Illinois Credit Agreements Act and the Unclean Hands Defense – No Writing = Difficulty Defeating Breach of Guaranty Claim

handsAmerican Chartered Bank v. Cameron. 2014 IL App (1st) 132231-U, an unpublished First District case, glaringly illustrates the difficulty of defeating a lender’s breach of guaranty claim when the defenses are based on the lender’s oral promises.  The case also sheds light on the nature of the borrower-lender relationship and the contours of the unclean hands defense in the context of a breach of contract action.

The defendant guaranteed a commercial loan made to a business that defendant invested in. After the borrower defaulted, the plaintiff sued the corporate borrower and guarantor defendant and won summary judgment of nearly $150K. The guarantor appealed arguing the guaranty wasn’t enforceable.

Held: summary judgment for the bank affirmed. Defendant’s defenses are defeated by the Illinois Credit Agreements Act 815 ILCs 160/1, et seq. (ICAA) and the express language of the guaranty.

Reasons:

The Court rejected the guarantor’s defense based on the clear guaranty language that specified the bank didn’t have to first proceed against the loan collateral (the bank could immediately go after the guarantor).  The guaranty also had a non-reliance clause: the guarantor waived his reliance on verbal statements by the bank’s agents.

The ICAA also trumped the defenses.  The ICAA prevents a debtor (here, the guarantor) from suing or defending a suit under a “credit agreement” unless it’s in writing and signed by both creditor and debtor” 815 ILCS 160/2.

The ICAA defines a “credit agreement” as an agreement to lend money, extend credit or to delay or forbear repayment of money that is not for consumer (personal, family or household) purposes and that doesn’t involve credit cards. 815 ILCS 160/1(1).  ICAA Section 3(3) negates any claims based on a creditor’s promise to modify, amend or forbear from enforcing a credit agreement.  815 ILCS 160/3

Illinois courts construe the ICAA broadly and describe it as a strengthened Statute of Frauds (740 ILCS 80/0.01 et seq.) that bars all actions at all related to a credit agreement.  The ICAA case law makes clear that the statute prevents a borrower from alleging he relied on any oral statements of a lender.

Here, the guarantor’s claim that the bank agent made verbal misstatements to induce the execution of the guaranty was clearly governed and defeated by the ICAA.  The court also found the ICAA negated the defendant’s argument that the bank officer orally modified the guaranty terms.(¶¶ 33-35).

The defendant’s “unclean hands” defense also failed.  This defense, which posits that a litigant can’t take advantage of his own wrongful conduct, was premised on the claim that the bank breached a fiduciary duty to inform the defendant of the bank’s intention to enforce the guaranty if there was a loan default.  The Court rejected this defense for two reasons: first, the lender-borrower relationship is not a fiduciary one as a matter of law.  Additionally, unclean hands defense only applies in equity cases: it doesn’t affect legal (actions at law) claims. (¶¶ 38-40)

The other argument raised and rejected by the guarantor was that since he successfully opened a confessed judgment in favor of the bank, this was tantamount to a summary judgment-defeating fact question claimed that since the trial court found that he satisfied the standard for opening a confessed judgment under Rule 276, this was tantamount to a summary judgment-defeating fact question.

Afterwords:

Cameron illustrates the expansive applicability of the ICAA and how that statute will bar almost all claims and defenses related to a promise to lend money.  The case also clarifies that the unclean hands defense will only apply in an equitable case (e.g. an injunction, declaratory judgment suit, etc.); not in a garden-variety breach of contract claim for money damages.  Procedurally, the case’s lesson is that opening a confessed judgment involves different evidentiary standards than does showing a fact question sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.

 

 

All About Charging Orders – When the Judgment Debtor Is an LLC Member

ChargeGetting a judgment against an LLC member can trigger a high-anxiety response.  That’s because the normal post-judgment collection rules set out in Code Section 2-1402 and Supreme Court Rule 277  don’t cleanly apply.  

Section 30-20 of the LLC Act (805 ILCS 180/30-20) states that a creditor’s exclusive remedy is to obtain a “charging order” against the LLC member’s “distributional interest.”  Illinois cases describe  Section 30-20 as a special remedy designed to allow a creditor of an LLC member to realize the value of the debtor’s distributional interest in the LLC and also protect both the LLC’s ability to function and the other members’ LLC interests.

