‘Your Check Bounced Like a Superball®!’ – Bad Check Laws in Illinois – Civil Liability

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(photo credit: www.sportsunlimitedinc.com)

The civil provisions of the Illinois Deceptive Practices Act, 720 ILCS 5/17-1 (a criminal statute), govern situations where a defendant issues bad checks with intent to defraud.  Section 5/17-1(B) provides:

(B) Bad checks.

A person commits a deceptive practice when:

(1) With intent to obtain control over property or to pay for property, labor or services of another,….he or she issues or delivers a check or other order upon a real or fictitious depository for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be paid by the depository. The [court] may infer that the defendant knows that the check or other order will not be paid by the depository and that the defendant has acted with intent to defraud when the defendant fails to have sufficient funds or credit with the depository when the check or other order is issued or delivered, or when such check or other order is presented for payment and dishonored on each of 2 occasions at least 7 days apart. In this paragraph (B)(1), “property” includes rental property (real or personal).

(2) He or she issues or delivers a check or other order upon a real or fictitious depository in an amount exceeding $150 in payment of an amount owed on any credit transaction for property, labor or services, or in payment of the entire amount owed on any credit transaction for property, labor or services, knowing that it will not be paid by the depository, and thereafter fails to provide funds or credit with the depository in the face amount of the check or order within 7 days of receiving actual notice from the depository or payee of the dishonor of the check or order.

The caselaw distills a civil bad check claim to the following elements: a plaintiff (the party to whom an NSF check was given) must show: (1) that defendant delivered a check to obtain services, labor and property of another, (2) that defendants knew the checks would not be honored, (3) that defendants acted with intent to defraud and (4) the defendants failed to pay on demand.

The corporate officer who signs a bad checks can also be individually liable under the Act.  This is an offshoot of the active participation rule: a corporate officer is liable for torts in which he actively participates.

Once a bad check claimant shows these elements, the Deceptive Practices Act’s civil liability provisions kick in.  Section 17-1(E) provides:

Civil liability. A person who issues a check or order to a payee in violation of paragraph (B)(1) and who fails to pay the amount of the check or order to the payee within 30 days following either delivery and acceptance by the addressee of a written demand both by certified mail and by first class mail to the person’s last known address or attempted delivery of a written demand sent both by certified mail and by first class mail to the person’s last known address and the demand by certified mail is returned to the sender with a notation that delivery was refused or unclaimed shall be liable to the payee….for, in addition to the amount owing upon such check or order, damages of treble the amount so owing, but in no case less than $100 nor more than $1,500, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.

An action under this subsection (E) may be brought in small claims court or in any other appropriate court. As part of the written demand required by this subsection (E), the plaintiff shall provide written notice to the defendant of the fact that prior to the hearing of any action under this subsection (E), the defendant may tender to the plaintiff and the plaintiff shall accept, as satisfaction of the claim, an amount of money equal to the sum of the amount of the check and the incurred court costs, including the cost of service of process, and attorney’s fees

So, if you are civilly prosecuting an NSF check case for a client, you should (a) be on the lookout for the check being returned twice in a 7-day period; and (b) send the 30-day demand by certified and regular mail.  Once the 30-day period elapses, you can file suit in Law Division ($30K and higher), Muni ($10,000-$30,000) or Muni small claims (under $10,000) and recover the face amount of the check plus up to $1,500 for each returned check and attorneys’ fees and costs.

For the less litigious, there’s Section 3-806 of the Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/3-806). This statute governs “non litigated” bad check collections.  Under this section, the aggrieved party can recover the amount of the check, and the greater of $25 or reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting on the bad check.  However, to recover more than $25, the check recipient must  provide 30-days notice by certified mail to the party that delivered the bad check and give that party an opportunity to cure by making good on the check.

 

 

 

 

Mechanics’ Lien Enhancement Rule – Post-Cypress Creek

Section 16 of the mechanics lien statute (770 ILCS 60/17), which codifies the enhancement rule (please see prior post), was recently amended in the wake of 2011’s LaSalle National Bank v. Cypress Creek 1, LLP decision:

http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2011/February/109954.pdf

In Cypress Creek, the Illinois Supreme Court severely diluted contractor’s lien rights by allowing a construction lender to trump contractors’ rights to sale proceeds.  The Court accomplished this by allowing the lender to take priority to the amount of property improvements it funded – even funds paid to contractors that didn’t record liens.  Essentially, as Justice Freeman said in his detailed dissent, the Court put lenders that fund property improvements on a par with contractor lien claimants and conferred lien creditor status on the lender by “judicial fiat”.  This resulted in the lender getting the lion’s share of sale proceeds while the contractors received only a  fraction of the monies. 

