“Mirror-Image” Contract Acceptance: 7th Circuit Finds Attorneys’ Fees Provision in Invoice Not Binding on Food Buyer

VLM Food Trading International, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., (http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-2776/14-2776-2016-01-21.pdf?ts=1453404644) considers whether a seller can recover attorneys’ fees where the contract doesn’t provide for fees but the invoices sent after the goods are shipped do have fee-shifting language.   

The Seventh Circuit held that the invoice fee-shifting clause does not bind the buyer.

The Contract Chronology: The plaintiff foods seller would submit a purchase order to defendant that stated the product, price, quantity and delivery locus.  The defendant, in turn, would send a confirming e-mail to the plaintiff.  After that, the plaintiff shipped the goods to the defendant and later sent a “trailing” invoice to the defendant.

The first appearance of the fee-shifting language in the contracting sequence were found in the trailing invoices sent after the seller’s items were shipped to the defendant.

The main dispute centered on when the contract was formed and whether the trailing invoices’ fees provisions were part of the contract. 

An international treaty – the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the “Convention”) – happened to govern this dispute.  The Convention applies a derivation of the common law “mirror image” rule of contract interpretation: an acceptance must “mirror” the offer or else it’s construed as a counter-offer.  

Under the mirror image rule, any additional terms or qualifications to the offer are considered proposed modifications.  A party doesn’t have to object to a proposed modification to exclude (reject) it.  Any term not contained in the offer and acceptance simply do not bind the parties.  What’s more, one’s silence or inactivity doesn’t equal acceptance of the proposed offer changes.  A party can only accept the terms through a statement or conduct.

The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s purchase orders were the offer, and the buyer’s confirming e-mails were the acceptance.  Any terms proposed outside the scope of the purchase orders or emails were not part of the parties’ agreement.  Since the plaintiff’s trailing invoices (and their fee-shifting and interest language) were sent after the acceptance, they didn’t bind the buyer.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s trade usage argument – that buyer assented to the fee provision by not objecting to the invoice language.  Again, under the mirror image rule, the buyer’s silence isn’t considered acceptance.  The Court also found that trade usage only applies where there is contractual ambiguity.  Here, the contract was clear and so there was no reason to consider any course of conduct or trade usage evidence.

Finally, the Court found the defendant did not manifest an intent to adhere to the invoice fee language.  The key factor on this point was the trailing invoices were sent to defendant’s generic billing address; they weren’t sent to a specific corporate decision-maker. 

Take-aways:

VLM is interesting reading to me since I’ve encountered this exact fact pattern several times through the years in my commercial litigation practice.  The case chronicles a typical multi-step goods contract involving commercial entities.  

In a case where an international treaty doesn’t govern, fee language can be considered part of the contract under the Uniform Commercial Code if it is standard practice in an industry to have after-the-fact fee provisions in invoices or the parties’ course of conduct shows an intent to hew to the invoice fee-shifting clause. 

VLM offers a useful analysis of the factors a court considers when determining whether after-the-fact contractual terms can bind the parties.

 

 

 

False Info in Employee Time Records Can Support Common Law Fraud Claim – IL Fed Court

Some key questions the Court grapples with in Laba v. CTA, 2016 WL 147656 (N.D.Ill. 2016) are whether an employee who sleeps on the job or runs personal errands on company time opens himself up to a breach of fiduciary or fraud claim by his employer.  The Court answered “no” (fiduciary duty claim) and “maybe” (fraud claim) in an employment dispute involving the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA).

Some former CTA employees sued the embattled transit agency for invasion of privacy and illegal search and seizure after learning the CTA implanted Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology on the plaintiffs’ work-issued cell phones. An audit of those phones revealed the plaintiffs’ regularly engaged in personal frolics during work hours.

The CTA removed the case to Federal court and filed various state law counterclaims to recoup money it paid to the ex-employees including claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and conversion. The Northern District granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the CTA’s counterclaims.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Sustaining the CTA’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against the ex-employees’ motion to dismiss, the Court looked to black-letter Illinois law for guidance.  To state a breach of fiduciary duty claim in Illinois, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) breach of the duty proximately caused damages.  The employer-employee relationship is one the law recognizes as a fiduciary one.

While the extent of an employee’s duty to his employer varies depending on whether the employee is a corporate officer, the law is clear that employees owe duties of loyalty to their employers.  Where an employee engages in self-dealing or misappropriates employer property or funds for the employee’s personal use, it can give rise to a fiduciary suit by the employer.