The LLC Act defines “distributional interest” as a “member’s interest in distributions by the limited liability company.”  A distributional interest is not salary, wages, draws or reimbursement. To reach an LLC member’s wages, for example, a creditor should still utilize a third-party citation on the LLC and seek a turnover of any wages to be paid to the debtor.

To obtain a charging order, the creditor files an application or motion with the Court (“Motion for Charging Order”) and requests a charging order on the LLC member’s interest in the LLC.  The Motion is served on the debtor by regular mail and the creditor does not have to name the LLC as a party defendant. 

The court also isn’t required to have jurisdiction over the LLC for a charging order to issue against the member-debtor.  See, Bank of America, N.A. v. Freed, 1-11-0749 et al., 2012 WL 6725894 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 28, 2012) (LLC is not a necessary party to creditor’s charging order application).

The charging order impresses a lien (a hold) on the debtor’s LLC interest and any distributions coming due to the debtor can be paid to the creditor.  The lien on the distribution can also be foreclosed by the creditor filing a petition to foreclose the lien.  The debtor’s LLC interest can then be sold by the Sheriff or a private property – much like with any other asset sale.  Any sale proceeds the debtor’s distributional interest garners can be applied to the judgment amount.

To summarize, then, an LLC member’s judgment creditor should follow this four-step enforcement process: (1) file a motion for a charging order against the LLC member’s distributional interest; (2) serve the charging order on the LLC’s manager and registered agent (so they know to forward the distribution to the creditor), (3) (if the debtor doesn’t redeem and the judgment isn’t satisfied after turnover of the distribution) file a motion to foreclose the charging order (appoint someone to evaluate and sell the distributional interest); and (4) schedule either a public or private sale of the debtor’s distributional interest.  I also serve a third-party citation directly on the LLC and ask for a turnover order on any wages, draws or other payments (that aren’t distributions) to the debtor.

Post-Judgment Statutory Changes

Effective January 1, 2012, several statutes that govern Illinois judgment enforcement practice took effect.  The key statutory change as it relates to enforcing judgments against LLC members is Code Section 12-112.5.  This Section speaks directly to the charging order remedy and provides:

Sec. 12-112.5. Charging orders. If a statute or case requires or permits a judgment creditor to use the remedy of a charging order, said remedy may be brought and obtained by serving any of the various enforcement procedures set forth within this Article XII or by serving a citation pursuant to Section 2-1402. If the court does not otherwise have jurisdiction of the parties, the law relating to the type of enforcement served shall be used to determine issues ancillary to the entry of a charging order such as jurisdiction, liens, and priority of liens.

The comments to revised Section 5-112.5 make it clear that while a charging order is still the exclusive remedy for a creditor to impress a lien on an LLC member’s distributional interest, the creditor can use citation/supplementary proceedings under Code Section 2-1402 and Rule 277 to obtain that charging order in the first place.

Going forward, and in light of Section 112.5 and until there are more published cases that more thoroughly examine the interplay between Section 112.5 with LLC Section 30/20, judgment creditors of an LLC member should (1) serve a citation on the debtor, (2) serve a third-party citation on the LLC (via its registered agent or manager); and (3) file a motion for a charging order against the debtor’s LLC interest.

Once the charging order enters, the creditor can either receive distributions until the judgment is satisfied or try to more quickly monetize the debtor’s LLC distribution by filing a petition to foreclose the charging order lien.  A foreclosure sale buyer of the distributional interest will have rights to future distributions but does not get to exercise voting rights or make LLC business decisions.

 

Contractors’ Honest Mistake in Lien Completion Date And Amounts Doesn’t Doom Mechanic’s Lien Case (IL Law)

imageThe First District recently validated the mechanics liens of two “ma and pa” construction companies against a competing lienholder’s argument that the  liens contained a flawed completion date and an exaggerated lien amount.

North Shore Community Bank v. Sheffield Wellington LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 123784 is a priority dispute between mortgage lenders and mechanics lien claimants on commercial property.  In examining the parties’ competing claims, the Court addresses what consequences flow from a contractor’s failure to accurately state and prove its completion date under the Illinois Mechanics’ Lien Act, 770 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (the “Lien Act”) and whether that failure defeats its lien claim.

