ReMax Franchisor Defeats Tortious Interference Claim With Privilege Defense – IL 4th Dist.

The plaintiffs in Byram v. Danner, 2018 IL App (4th) 170058-U, sued after their planned purchase of a Remax real estate franchise imploded.  The plaintiffs missed an installment payment and the defendants responded by cancelling the agreement. Plaintiffs then filed a flurry of tort claims including fraud and tortious interference with contract.

Plaintiffs’ fraud count alleged the defendants lacked Remax authority to sell the franchise and hid this fact from the plaintiffs. The tortious interference claim asserted defendants bad-mouthed plaintiffs to certain agents, causing them to disassociate from plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sought to recover their franchise fee, their first installment payment and unpaid commissions earned over a 16-month period. The trial court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims under Code Sections 2-615 and 2-619.  Plaintiffs appealed.

In finding the trial court properly jettisoned the fraud claim, the court noted that a valid cause of action for fraud requires (1) a false representation of material fact, (2) by a party who knows or believes it to be false, (3) with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act, (4) action by the plaintiff in reliance on the statement, and (5) injury to the plaintiff as a consequence of the reliance.

However, where a contractual provision negates one of the fraud elements, the fraud claim fails. Here, the underlying contract expressly conditioned defendants’ sale of the franchise on Remax accepting plaintiffs as a franchisee. This qualified language precluded plaintiffs from alleging that defendants misrepresented that they had authority from Remax to sell their franchise. (⁋ 43)

The appeals court also affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim.  To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) his reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s expectancy, (3) purposeful interference by defendant that prevents plaintiff’s legitimate expectation from coming to fruition, and (4) damages to the plaintiff.

The ‘purposeful interference’ prong of the tort requires a showing of more than interference.  The plaintiff must also prove a defendant’s improper conduct done primarily to injure the plaintiff.  Where a defendant acts to protect or enhance his own business interests, he is privileged to act in a way that may collaterally harm another’s business expectancy.  Where a defendant invokes a privilege to interfere with a plaintiff’s business expectancy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct was unjustified or malicious.  (¶ 46)

The Court found defendants’ actions were done to protect the future success of their real estate franchise and listings.  Since plaintiffs failed to plead any specific facts showing defendants’ intent to financially harm the plaintiffs, dismissal of the tortious interference count was proper.

The Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, however. This was because the affidavit filed in support of defendant’s Section 2-619 motion didn’t qualify as affirmative matter.  An affirmative matter is any defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Affirmative matter is not evidence a defendant expects to contest an ultimate fact alleged in a complaint.

Here, defendants’ Section 2-619 affidavit effectively plaintiffs’ allegations were “not true:” that defendants didn’t owe plaintiffs any commissions.  The Court found that a motion affidavit that simply denies a complaint’s material facts does not constitute affirmative matter. (¶¶ 56-59)

Afterwords:

Byram provides a useful summary of the relevant guideposts and distinctions between section 2-615 and 2-619 motions to dismiss. Where a supporting affidavit merely disputes plaintiff’s factual allegations, it will equate to a denial of the plaintiff’s allegations. Such an affidavit will not constitute proper affirmative matter than wholly defeats a claim.

The case also provides value for its discussion of the Darwinian privilege defense to tortious interference. When a defendant acts to protect herself or her business, she can likely withstand a tortious interference claim by a competitor – even where that competitor is deprived of a remedy.

Saying “I Wasn’t Served” Not Enough to Challenge Service Return On Corp. Registered Agent – IL Law

In Charles Austin, Ltd. v. A-1 Food Services, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132384, the First District affirmed the denial of a corporate defendant’s Section 2-1401 motion to vacate a judgment.

About three months after judgment, the defendant sought to vacate the judgment claiming it was never served with the lawsuit.  The trial court denied the motion leaving the judgment intact.

Q: Why?

A:  

1/ A party can serve a private corporation by leaving the complaint and summons with the registered agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere in the State. 735 ILCS 5/2-204;

2/ An affidavit of service is prima facie proof of proper service and the court will indulge every presumption in favor of finding that service was proper;

3/ To attack service, the moving party must produce evidence that casts doubt on the return of service by clear and convincing evidence;

4/ A conclusory affidavit that merely says “I was never served” isn’t sufficient to refute a return of service.  ¶ 16.

Here, the defendant’s affidavit saying he didn’t recall receiving the plaintiff’s complaint wasn’t enough to contest service on the corporation.  A defendant’s bare assertion that it doesn’t remember receiving a summons and complaint is not the kind of evidence required to impeach a facially valid service return. ¶ 19.

In Illinois, to vacate a judgment more than 30 days old,  a petitioner must show (1) the existence of a meritorious defense, (2) due diligence in presenting the defense in the underlying claim, and due diligence in filing the 2-1401 petition.

