Contractual Indemnity Clause May Apply to Direct Action in Bond Offering Snafu; No Joint-Work Copyright Protection for PPM – IL ND

The Plaintiff in UIRC-GSA Holdings, Inc. v. William Blair & Company, 2017 WL 3706625 (N.D.Ill. 2017), sued its investment banker for copyright infringement and professional negligence claiming the banker used the plaintiff’s protected intellectual property – private placement memoranda – to get business from other clients.  The parties previously executed an engagement agreement (“Agreement”) which required the banker to facilitate plaintiff’s purchase of real estate through bond issues.

The banker denied infringing plaintiff’s copyrights and counterclaimed for breach of contract, contractual indemnity and tortious interference with contract.  Plaintiff moved to dismiss all counterclaims.

In partially granting and denying the (12(b)(6)) motion to dismiss the counterclaims, the Northern District examined the pleading elements for joint-author copyright infringement and tortious interference claims and considered the reach of contractual indemnification provisions.

The counterclaiming banker first asserted that it was a joint owner of the private placement documents and sought an accounting of the plaintiff’s profits generated through use of the materials.  Rejecting this argument, the Court stated the Copyright’s definition of a ‘joint work’: “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that the authors’ work be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. 101.

To establish co-authorship, the copyright plaintiff must establish (1) an intent to create a joint work, and (2) independently copyrightable contributions to the material.  The intent prong simply means the two (or more) parties intended to work together to create a single product; not that they specifically agreed to be legal co-copyright holders.

To meet the independently copyrightable element (the test’s second prong), the Court noted that “ideas, refinements, and suggestions” are not copyrightable.  Instead, the contributed work must possess a modicum of creativity vital to a work’s end product and commercial viability.

Here, while the counter-plaintiff alleged an intent to create a joint work, it failed to allege any specific contributions to the subject private placement documents.  Without specifying any copyrightable contributions to the documents, the investment firm failed to satisfy the pleading standards for a joint ownership copyright claim.

The court next considered the banker’s indemnification claim – premised on indemnity (one party promises to compensate another for any loss) language in the Agreement. The provision broadly applied to all claims against the counter-plaintiff arising from or relating to the Agreement.  The plaintiff argued that by definition, the indemnity language didn’t apply to direct actions between the parties and only covered third-party claims (claims brought by someone other than plaintiff or defendant).

The Court rejected this argument and found the indemnity language ambiguous.  The discrepancy between the Agreement’s expansive indemnification language in one section and other Agreement sections that spoke to notice requirements and duties to defend made it equally plausible the indemnity clause covered both third-party and first-party/direct actions.  Because of this textual conflict, the Court held it was premature to dismiss the claim without discovery on the parties’ intent.

The court also sustained the banker’s tortious interference counterclaim against plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.  The counter-plaintiff alleged the plaintiff sued and threatened to continue suing one of the counter-plaintiff’s clients (and a competitor of the plaintiff’s) to stop the client from competing with the plaintiff in the bond market.  While the act of filing a lawsuit normally won’t support a tortious interference claim, where a defendant threatens litigation to dissuade someone from doing business with a plaintiff can state a tortious interference claim.

Take-aways:

Contractual indemnity provisions are construed like any other contract.  If the text is clear, it will be enforced as written.  In drafting indemnity clauses, the parties should take pains to clarify whether it applies only to third-party claims or if it also covers direct actions between the parties.  Otherwise, the parties risk having to pay the opposing litigant’s defense fees.

Filing a lawsuit alone, isn’t enough for a tortious interference claim.  However, the threat of litigation to dissuade someone from doing business with another can be sufficient business interference to support such a claim.

Joint ownership in copyrighted materials requires both an intent for joint authorship and copyrightable contributions from each author to merit legal protection.

 

‘Salesy’ LinkedIn Posts Can Violate Ex-Employee’s Noncompete – Minn. Federal Court

In July 2017, a Federal court in Minnesota grappled with the in-vogue issue of whether a former employee violates post-employment nonsolicitation provisions by asking her network for business on LinkedIn.

The warring factions in Mobile Mini v. Vevea, (see here) are direct competitors in the portable storage business.  Plaintiff sued when the defendant, a former sales representative for plaintiff, went to work for a competitor in violation of noncompete requirements in her employment agreement.  After the defendant posted on LinkedIn where she was working and requested viewers to call her for quote, the Plaintiff sued.

Partially granting the request for an injunction, the Court examined the pleading and proof elements for injunctive relief and whether a social media post can support a nonsolicitation violation.

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs preliminary injunctions.  The moving party must establish: (1) the likelihood of the moving party’s success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party; (3) the state of balance between the alleged irreparable harm and the harm that granting the injunction would inflict on the other party; and (4) how the public interest is impacted if an injunction does/doesn’t issue.  The critical question on a request for an injunction is whether a Court should “intervene to preserve the status quo” until it determines the merits of the case.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court found plaintiff’s prospects for winning on the merits were strong.  To prevail on a non-compete claim in Delaware (Delaware law governed the parties’ agreement), a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a valid, enforceable contract; (2) breach of a contractual obligation by the defendant; and (3) damages.

