LLC Stopped From Selling Member’s Residence In Violation of Prior Charging Order – Utah Federal Court

Q: Can A Court Stop An LLC That Pays the Monthly Mortgage of One of Its Members From Selling that Member’s Home Where A Charging Order Has Issued Against the LLC to Enforce a Money Judgment Against the LLC Member?

A: Yes.

Q2: How So?

A2: By selling the member’s property and paying off the member’s mortgage with the sale proceeds, the LLC is effectively “paying the member” to the exclusion of the plaintiff judgment creditor.

Source: Earthgrains Baking Companies, Inc. v. Sycamore Family Bakery, Inc., et al, USDC Utah 2015 (https://casetext.com/case/earthgrains-baking-cos-v-sycamore-family-bakery-inc-3)

In this case, the plaintiff won a multi-million dollar money judgment against a corporate and individual defendant in a trademark dispute.  The plaintiff then secured a charging order against a LLC of which the individual defendant was a 48% member.  When the LLC failed to respond to the charging order, the plaintiff moved for an order of contempt against the LLC and sought to stop the LLC from selling the defendant’s home.

The court granted the contempt motion.  First, the court found that it had jurisdiction over the LLC.  The LLC argued that Utah lacked jurisdiction over it since the LLC was formed in Nevada.  The LLC claimed that under the “internal affairs” doctrine, the state of the LLC’s formation – Nevada – governs legal matters concerning the LLC.

Disagreeing, the court noted that a LLC’s internal affairs are limited only to “matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”  The internal affairs doctrine does not apply to claims of third party creditors.  Here, since the plaintiff was a creditor of the LLC’s member, this was not a dispute between LLC and member.  As a result, the internal affairs rule didn’t apply and the Utah court had jurisdiction over the LLC since a LLC member lived in Utah.  (See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)).

The Charging Order required the LLC to pay any distribution that would normally go to the member directly to the plaintiff until the money judgment was satisfied.  The Charging Order specifically mentions transfers characterized or designated as payment for defendant’s “loans,” among other things.

The LLC was making monthly mortgage payments on the member’s home and listed the home for sale in the amount of $4M.  Plaintiff wanted to prevent the sale since there was a prior $2M mortgage on the home.

In blocking the sale, the court found that if the LLC sold the member’s home and paid off the member’s mortgage lender with the proceeds, this would violate the Charging Order since it would constitute an indirect payment to the member.  The court deemed any payoff of the member’s mortgage a “distribution” (a direct or indirect transfer of money or property from LLC to member) under the Utah’s LLC Act. (Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(5)(a)).

Since the Charging Order provided that any loan payments involving the member were to be paid to the plaintiff until the judgment is satisfied, the court found that to allow the LLC to sell the property and disburse the proceeds to a third party (the lender) would harm the plaintiff in its ability to satisfy the judgment.

Afterwords:

An interesting case that discusses the intricacies of charging orders and the thorny questions that arise when trying to figure out where to sue an LLC that has contacts in several states.  The case portrays a court willing to give an expansive interpretation of what constitutes an indirect distribution from an LLC to its member. 

Earthgrains also reflects a court endeavoring to protect a creditor’s judgment rights where an LLC and its member appear to be engaging in misdirection (if not outright deception) in order to elude the creditor.

[A special thanks to attorney and Forbes contributor Jay Adkisson for alerting me to this case (http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/)]

 

Non-Shareholder Can Be Liable On Alter-Ego and Veil Piercing Theory – IL Bankruptcy Court

Buckley v. Abuzir  will likely be viewed as a watershed in piercing the corporate veil litigation because of its exhaustive analysis of when a non-shareholder can be personally liable for corporate debts.  In that case, the court provides an extensive survey of how nearly every jurisdiction in the country has decided the non-shareholder piercing question.

In re Tolomeo, 2015 WL 5444129 (N.D.Ill. 2015) considers the related question of whether a creditor can pierce the corporate veil of entities controlled by a debtor non-shareholder so that those entities’ assets become part of the debtors’ bankruptcy estate.

The answer: “yes.”  In their complaint, the creditors sought a determination that three companies owned by the debtor’s wife but controlled by the debtor were the debtors’ alter-egos.  The creditors of the debtor also sought to pierce the companies’ corporate veils so that the companies’ assets would be considered part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  This would have the salutary effect of providing more funds for distribution to the various creditors.  After striking the debtor’s defenses to the complaint, the court granted the creditors motion for judgment on the pleadings. In doing so, the bankruptcy court applied some fundamental piercing principles to the situation where an individual debtor controls several companies even though he is not a nominal shareholder of the companies.

In Illinois, a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. However, this separateness will be disregarded where limited liability would defeat a strong equitable claim of a corporate creditor.

A party who seeks to set aside corporate liability protection on an alter-ego basis must make the two-part showing that (1) the company was so controlled and manipulated that it was a mere instrumentality of another entity or individual; and (2) misuse of the corporate form would promote fraud or injustice.

The mere instrumentality factors include (a) inadequate capitalization, (b) a failure to issue stock, (c) failure to observe corporate formalities, (d) nonpayment of dividends, (e) insolvency of the debtor corporation, (f) nonfunctioning officers or directors, (g) lack of corporate records, (h) commingling of funds, (i) diversion of assets from the corporation by or to a shareholder, (j) failure to maintain arm’s length relationships among related entities; and (k) the corporation being a mere façade for the dominant shareholders.