The defendant failed to show a meritorious defense.  The plaintiff alleged the predecessor corporation secretly sold its assets to the defendant – the acquiring entity – while the litigation was pending and did so to elude the debt to the plaintiff.  A well-known exception to the general rule that a successor corporation doesn’t assume the debts of a corporate predecessor is where the seller engages in a fraudulent transaction to avoid the seller’s contract obligations.

Here, the court found that the fraud exception to the rule against successor liability applied.

The court found that plaintiff sufficiently pled under Illinois fact-pleading rules that the sale of the predecessor’s assets to the defendant was fraudulent and done for the purpose of evading the plaintiff’s contract rights.  As a result, the meritorious defense argument failed.  ¶¶ 28-37.

The defendant also failed to establish due diligence in raising its defenses to the underlying breach of contract suit.  The court noted the defendant’s registered agent was served with process in October 2012, the judgment entered in January 2013, the defendant’s bank account was liened in May 2013 and it didn’t file its 2-1401 motion until June 2013.

The eight month delay in responding to the lawsuit signaled its lack of diligence in defending the suit.

Take-aways:

– To challenge service, a defendant must do more than blanketly allege that he doesn’t recall receiving a pleading;

– If a plaintiff alleges factual basis for his claim, the defendant trying to vacate a default judgment will have difficulty meeting 2-1401’s meritorious defense element.

Serving The Corporate Defendant – An IL Case Note

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(Photo credit: www.corbusimages.com)

This case piqued my interest since I recently spent an obscene amount of time trying to serve a defendant in a commercial lease dispute.  It wasn’t until after my process server gave sworn testimony for nearly an hour at an evidentiary hearing that the court finally (and mercifully) put the service issue to bed and allowed us to proceed with prosecuting the case.

A few weeks ago (late June 2014), the First District appeals court examined the importance of proper process service in the context of a petition to vacate a default judgment.  The commercial tenant in Essi v. Fiduccia, 2014 IL App (1st) 120203-U, sued her ex-landlord for wrongful eviction.  After serving the summons and complaint on who she thought was the defendant at his insurance agency office, the plaintiff got a default judgment of nearly $300,000 – a sum comprised of lost profits, lost equipment and punitive damages.  About four months later, the defendant filed a petition to vacate the default judgment.  The trial court granted the petition and plaintiff appealed.

Held: Affirmed.  Trial court properly granted defendant’s petition to vacate the default judgment.

Rules/Reasoning:

The defendant’s petition to vacate the default judgment was properly granted because the defendant was never served.  In Illinois a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over a party is void and can be attacked at any time and the petitioner doesn’t have to show due diligence or a meritorious defense.  735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), (¶¶ 28-29).

Code Section 2-203 (735 ILCS 5/2-203) governs service of process on individual and corporate defendants in Illinois.  Permissible service methods are (1) personal service – delivering a copy of process to the defendant personally; or (2) substitute or abode service: leaving a copy of process at defendant’s usual place of abode with someone living there over the age of 13, and informing the person of the contents of the summons.  A corporation can be served by leaving the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere in the state.  (¶45); 735 ILCS 5/2-203.

A sheriff or process server’s return of service that reflects personal service on a defendant is presumptively valid and can only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence.  Uncorroborated, self-serving testimony of a defendant who claims he wasn’t served is usually insufficient to challenge a sheriff’s or process server’s sworn return.  (¶¶ 29, 36-37).  Conversely, where a defendant does submit a properly supported affidavit contesting service, the plaintiff must have the process server testify at an evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances surrounding the challenged process service.  (¶ 37).

Here, the sheriff deputy’s return stated that process was served on the defendant at his insurance agency’s office.  But this was only a business address.  The defendant didn’t live there.  Defendant supported his petition to vacate with two affidavits: one from him, the other from his brother who is also defendant’s business partner.  Defendant’s brother testified that he was the only one in the insurance officer at the date and time on the sheriff’s return and accepted the papers because he thought they were insurance documents. Defendant, for his part, testified in his affidavit that he was never served at home and that nobody who lived with him was served.  Plaintiff failed to challenge defendants’ affidavits and didn’t call the sheriff deputy to testify in support of his service return (that showed personal service on the defendant).  The Court held that because plaintiff failed to challenge defendants’ affidavits, defendant met the clear and convincing standard for vacating the default judgment.

Afterwords:

This case illustrates that a default judgment entered without proper service can be attacked at any time.  A sheriff’s return of service is prima facie valid but not inviolable.  If a defendant offers sworn testimony contesting service, the plaintiff should call the sheriff deputy or process server to testify at an evidentiary hearing and elicit testimony on the date, time and circumstances surrounding the service on the defendant.  Then, it’s up to the judge to decide based on whose testimony she finds more believable.