It emphasizes how crucial it is for a contractor to comply with Section 5 of the mechanic’s lien act – 770 ILCS 60/5 (the “Act”) – the section that requires a contractor to give the owner a sworn statement that lists all persons providing labor and materials on a project.

The plaintiff contractor sued to foreclose a mechanics lien on several townhomes it was hired to build and also sued a subcontractor for defective concrete work supplied to the project.  After a bench trial, the court nullified the lien because it was negated by damage to the property.  Plaintiff appealed.

Result: Plaintiff’s lien is defeated because it didn’t comply with Section  5.

Reasons:

– The purpose of the Section 5 affidavit is to put the owner on notice of subcontractor claims;

– An owner has the right to rely and act upon a contractor’s section 5 affidavit unless the owner has reason to suspect the notice is false or knows that it’s false;

– An owner is protected from subcontractor claims where they’re not listed on the contractor’s affidavit unless the owner knows of the subcontractor omissions or has colluded with the contractor to exclude the subcontractors;

– Section 5 provides that it’s the owner’s duty to ask for and the contractor’s obligation to supply a sworn statement listing all parties furnishing lienable work on the property and the amounts owed to them;

– Where an owner doesn’t request a Section 5 affidavit, the contractor isn’t required to provide one;

– An owner’s previous acceptance of a flawed Section 5 affidavit doesn’t waive the contractor’s compliance with that section. (i.e., Just because an owner has accepted deficient affidavits in the past, doesn’t mean the contractor doesn’t have to comply with Section 5, e.g.)

(¶¶ 26-29).

Here, the property owner had a pattern of accepting faulty Section 5 affidavits. The plaintiff’s principal admitted that the names and amounts on the affidavits were often wrong and the amounts inflated.  Plaintiff also conceded that it routinely named itself as a subcontractor when it didn’t actually do any of the work on the townhomes.

The court held that since the plaintiff’s section 5 affidavits were facially erroneous, the lien claim was properly defeated.

The court also affirmed judgment against the plaintiff on its breach of contract claim. In a breach of contract suit involving construction services, a contractor is held to the “substantial performance” standard: he must perform in a workmanlike manner and a failure to do so is a breach of contract. (¶ 35).

A breach of contract plaintiff must also prove money damages.  And while he doesn’t have to do so with mathematical certainty, he still must offer some basis from which the court can compute the damage with reasonable probability. (¶ 37).

Here, the plaintiff didn’t meet his burden of proving damages.  Its record-keeping was scatter-shot and rife with discrepancies.  The plaintiff’s numbers didn’t match up and it couldn’t explain myriad invoice errors at trial.  This failure to carry its burden of proving damages doomed the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

Take-aways:

Accurate record-keeping is essential; especially on high dollar projects with multiple contractors;

Where an owner requests a section 5 affidavit, the contractor must supply one;

An Owner’s past acceptance of a faulty affidavit won’t excuse contractors duty to strictly adhere to section 5.

Two-Year Continuous Employment Rule to Support Non-Compete Validated by Illinois Appeals Court

Fifield v. Premier, 2013 IL App (1st) 120327 is rightly regarded as a watershed case in Illinois employment and non-compete law circles for squarely stating that two years of continuous employment is the required consideration to support a non-compete agreement in an at-will setting.

Prairie Rheumatology Associates, SC v. Francis, 2014 IL App (3d) 140338 represents an appeals court’s recent validation of the two-year rule in the context of a medical practice suing to prevent one of its former physician employees from competing against it.

The plaintiff medical company and the doctor defendant entered into an at-will employment contract (it could be terminated by either side at any time) that contained a 2-year and 14-mile non-compete term. The defendant agreed not to perform competing medical services for 2 years and within 14 miles of the plaintiff’s office measured from the date defendant’s employment ceased and the physical office location.

19 months into her tenure, defendant quit and went to work for a medical services firm located nine miles from plaintiff’s office. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the non-compete. The trial court entered an injunction that prevented the defendant from treating plaintiff’s current patients but allowed defendant to treat patients that belonged to her before she started working for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

Held: reversed. Non-compete lacks consideration and is not enforceable.

