Tag: M3R

Mechanics Lien Trumps Prior Mortgage in ‘Lien Strip’ Bankruptcy Dispute Involving Residential Property

Priority disputes happen a lot in mechanics’ lien litigation.  Typically, a mortgage lender claims that its first-filed mortgage trumps a later-filed mechanics lien.  The “trumps” part is activated if and when the property is sold and there aren’t enough proceeds to pay both the lender and contractor.  If the lender’s mortgage has priority, it gets first dibs on the sale proceeds, leaving the contractor with little or nothing.

Section 16 of the Mechanics’ Lien Act (770 ILCS 60/16) governs the lien priority issue.  This section provides that (i) prior lien claimants have lien priority up to the value of the land at the time of making of the construction contract; and (ii) mechanics’ lien claimants have a paramount lien to the value of all improvements made to the property after the construction contract is signed.

In re Thigpen, 2014 WL 1246116 examines the mortgage lender-versus-contractor priority question through the lens of a bankruptcy adversary case where the debtors attempt to strip away a mechanics’ lien recorded against their homeresidence.

The debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection and later filed an adversary proceeding to extinguish the lien a contractor recorded against the home. 

The debtors claimed that since there was a prior mortgage on the home and the home’s value had dropped to a sum less than the lien amount, the lien should be removed.

In bankruptcy parlance, this is called “lien stripping” and applies where a mechanics lien lacks collateral; usually because of plummeting property values. 

The contractor argued that its lien took priority to the value of the improvements/enhancements and moved for summary judgment.

Held: Contractor’s summary judgment motion granted.

Q: Why?

A: Applying Section 16 of the Act, the Court held that where proceeds of a property sale are insufficient to pay competing lienholders, a mechanics’ lien claimant takes priority over a lender up to the value the contractor added to the property.

The Court wrote: “the Illinois Supreme Court has expressly recognized that Section 16 of the Act confers first priority, not something less, on mechanic’s lien holders, and that they trump pre-existing mortgages to the extent of the value of the improvements.”  (*2).

While the court found that the contractor’s lien trumped the prior mortgage, the Court did not decide the specific monetary amount of the improvements relative to the home’s value. 

The holding is still significant because now the contractor has a secured claim (as opposed to an unsecured one) against the debtors’ estate which must be paid over the life of the Chapter 13 plan. 

If the debtors default, the contractor can liquidate the collateral –  by forcing a sale of the home – and get paid via the proceeds.  An unsecured creditor, by contrast, has no assets securing its claim.  It must hope that the debtors have unattached assets (e.g. paycheck, bank accounts, accounts receivable) with which to pay the debt.  (Good luck with that!)

Take-away: A big win for the contractor.  Instead of having an unsecured claim (with no collateral tied to the claim), its mechanics’ lien claim is secured.  This means the contractor’s lien attaches to the debtors’ house. 

If the debtor defaults under the plan, the contractor can foreclose its lien and force a sale of the home and take priority to the sale proceeds up to the amount of the improvements (here, about $200,000).  

The case’s unanswered question is how does the contractor prove the dollar amount of his improvements?  The contractor will likely have to produce expert witness testimony or documents to establish the dollar value of the contractor’s time, labor and materials  furnished to the debtors’ home.

Fee Shifting – Is ‘Prevailing Party’ Language Required?

I see this often: plaintiff sues a defendant for breach of contract.  The defendant has more financial resources than the plaintiff and the contract doesn’t have an attorneys’ fees provision.  Meaning, each side is responsible for its own fees. 

After several months, the plaintiff gets financially (and mentally) worn down by the richer defendant – who by now has filed numerous counterclaims and scheduled a flurry of witness depositions. 

The plaintiff says “uncle” and the parties enter the dreaded Mutual Walk-Away.  The plaintiff gets nothing, is annoyed at her lawyer (whom she has been paying hourly) and loses confidence in the litigation system. 

Once again, the deeper-pocketed defendant gets its way and the plaintiff, whose claim had merit, never gets her day in court.

One way to protect against this  common occurrence is to insert an attorneys’ fees or “fee-shifting” provision in the contract. 

Fee language can at least make a defendant think twice about trying to break a plaintiff’s will through protracted litigation.  It also encourages the plaintiff to not give up so easily when there is a potential fees and costs recovery at the end of the lawsuit. 

In Bank of America v. Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert, Inc., 2014 WL 293662,  an accounting firm sued a commercial lender for breach of a commercial loan agreement.  The agreement contained fee-shifting language applicable to the “collection, enforcement, administration, or protection” of the loan agreement. 