Here, the Court found that the employees’ conduct, while irresponsible and possibly negligent, didn’t rise to the level of disloyalty under the law.  The Court made it clear that under-par job performance doesn’t equate to conduct that can support a breach of fiduciary duty claim. (**6-7).

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

The Court upheld the CTA’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim – premised on the allegation that the plaintiffs lied to the CTA about the hours they were working in order to induce the CTA to pay them.  Under Illinois law, a fraud plaintiff must show (1) a false statement of material fact, (2) known or believed to be false by the party making the statement, (3) with the intent to induce the statement’s recipient to act, (4) action by the recipient in reliance on the truth of the statement, and (5) damage resulting from that reliance.

Under the Federal pleading rules, a fraud claimant must plead the “who, what, where when and how” of the fraud but the allegation of a defendant’s intent or knowledge can be alleged generally.

Here, the Court found that the CTA sufficiently alleged a fraudulent scheme by the employees to misrepresent the hours they worked in exchange for their paychecks.  This was enough, under Illinois fraud law, to survive the employees’ motion to dismiss.  See FRCP 9(b); (*7).

Take-aways:

1/ While an employee owes an employer fiduciary duties of loyalty, his sub-par job performance doesn’t equate to a breach of fiduciary duty.  There must be self-dealing or intentional conduct by the employee for him to be vulnerable to an employer’s fiduciary duty suit;

2/ An employee misrepresenting hours work can underlie a common law fraud claim if the employer can show it paid in reliance on the truth of the employee’s hour reporting;

 

 

 

Cab Passenger Fares Aren’t “Wages” Under IL Wage Payment and Collection Act – 7th Circuit

The salient question considered by the Seventh Circuit in Enger v. Chicago Carriage Cab Corp., 2016 WL 106878 (7th Cir. 2016) was whether “wages” under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (the “Act”) encompasses “indirect wages” – monies paid an employee by third parties (i.e. as opposed to money paid directly from an employer).

The answer: No, it does not.

The plaintiffs, current and former Chicago cab drivers over a ten-year time frame sued various cab companies alleging Wage Act violations and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiffs alleged the companies violated the Act by misclassifying them as independent contractors instead of employees. The plaintiffs argued that the cab companies requirement that the driver plaintiffs pay daily or weekly shift fees (basically, a lease payment giving the drivers the right to operate the cabs) and other operating expenses, the companies violated the Act.

Affirming the district court’s motion to dismiss, the Seventh Circuit gave a cramped construction to the term wages under the Act examined the content and reach of the Act as applied to claims that

The Act gives employees a cause of action for payment of earned wages. “Wages” is defined by the Act as compensation owed an employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract.

While the Seventh Circuit agreed with the drivers that there was at least an implied contract between them and the cab companies, those companies did not pay wages to the drivers as the term is defined by the Act.

This was because there was no obligation for the cab company to pay anything to the driver. The cab driver-cab company relationship was a reciprocal one: the driver paid a license fee to the company and then collected fares and tips from passengers.  No money was paid directly from the company to the driver.

The Court found that for the Act to apply to the drivers claims, it would have to expand the statutory definition of wages to include “indirect compensation:” compensation from someone other than the employer. Since there was no published case law on this issue, the Seventh Circuit refused to expand the Act’s definition of wages to include non-employer payments.

For support, the Court noted that Illinois’ Minimum Wage Law specifically defines wages to include gratuities in addition to compensation owed a plaintiff by reason of his employment. Since the legislature could have broadened the Act’s wages definition to include indirect compensation (like tips, etc.) but chose not to, the Court limited wages under the Act to payments directly from an employer to employee.

The Court also rejected the drivers’ argument that they received wages under the Act since drivers are often paid by the cab company when a passenger pays a fare via credit card. In this credit card scenario, the court found that the cab company simply acted as an intermediary that facilitated the credit card transaction. The company did not assume role of wage paying employer just because its credit card processor was used to handle some passenger credit card payments.

The driver’s unjust enrichment claim – that the cab companies were unjustly enriched by the drivers’ shift fees – also fell short.  Since there was an implied contract between the drivers and cab companies, unjust enrichment didn’t apply since an express or implied contract negates an unjust enrichment claim.

Afterwords:

This case clarifies that recoverable wages under Illinois’ Wage Act must flow directly from an employer to an employee.  Payments from third-party sources (like cab passengers) aren’t covered by the Wage Act.

Enger also serves as latest in a long line of cases that emphasize that an unjust enrichment can’t co-exist with an express or implied (as was the case here) contract governs the parties’ relationship.