In Sienna Court Condominium Association v. Champion Aluminum Corporation, 2017 IL App (1st) 143364, the First District addressed two important issues of common law and statutory corporate law. It first considered when a property owner could sue the subcontractor of a defunct general contractor where there was no contractual relationship between the owner and subcontractor and then examined when a defunct limited liability company (LLC) could file a lawsuit in the LLC’s name.
The plaintiff condo association sued the developer, general contractor (“GC”) and subcontractors for various building defects. The subcontractors moved to dismiss the association’s claims on the ground that they couldn’t be liable for breaching the implied warranty of habitability if the plaintiff has possible recourse from the defunct GC’s insurer.
The trial court denied the subcontractors’ motion and they appealed.
Affirming denial of the subcontractors’ motions, the First District considered whether a homeowner’s implied warranty claim could proceed against the subcontractors of an insolvent GC where (1) the plaintiff had a potential source of recovery from the GC’s insurer or (2) the plaintiff had already recovered monies from a warranty fund specifically earmarked for warranty claims.
The court answered “yes” (plaintiff’s suit can go forward against the subs) on both counts. It held that when deciding whether a plaintiff can sue a subcontractor for breach of implied warranty of habitability, the focus is whether or not the GC is insolvent; not whether plaintiff can possibly recover (or even has recovered) from an alternate source (like a dissolved GC’s insurer).
For precedential support, the Court looked to 1324 W. Pratt Condominium Ass’n v. Platt Construction Group, 2013 IL App (1st) 130744 where the First District allowed a property buyer’s warranty claims versus a subcontractor where the general contractor was in good corporate standing and had some assets. The court held that an innocent purchaser can sue a sub where the builder-seller is insolvent.
In the implied warranty of habitability context, insolvency means a party’s liabilities exceed its assets and the party has stopped paying debts in the ordinary course of its business. (¶¶ 89-90). And under Pratt’s “emphatic language,” the relevant inquiry is GC’s insolvency, not plaintiff’s “recourse”.¶ 94
Sienna Court noted that assessing the viability of an owner’s implied warranty claim against a subcontractor under the “recourse” standard is difficult since there are conceivably numerous factual settings and arguments that could suggest plaintiff has “recourse.” The court found the insolvency test more workable and more easily applied then the amorphous recourse standard. (¶ 96).
Next, the Court considered the chronological outer limit for a dissolved LLC to file a civil lawsuit. The GC dissolved in 2010 and filed counterclaims in 2014. The trial court ruled that the 2014 counterclaims were too late and time-barred them.
The appeals court affirmed. It noted that Section 35-1 of the Illinois LLC Act (805 ILCS 180/1-1 et seq.) provides that an LLC which “is dissolved, and, unless continued pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 35-3, its business must be wound up,” upon the occurrence of certain events, including “Administrative dissolution under Section 35-25.” 805 ILCS 180/35-1
While Illinois’ Business Corporation Act of 1993 specifies that a dissolved corporation may pursue civil remedies only up to five years after the date of dissolution (805 ILCS 5/12.80 (West 2014)), the LLC Act is silent on when a dissolved LLC’s right to sue expires. Section 35-4(c) only says “a person winding up a limited liability company’s business may preserve the company’s business or property as a going concern for a reasonable time”
The Court opted for a cramped reading of Section 35-4’s reasonable time language. In viewing the LLC Act holistically, the Court found that the legislature contemplated LLC’s having a finite period of time to wind up its affairs including bringing any lawsuits. Based on its restrictive interpretation of Section 35-4, the Court held the almost four-year gap between the GC’s dissolution (2010) and counterclaim filing (2014) did not constitute a reasonable time.
Sienna Court emphasizes that a general contractor’s insolvency – not potential recourse – is the dominant inquiry in considering a property owner’s implied warranty of habitability claim against a subcontractor where the general contractor is out of business and there is no privity of contract between the owner and subcontractor.
The case also gives some definition to Section 35-4 of the LLC Act’s “reasonable time” standard for a dissolved LLC to sue on pre-dissolution claims. In this case, the Court found that waiting four years after dissolution to file counterclaims was too long.