A Delaware non-compete agreement is valid if it its duration and geographic reach are reasonably limited and the non-compete’s purpose and effect is to protect a legitimate employer interest. The Court found the subject agreement met these requirements

Next, the court turned to defendant’s LinkedIn activity and whether that amounted to a breach of the employment agreement.  The Court found the plaintiff breached the contract by making “two blatant sales pitches” for her new employer before the noncompete lapsed.

The court viewed the defendant’s solicitations as going further than simple status updates.  It held that had defendant simply posted her new position and contact information, it likely wouldn’t have run afoul of the defendant’s employment contract. For support, the Court pointed to an Ohio Federal court and a Mass. state court which held that a defendant’s social media postings did not rise to the level of an actionable noncompete claim. See Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Anthony, 2016 WL 4523104, at *15 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (press release posted on LinkedIn and Twitter announcing that an employer had hired a new employee was not a solicitation); Invidia, LLC v. DiFonzo, 2012 WL 5576406, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2012) (hair stylist’s Facebook post announcing new job not a solicitation).

Since the defendant’s purpose in her LinkedIn postings was to entice business from her network and not simply announce a job change, the Court held that defendant likely violated the the employment contract.

Other Injunctive Relief Factors

The Court then found the plaintiff satisfied the irreparable harm element.  It noted defendant’s past and threatened future noncompete violations and that they could imperil plaintiff’s future customers, goodwill and reputation.

On the noncompete’s start date (the plaintiff wanted the court to reset the time to the date of the court’s order on the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion – several months after suit was filed), the court sided with the defendant.  The Court agreed that restarting the clock would give the plaintiff a windfall and impede defendant’s ability to earn a living.

Take-aways:

This case is instructive on how the line between digital self-promotion and blatant sales pitches can blur.  One of the case’s chief lessons is that while noncompetes are not favored,  social media posts can still violate post-employment restrictions.  Those who sign noncompetes should be careful whether their post-employment LinkedIn posts can objectively be viewed as a sales pitch.

 

 

Truthful Information Can’t Support An Intentional Interference With Employment Suit – IL Court

 

 

The Illinois First District recently discussed the contours of pre-suit discovery requests in cases that implicate fee speech concerns and whether truthful information can ever support an intentional interference with employment claim.

After relocating from another state to take a compliance role with a large bank, the plaintiff in Calabro v. Northern Trust Corporation, 2017 IL App (1st) 163079-U, was fired after only two weeks on the job for failing to disclose his forced removal from a prior compliance position.

When the defendant refused to identify the person who informed it of plaintiff’s prior firing, plaintiff sued to unearth the informant’s identity.  Plaintiff planned to sue that person for intentional interference with plaintiff’s employment contract.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s petition for pre-suit discovery and the plaintiff appealed.

Affirming, the Court construed pre-suit discovery request under Supreme Court Rule 224 narrowly.  That rule allows a petitioner to discover the identity of someone who may be responsible in damages to petitioner.

To initiate a request for discovery under Rule 224, the petitioner files a verified petition that names as defendant the person(s) from whom discovery is sought and states why discovery (along with a description of the discovery sought) is necessary.  An order granting a Rule 224 petition is limited to allowing the plaintiff to learn the identity of the responsible party or to at least depose him/her.

To show that discovery is necessary, the petitioner must present sufficient allegations of actionable harm to survive a Section 2-615 motion to dismiss.  That is, the petition must state sufficient facts to state a recognized cause of action.

But Rule 224 limits discovery to the identity of someone who may be responsible to the petitioner.  A petitioner cannot use Rule 224 to engage in a “vague and speculative quest to determine whether a cause of action actually exists.”

Here, the petitioner didn’t know what was actually said by the third party who alerted defendant to petitioner’s prior compliance role ouster.  The Court viewed this as petitioner’s tacit admission he didn’t know whether he possessed a valid interference claim.

The Court then focused on the veracity of the third-party’s statement.  To be actionable, an intentional interference claim requires the supply of false data about a plaintiff.  Accurate and truthful information, no matter how harmful, cannot underlie an intentional interference action. This is because allowing someone to sue another for imparting truthful information would raise First Amendment problems and discourage dissemination of accurate facts.

Truthful statement immunity is also supported by Section 772 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which makes clear that one who purposely causes another not to perform a contract or enter into a business relationship is not liable for improper interference where that person gives truthful information.  And while the Court pointed out that the Restatement hadn’t been formally adopted the Illinois Supreme Court, appeals courts still looked to the Restatement for guidance on tortious interference questions.  (¶¶ 18-19).

Afterwords:

This case portrays an interesting application of Rule 224 – a device often employed in the personal injury context instead of in the commercial or employment law arenas.  While the rule provides a valuable tool for plaintiffs trying to identify possible defendants, it doesn’t give a petitioner a blank check to engage in wide-ranging, “fishing expedition” requests.  The discovery petitioner must still state a colorable claim as a precondition to obtaining a pre-suit discovery order from the court.

Calabro also vaunts the importance of free speech in our society.  After all, the petitioner’s intentional interference claim was predicated on a true statement – the petitioner was fired from a former compliance role.  The Court makes clear that a valid interference action requires a false statement and that accurate information isn’t actionable interference.

Clearly, the Court viewed the potential for chilling truthful information as more concerning than an individual’s private contract rights with an employer.