The lender sued to foreclose its mortgage and two contractors counterclaimed to foreclose their mechanics liens on the site.  One lien claimant – who built an office at the site – misstated its completion date by about a week while a roofing contractor couldn’t prove (in its deposition testimony and documents) that it actually performed on its stated completion date.  In addition, the office builder’s principal admitted in his deposition that the lien amount could be off by as much as 10%.  Based on the completion date and lien amount discrepancies, the lender moved for summary judgment against both contractors.  The trial court granted the lender’s motion and found that the mortgage lien trumped the mechanics’ liens.

Held: Summary judgment reversed.

Rules/Reasons:

Reversing summary judgment for the lender, the Court expanded on the Lien Act’s purpose and discussed whether misstated recorded lien information was a binding judicial admission:

The Mechanics’ Lien Act’s Purpose

– The Lien Act’s purpose is to allow someone who has improved property by furnishing labor or materials to lien that property;

– Section 7 of the Lien Act requires a contractor to file its lien  within 4 months after completion in order to enforce his lien against third-party creditors or other lienholders;

– While the Act is silent on completion date, the courts have interpreted Section 7 to require a lien claimant to include a completion date in order to be enforceable;

– Section 24 of the Act governs subcontractors and requires them to serve notice of their lien to the lender (“lending agency”) within 90 days after the completion date;

– Completion date under Section 7 and 24 doesn’t mean completion of the project in total; it just means completion of the work sought to be liened;

– The purpose of Section 7 (which governs contractors) and 24 (which governs subs) is to provide notice to third parties of the existence of a lien claim.

Overstated Liens – What Is ‘Intent to Defraud’?

– An overstated lien can be deemed fraudulent only where an “intent to defraud” is shown (770 ILCS 60/7a);

– A lien will be defeated where it contains a (1) knowing and (2) substantial overcharge;

– An intent to defraud can be proven by executed documents that overstate the amount in combination with some other evidence (i.e. a “Plus Factor”) from which fraudulent intent can be inferred;

– Section 7 of the Act is designed to protect the honest lien claimant who makes a mistake; not a dishonest claimant who knowingly makes a false statement;

Judicial Admissions – What Are They?

– A judicial admission is a “deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement” by a party about a concrete fact within that party’s knowledge;

– The effect of a judicial admission is that is withdraws a fact from dispute and makes unnecessary any need to prove the fact at trial;

– A statement that is the product of mistake or inadvertence is not a binding judicial admission;

– Judicial admissions are designed to deter perjury; they aren’t designed to punish honest mistakes;

– A litigant can’t contradict a prior judicial admission in summary judgment proceedings or at trial;

(¶¶ 81-90, 101-103, 126).

Applying these rules, the Court found that plaintiffs’ incorrect completion dates didn’t impact the mortgage lender’s notice rights.  Both liens were facially valid since they were timely filed; even with a technically wrong completion date.  The office subcontractor served its lien notice on the lender within 90 days of the completion of its work and the roofing general contractor filed its lien within the four-month period required Section 7.

The Court also noted that any incorrect completion dates were the results of honest mistakes – they weren’t binding judicial admissions.  This was because the lien claimants were “ma and pa” companies with limited resources.  One claimant was a single-person entity while the other had two employees that operated from a home office.  The Court also credited testimony by one of the contractors that it had never filed a lien before and wasn’t sure what information was key to the completion date or lien amount questions.  (¶¶129-130).

Finally, the Court rejected the lender’s constructive fraud argument – premised on the subcontractor’s officer admitting in a deposition that the lien amount could be “about 10% off.”  There was no evidence that the subcontractor intentionally made a substantial overcharge and that any flawed numbering was the result of an honest mistake.  An inflated lien amount – without more – is not enough for a constructive fraud finding.

Now What?: This case serves as a strong example of a court refusing to elevate form over substance.  While a completion date is required, a minor error in that date won’t defeat the lien if its otherwise facially valid (i.e. timely filed).  Also, constructive fraud in the lien context is hard to prove.  If a lien claimant can show that a lien error is an honest mistake and not purposely exaggerated, that lien claimant may still be able to prosecute his lien foreclosure suit.