After plaintiff’s Illinois suit was dismissed for the fourth time and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal, the lender filed a separate action to recover its defense fees.

The accounting firm moved to dismiss the lender’s claim on the basis that the loan documents  didn’t specify that the prevailing party could recover attorneys’ fees.  The Northern District denied the motion.

Reasoning:

– The general rule in Illinois is that the lawsuit winner isn’t entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees unless there is a contractual provision that says so;

– Allowing a losing party to collect attorneys’ fees from the successful party violates Illinois public policy;

– A fee provision doesn’t have to contain the magic words “prevailing party” to be enforceable.

*4-5.

The Northern District found the fee-shifting language applied to the lender’s defense of the accounting firm’s various lawsuits.  The loan contract specifically said that fees incurred in the “protection” of the loan agreement were recoverable. 

The Court applied the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of protection (“to defend from danger or injury”) in ruling that defending a lawsuit equated to protecting the lender’s contract rights.  

Afterword:

To avoid the negative aftershocks of the above walk-away scenario, I always stress to clients that their contracts should contain attorneys’ fees language.  I also caution them that when signing another party’s contract, to be alert for attorneys’ fees language slanted in the other side’s favor. 

This case illustrates that while “prevailing party” terminology isn’t required to enforce a fee-shifting clause; the clearer and broader the clause, the better. 

 

 

Medical Practice Break-Up Spawns Non-Compete Dispute

imageThe bitter breakup of a medical practice provides the setting for the Illinois Fifth District to consider the scope of a non-compete clause and how it impacts a minority shareholder’s buy-out rights.

Gingrich v. Midkiff, 2014 IL App (5th) 120332-U presents a dispute between two former partners in a medical corporation.  At the medical practice’s inception – in the late 1990s – the parties signed a stock purchase agreement that contained a 5-year/20-mile non-compete provision (the “Non-Compete”).

The Non-Compete only applied in two situations: (1) if a shareholder withdrew from the practice after giving the required written notice; or (2) where a shareholder was expelled from the practice.  The parties’ relationship quickly soured and in 2002, a decade-long cycle of litigation between the two doctors ensued.

The 2002 Lawsuit

A 2002 lawsuit between the parties culminated in the plaintiff buying defendant’s stock in the medical corporation.  The court in the 2002 case didn’t rule on whether the Non-Compete was enforceable.

The 2007 (and current) Lawsuit

In the 2007 case, plaintiff sued defendant alleging the defendant violated the Non-Compete by going to work for a rival practice within 20 miles of plaintiff’s office. 

The trial court dismissed.  It held that the Non-Compete didn’t apply because defendant didn’t withdraw and wasn’t expelled from the medical corporation.  Plaintiff appealed.

Ruling: Affirmed.

Reasoning:

The court rejected plaintiff’s law of the case (LOTC) argument.  The LOTC doctrine prevents relitigation of an issue of fact or law previously decided in the same case.  ¶ 14.  Its purpose is to avoid repetitive litigation of the same issues and to foster finality and consistency in litigation.  LOTC reflects the court’s preference to generally not reopen previously decided issues.

Here, there was no adjudication of the Non-Compete in the 2002 case.  The core issue litigated in that first suit was the valuation of defendant’s shares and whether plaintiff served a proper election to purchase those shares.

Since the cardinal issues in the 2002 and 2007 Lawsuits substantively differed, LOTC didn’t prevent defendant from challenging the Non-Compete in the 2007 case. ¶¶  17-19.

The court also found the Non-Compete wasn’t enforceable.  In Illinois, noncompetition clauses in the medical services context are heavily scrutinized and only validated where they have reasonable time and space limits.

¶¶ 22-24.

Finding the Non-Compete unambiguous, the Court held that the 5 year/20-mile strictures attached in only two circumstances: where a shareholder either (1) withdrew or (2) was expelled from the practice.  Here, defendant  didn’t withdraw and she wasn’t expelled.  As a result, the Non-Compete didn’t prevent the defendant from practicing within twenty miles of plaintiff’s office.  ¶¶ 25-29.

Afterwords: Clarity in contract drafting is critical.  The case illustrates that a Court won’t strain to find ambiguity where contract language is facially clear.  Gingrich also illustrates that a restrictive covenant will be construed in favor of permitting, instead of stifling, competition.  In hindsight, the plaintiff should have made it clear that if a shareholder departed the medical practice for any reason: whether voluntary, forced, or after a buy-out, the non-compete would still govern.