Reasons:

In Illinois, a post-employment restrictive covenant (like a non-compete agreement) is enforceable only where it is reasonable in geographic and temporal scope (“space and time”) and necessary to protect a legitimate employer interest.  A restrictive covenant is reasonable where (1) it’s no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest, (2) it doesn’t impose an undue hardship on the employee, and (3) isn’t injurious to the public. (¶ 12).  But before the court analyzes these three factors, it must first determine whether the restrictive covenant is supported by consideration.

The reason for the consideration rule is because an employer’s promise of continued employment is often illusory in an at-will relationship since the employer can fire the employee at any time without warning.  Two years or more of continued employment constitutes adequate consideration in the non-compete setting and the two-year rule applies even where the employee resigns on his own instead of where he is fired.  (¶¶ 14-15).

Here, the defendant resigned 19 months after her employment commenced – five months short of the required two-year consideration period. As a result, the court declined to enforce the non-compete.

The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that it gave the defendant “additional consideration” in the form of marketing support and facilitating defendant’s hospital privileges. Looking at the evidence, the court found plaintiff gave defendant minimal assistance in obtaining hospital privileges and failed to introduce defendant to any referral sources as was promised. At the injunction hearing, plaintiff’s principal couldn’t name a single doctor to whom she introduced defendant during defendant’s time practicing at plaintiff’s office.  (¶¶ 18-19).

Afterwords:

This case cements rule that two years of continuous employment is required for there to be adequate consideration to enforce a post-employment non-compete term.  An employer can possibly get around this by offering additional consideration (i.e., something the employee is otherwise not entitled to).  But where the employer cannot offer evidence of the additional consideration, the two-year rule controls and will bar enforcement of the non-compete.

Saying “I Wasn’t Served” Not Enough to Challenge Service Return On Corp. Registered Agent – IL Law

In Charles Austin, Ltd. v. A-1 Food Services, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132384, the First District affirmed the denial of a corporate defendant’s Section 2-1401 motion to vacate a judgment.

About three months after judgment, the defendant sought to vacate the judgment claiming it was never served with the lawsuit.  The trial court denied the motion leaving the judgment intact.

Q: Why?

A:  

1/ A party can serve a private corporation by leaving the complaint and summons with the registered agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere in the State. 735 ILCS 5/2-204;

2/ An affidavit of service is prima facie proof of proper service and the court will indulge every presumption in favor of finding that service was proper;

3/ To attack service, the moving party must produce evidence that casts doubt on the return of service by clear and convincing evidence;

4/ A conclusory affidavit that merely says “I was never served” isn’t sufficient to refute a return of service.  ¶ 16.

Here, the defendant’s affidavit saying he didn’t recall receiving the plaintiff’s complaint wasn’t enough to contest service on the corporation.  A defendant’s bare assertion that it doesn’t remember receiving a summons and complaint is not the kind of evidence required to impeach a facially valid service return. ¶ 19.

In Illinois, to vacate a judgment more than 30 days old,  a petitioner must show (1) the existence of a meritorious defense, (2) due diligence in presenting the defense in the underlying claim, and due diligence in filing the 2-1401 petition.

The defendant failed to show a meritorious defense.  The plaintiff alleged the predecessor corporation secretly sold its assets to the defendant – the acquiring entity – while the litigation was pending and did so to elude the debt to the plaintiff.  A well-known exception to the general rule that a successor corporation doesn’t assume the debts of a corporate predecessor is where the seller engages in a fraudulent transaction to avoid the seller’s contract obligations.

Here, the court found that the fraud exception to the rule against successor liability applied.

The court found that plaintiff sufficiently pled under Illinois fact-pleading rules that the sale of the predecessor’s assets to the defendant was fraudulent and done for the purpose of evading the plaintiff’s contract rights.  As a result, the meritorious defense argument failed.  ¶¶ 28-37.

The defendant also failed to establish due diligence in raising its defenses to the underlying breach of contract suit.  The court noted the defendant’s registered agent was served with process in October 2012, the judgment entered in January 2013, the defendant’s bank account was liened in May 2013 and it didn’t file its 2-1401 motion until June 2013.

The eight month delay in responding to the lawsuit signaled its lack of diligence in defending the suit.

Take-aways:

– To challenge service, a defendant must do more than blanketly allege that he doesn’t recall receiving a pleading;

– If a plaintiff alleges factual basis for his claim, the defendant trying to vacate a default judgment will have difficulty meeting 2-1401’s meritorious defense element.