Federal Court Applies IL Tortious Interference Rules and the Statute of Frauds in Railcar Lease Dispute

trainThe Northern District of Illinois recently discussed the pleading and proof elements of tortious interference with contract and the promissory estoppel doctrine in a commercial railcar lease dispute. In Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC v. Marquis Energy-Wisconsin, LLC 2014 WL 4627921 (N.D. Ill. 2014), the plaintiff sublessor of railcars sued the sublessee for damages after the plaintiff’s lessor terminated a lease (“Master Lease”) for the same cars.  The sublessee moved for summary judgment.

Result: Motion granted.  Plaintiff’s tortious interference and promissory estoppel claims are defeated.

Q: Why?

A: After the railcar lessor terminated the Master Lease with the plaintiff and started dealing directly with the sublessee, the plaintiff sued it’s sublessee for tortious interference and promissory estoppel. Granting summary judgment for the sublessee , the Court enunciated the key tortious interference with contract elements under Illinois law.

Tortious Interference with Contract

A tortious interference with contract plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another, (2) the defendants’ awareness of the contract, (3) the defendants’ intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract, (4) subsequent breach of the contract caused by the defendants’ wrongful conduct, and (5) damagesIf a plaintiff fails to perform its contractual obligations, it can’t prove breach and its tortious interference claim will fail.

Here, the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim failed because it couldn’t show that its lessor breached the Master Lease. The plaintiff actually breached it by subletting it to defendant without the (Master) lessor’s knowledge and consent (the Master Lease required the lessor’s consent to any sublease or assignment) and also by failing to make several months’ of railcar lease payments.  Since the lessor was able to terminate the lease on plaintiff’s breach, the plaintiff failed to establish that the lessor breached – an essential tortious interference element.

Promissory Estoppel

Next, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel count. Plaintiff predicated this claim on the defendant/sublessee’s promise to buy out plaintiff’s rights under the Master Lease.

Promissory estoppel is a doctrine under which the plaintiff may recover without the presence of a contract. To prove promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show (1) defendant made n unambiguous promise to plaintiff, (2) plaintiff relied on such promise, (3) plaintiff’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants, and (4) plaintiff relied on the promise to its detriment.  Aspirational negotiations or proposals don’t equate to a clear promise under the doctrine.

Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim failed because it couldn’t show a clear promise by the defendant to buy out plaintiff’s Master Lease rights. The evidence reflected that any lease buy-out talks were merely negotiations; not ironclad promises.

The promissory estoppel clam was also defeated by the statute of frauds – which requires certain contracts to be in writing.  Under Section 2A of the UCC, lease contracts for goods (like railcars) have to be in writing unless the total lease payments are less than $1,000.  810 ILCS 5/2A–201(1). Where the statute of frauds applies, to a contract, it also requires an assignment of the contract to be in writing and signed by the party being sued.

Here, since the statute of frauds applied to the Master Leases and well over $1,000 was at stake, any assignment from plaintiff to defendant of the Master Lease had to be in writing.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that several e-mail exchanges with the sublessee satisfied the statute’s writing requirement.  The Court found that since the none of the emails contained the contract parties, subject matter or price term of the supposed assignment agreement, the sporadic emails didn’t meet the writing requirement. (*5).

Take-aways: The case is post-worthy for its discussion of the key tortious interference with contract elements and how important it is for a plaintiff to show that it complied with the contract it is claiming was wrongfully interfered with. The case also provides good summary of promissory estoppel elements and cements the proposition that the statute of frauds will still apply to bar the claim if the subject matter is one that has to be in writing under the law.  Finally, this case amplifies the importance of careful lease drafting and review.  Parties to lease agreements – whether for real estate or tangible goods – should be cognizant of assignment and sublease provisions.  They almost always require the prime lessor’s knowledge and written consent.






Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage – An Illinois Case Note

In Davidson v. Schneider, 2014 WL 656780 (N.D.Ill. 2014), the Court describes the quantum of proof required for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment on both the damages element of a breach of contract claim and the “reasonable expectancy” prong of a tortious interference claim.

The plaintiff and defendant were competitors in the baseball vision testing business.  They were also parties to prior patent infringement litigation that culminated in a written settlement agreement that contained broad non-disparagement language.

 When the plaintiff found out that one of defendant’s employee’s was bad-mouthing the plaintiff to a college softball coach and prospective client, he sued in Federal court.  After discovery finished, the Court entered summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s breach of contract and tortious interference claims.

An Illinois breach of contract plaintiff must show (a) existence of a contract, (b) performance by the plaintiff, (c) breach by the defendant and (d) compensable damages resulting from the breach.  Davidson, *3, Asset Exch. II, LLC v. First Choice Bank, 2011 Ill.App. (1st) 103718. 

Damage to reputation or goodwill resulting in a diminished ability to make money as a result of a breach can be recovered in a breach of contract suit.  However, where a party shows a breach but no damages, the contract claim is “pointless” and must failDavidson, *5.