Promotion of injustice (factor (2) above)), in the veil piercing context, requires less than a showing of fraud but something more than the prospect of an unsatisfied judgment.

The court echoed Buckley and found that the corporate veil can be pierced to reach the assets of an individual even where he is not a shareholder, officer, director or employee.

The key question is whether a person exercises “equitable ownership and control” over a corporation to such an extent that there’s no demarcation between the corporation and the individual.  According to the court, making shareholder status a prerequisite for piercing liability elevates form over substance.

Applying these standards, the court found the circumstances ripe for piercing. The debtor controlled the three entities as he handled the day-to-day operations of the companies. He also freely shifted money between the entities and regularly paid his personal bills from company bank accounts. Finally, the court noted an utter lack of corporate records and threadbare compliance with rudimentary formalities. Taken together, the court found that the factors weighed in favor of finding that the three companies were the debtor’s alter-egos and the three entities should be considered part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Take-aways:

1/ A defendant’s status as a corporate shareholder will not dictate whether or not his assets can be reached in an alter-ego or veil piercing setting.

2/ If non-shareholder sufficiently controls a corporate entity, he can be responsible for the corporate debts assuming other piercing factors are present.

3/ Veil piercing can occur absent actual fraud by a controlling shareholder.  The creditor plaintiff must show more than a mere unpaid debt or unsatisfied judgment, though.  Instead, there must be some element of unfairness present for a court to set aside corporate protection and fasten liability to the individual.

 

 

No Automatic Finality Where Pleading Never Amended After ‘Without Prejudice’ Dismissal – IL Court

Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc.’s, (2016 IL 119518) essential holding is that a prior dismissal without prejudice doesn’t convert to a final order for res judicata or appeal purposes where a plaintiff fails to amend the dismissed pleading within the time deadline set by the court and the movant defendant doesn’t seek a dismissal with prejudice.

Claiming their membership in an agriculture cooperative was unfairly terminated, the Richter plaintiffs sued the defendant co-op for statutory shareholder remedies under the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 805 ILCS 5/12.56 (BCA), and common law fraud. Plaintiffs’ key theory was that defendant prematurely and pretextually terminated a milk marketing agreement by invoking an obscure bylaws provision in the agreement.

The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ fraud claims without prejudice and gave them 30 days to amend their complaint – a deadline ultimately increased to 120 days. Plaintiffs never amended their fraud claims though, instead choosing to pursue the BCA claim. After nearly five years of litigation, the plaintiff sought the voluntary dismissal of the BCA claim and later refiled another action within the one-year window allowed by 735 ILCS 5/2-1009.

The trial court granted the defendant’s 2-619 motion to dismiss the refiled suit under res judicata principles. It found the plaintiffs’ failure to amend the fraud claims “finalized” the prior dismissal without prejudice order and barred plaintiffs’ refiled suit.  The Fourth District reversed.  It held the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice was not final on its face and could never support a res judicata finding. Defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Affirming the appeals court, the Supreme Court dove deep into the earmarks of a final judgment for appeal and res judicata purposes and examined when an involuntary dismissal precludes the later refiling of a lawsuit.

Res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits for the doctrine to preclude a second lawsuit between two parties for the same cause of action. The doctrine bars not only what was actually decided in a prior action, but also matters that could have been litigated and decided in that action.

A “final” judgment or order denotes one that terminates the litigation and absolutely fixes the parties’ rights so that all that’s left is enforcing the judgment. (⁋24)
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 provides that an involuntary dismissal – other than one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join an indispensable party – is considered an adjudication on the merits.

A dismissal “without prejudice” signals there was no final decision on the merits. A dismissal that grants a plaintiff leave to amend its pleading is not final because the dismissal does not terminate the litigation. (⁋25). In such a case, a plaintiff is not barred from refiling an action. s

The Illinois Supreme Court declined the defendant’s invitation to create an “automatic final judgment ” rule when a plaintiff fails to amend within court-imposed time limits. Instead, the Court placed the onus on the litigants to convert a non-final dismissal order into a final one by seeking a dismissal with prejudice once the time for amendments has lapsed. And since the defendant had the burden of showing that res judicata applied and failed to obtain a definite with prejudice dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff was not prevented from refiling their lawsuit.

But What About Rein and Hudson?

Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325, 334–35 (1996) and Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462, 467 (2008) are oft-cited case law poster children for the perils of refiling previously (voluntarily) dismissed claims when other claims in the same suit were involuntarily dismissed. In such a case, a plaintiff’s refiled action can be barred by res judicata since the voluntarily dismissed claims could have been litigated in the earlier suit.  But here, unlike in Rein and Hudson, no part of plaintiff’s suit was dismissed with prejudice. And since a nonfinal order can never bar a subsequent action, res judicata didn’t apply.

Implication

When faced with a dismissal without prejudice, a plaintiff should quickly seek leave to amend or seek a dismissal with prejudice to start the notice of appeal clock. For its part, a defendant should seek with- prejudice dismissal language where a plaintiff fails to amend within time limits allowed by the court. Doing so will put the defendant in a good position to file a dismissal motion predicated on res judicata or claim-splitting if the plaintiff later refiles against the same defendant.