Another pro-lender, anti-contractor holding of the Cypress Creek was that lien claimants only took priority for the specific value of their individual improvements; as opposed to proportionally taking priority to the total value of all contractor improvements to the land. The result: banks and lenders were thrilled; contractors were furious.

After public outcry and warring legislative bills, the legislature passed H.B. 3636, and the bill was signed into law on February 11, 2013 as P.A. 97–1165.  It essentially reverses Cypress Creek and provides that a lender has priority only to the value of the land at the time of the owner-general prime contract and that lien claimants (contractors) take priority for the value of all improvements constructed after the prime contract (not just the specific improvements performed by an individual contractor).

770 ILCS 60/16 of the Act now reads:

When the proceeds of a sale are insufficient to satisfy the claims of both previous incumbrancers and lien creditors, the proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as follows: (i) any previous incumbrancers shall have a paramount lien in the portion of the proceeds attributable to the value of the land at the time of making of the contract for improvements; and (ii) any lien creditors shall have a paramount lien in the portion of the proceeds attributable to the value of all subsequent improvements made to the property.

 At this point it’s too early to tell what impact HB 3636 will have on construction lending and mechanics lien law in Illinois.  Stay tuned.

PBP

Illinois Contractor’s Lien Issues: The Enhancement Rule

The enhancement doctrine comes into play when liened property goes to foreclosure sale and the sale proceeds are insufficient to pay off both the lender and competing lien claimants. The lender, who often records its mortgage before the contractor’s lien attaches, will argue that its mortgage interest takes priority over the contractor’s lien and any property sale proceeds should go first to the lender. 

The contractor will counter that it’s unfair for his lien to get extinguished after he furnished valuable improvements to the property just because his lien happened to attach after the lender recorded its mortgage against the property.  Recall that in Illinois, the lien attaches on the date of the owner-general contractor contract and relates back to that prime contract date.

Enter the enhancement rule.  Codified at Section 16 of the Mechanics Lien Act, 770 ILCS 60/16, it allows a contractor whose lien attached after the mortgage was recorded to still take priority over the lender to the value of improvements furnished to the property.  The theory being that the contractor should be able to defeat or “prime” the prior mortgage in the amount the contractor improved or “enhanced” the value of the property.

To prove enhancement, a contractor must demonstrate that: (1) the work was authorized by the owner; (2) the contract price was reasonable; (3) he performed his obligations under the contract; and (4) the work constitutes a valuable and permanent improvement. Lyons Sav. v. Gash, 279 Ill.App.3d 742 (1st Dist. 1996); Erickson Brothers, Inc. v. Jenkins, 41 Ill.App.2d 180 (1963).

The question then arises as to how to prove enhancement.  Typically, the contractor will employ the market value approach.  This usually requires the contractor to provide expert testimony and appraisals to show the “before and after” value of the property – by comparing the property value before the contractor’s improvements vs. the value after the liened improvements.

However, in Gash, the court held that the market value approach was not the proper method to prove enhancement and instead found that the contract price was the proper measure of enhancement.  The basis for this holding was that the amount of the contractor’s improvements was minuscule compared to the Property’s value. Gash, 279 Ill.App.3d at 747.

In Gash, the contractors’ liens totaled $78,411.55 and the property sold for over $4 million at foreclosure sale.  Because the market value theory of enhancement contained a 10% margin of error or variance, and because the property value far exceeded the lien claims, the court held that the market value theory was improper and instead the contract price was the correct gauge of enhancement. Id. at 745-47.

This is a significant holding for contractors because it dispenses with the time, expense and burden (evidential and time-wise) of hiring an expert to testify concerning before and after property values.

Going forward, if you represent a contractor whose lien attached after a mortgage was recorded on the property, it’s critical that you prove that your client enhanced the property’s value. 

Where the property value dwarfs the lien amount, the contract amount will be the presumed enhancement amount.  However, if it’s a closer call (there is not a huge gap between property value and lien amount), be prepared to hire an appraiser or similar opinion witness to testify concerning the value of the property before and after your client’s improvements.  Proving this amount will enable your client to trump a prior competing mortgage lien.