Here, the plaintiff established a contract (the settlement agreement) and defendant’s breach (by disparaging plaintiff’s products and services).  However, the plaintiff was unable to pinpoint any measurable money damages resulting from the defendants’ denigrating the plaintiff’s vision training services.

 Plaintiff cited no lost clients or business opportunities traceable to the defendants disparaging comments.  Without any damages evidence, the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law.  Davidson, *4.

The Court also granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim.  Plaintiff’s tortious interference count was based on derogatory comments defendants’ employee made to another baseball coach and prospective customer of plaintiff. 

The elements of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage are: (1) a reasonable expectation of entering a valid business relationship, (2) defendant’s knowledge of the expectation, (3) purposeful interference by the defendant that prevents plaintiff’s expectation from ripening into a business relationship, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the interference.  *5

The mere  hope for or possibility of a future business relationship is insufficient to show a reasonable expectancy. 

Here, plaintiff’s evidence showed only a nebulous hope of a future business pairing with the baseball coach to whom defendants trashed plaintiff’s product.  He didn’t show any specific business arrangement that was in the works.  As a result, plaintiff failed to raise a triable fact question on whether he had a reasonable expectation of a future business relationship with the baseball coach.

Take-aways: A breach of contract plaintiff’s failure to prove damages with tangible evidence of financial loss at the summary judgment state will doom his case. 

To survive summary judgment on a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim, the plaintiff must offer tangible evidence that he had a specific, proposed business arrangement with an identified third party – instead of a wish or hope for one – to meet the tort’s reasonable expectancy test.


Summary Judgment Practice: When The Deposition Clashes With The Affidavit



A summary judgment motion axiom posits that you can’t contradict prior sworn deposition testimony with a later affidavit in order to create a triable fact dispute. 

A crude example: if in a deposition you say “I didn’t suffer any monetary damages”, you can’t file an affidavit later in the lawsuit where you say “actually, come to think of it, I lost a million dollars” in order to defeat a summary judgment motion.  You’ll be bound to your earlier deposition testimony. 

Otherwise, anyone could contradict his earlier sworn testimony with impunity and undermine summary judgment’s entire evidence testing system.

Kuvedina, LLC v. Pai, 2013 WL 6499696 (N.D.Ill. 2013) examines summary judgment in the context of a conversion suit.

Facts:  Plaintiff management company hired defendant to provide consulting services to one of plaintiff’s clients.  The relationship between plaintiff and defendant soured and plaintiff fired defendant.  When defendant failed to return a company laptop, plaintiff sued in Federal court for conversion, asserting that defendant’s actions caused plaintiff to lose a large corporate client. 

Defendant moved for summary judgment and attached plaintiff’s owner’s deposition testimony as a supporting exhibit.  In the deposition, the owner gave vague, non-responsive answers and couldn’t pinpoint any evidence to support plaintiff’s money damages claim.

Result: Summary judgment entered for defendant on plaintiff’s conversion count. 


Conversion is the wrongful possession of another’s property or any act that permanently or indefinitely deprives someone of the use and possession of his property.

To prove civil conversion in Illinois, a plaintiff must establish (1) a right to the property; (2) an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; (3) a demand for possession of the property; and (4) defendant’s wrongful and unauthorized assumed control, dominion or ownership over the property. *4. 

Money can be converted – but it must be a specific, identifiable fund (e.g. the $876 contained in defendant’s checking account at XYZ bank).  It can’t be a general obligation (“you didn’t paint my house like you promised, so you stole that $500 I gave you.)

Siding with defendant on the conversion count, the Court applied Illinois conversion case law which holds that voluntarily paid funds won’t support a conversion claim. 

The Court found that since plaintiff freely paid defendant almost $40,000 without protest,  plaintiff couldn’t show conversion as to those funds. *4.

The court did side with the plaintiff on its breach of contract, tortious interference, and fraud claims. In its summary judgment motion, defendant pointed to a factual clash between plaintiff’s owner’s earlier deposition and later affidavit testimony.

In his deposition, the plaintiff’s owner couldn’t substantiate any money damages when asked.  Yet, in his later affidavit – filed in response to defendant’s summary judgment motion – he calculated damages of over $500,000 based on defendant’s conduct.

In sustaining plaintiff’s claims, the court stated that all summary judgment evidence – be it interrogatories, depositions, or affidavits – is to some extent self-serving.  The question is a matter of degree.  

Here, the Court found that while plaintiff’s affidavit was self-serving, there were still too many factual disputes in connection with plaintiff’s contract, tortious interference and fraud claims that couldn’t be resolved on a summary judgment motion.   *5.

Take-away: Kuvedina presents a good discussion of how differing deposition versus affidavit testimony impacts the court’s summary judgment calculus and that voluntary payments by a plaintiff are unlikely to support a conversion claim.  

The case also clarifies that summary judgment movant must argue and show more than that the opponent’s evidence is self-serving to win the motion.  The moving party must show that the self-serving evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact.