Tag: business records

Veil Piercing Claim Triable By Jury; Consumer Fraud Act Applies to Failed Gas Station Sale – IL 3rd Dist.

An Illinois appeals court recently affirmed a $700K money judgment for a gas station buyer in a fraud case against the seller.

The plaintiff gas station buyer in Benzakry v. Patel, 2017 IL App(3d) 160162 sued the seller when the station closed only a few months after the sale.

The plaintiff alleged he relied on the seller’s misrepresenting the financial health and trustworthiness of the station tenant which led the plaintiff to go forward with the station purchase.  Plaintiff sued for common law and statutory fraud and sought to pierce the corporate veil of the LLC seller.

Affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the Third District discusses, among other things, the piercing the corporate veil remedy, the required evidentiary foundation for business records, the reliance element of fraud and the scope of the consumer fraud statute.

Piercing the Corporate Veil: Triable By Bench or Jury?

The jury pierced the seller LLC’s corporate veil and imposed liability on the lone LLC member.

The Court addressed this issue of first impression on appeal: whether a piercing the corporate veil claim is one for the court or jury.  The Court noted a split in Federal authority on the point.  In FMC v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980), the 5th Circuit held that a jury could hear a piercing claim while the  7th Circuit reached the opposite result (only a court can try a piercing action) in IFSC v. Chromas Technologies, 356 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court declined to follow either case since they applied only Federal procedural law (they were diversity cases).  The Court instead looked to Illinois state substantive law for guidance.

Generally, there is no right to a jury trial in equitable claims and piercing the corporate veil is considered an equitable remedy.  However, Code Section 2-1111 vests a court with discretion to direct any issue(s) involved in an equitable proceeding to be tried by a jury.  The appeals court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding that the piercing claim should be decided by a jury. (¶¶ 29-30)

Consumer fraud – Advertisement on Web = ‘Public Injury’

The Third District reversed the trial court’s directed verdict for the defendants on the plaintiff’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) count.  Consumer fraud predicated on deceptive practices requires the plaintiff to prove (1) a deceptive act or practice by a defendant, (2) defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, (4) actual damage to the plaintiff, and (5) damage proximately caused by the deception.

The trial court sided with the defendant on this count since the plaintiff didn’t prove that defendants conduct resulted in injury to the public generally.  CFA Section 10a (815 ILCS 505/10a) used to require a plaintiff to prove that a misrepresentation involved trade practice that addressed the market generally.  However, a 1990 amendment to the Act changed that.  The current version of the Act doesn’t require a plaintiff to show public injury except under limited circumstances.

Even so, the Court still held that the defendant’s misstating the gas station’s annual fuel and convenience store sales on a generally accessible website constituted a public injury under the CFA.

Going further, the Court construed the CFA broadly by pointing to the statutory inclusion of the works “trade” and “commerce.”  This evinced the legislative intent to expand the CFA’s scope.  Since defendant’s misrepresentations concerning the tenant were transmitted to the public via advertisements and to the plaintiff through e-mails, the Court viewed this as deceptive conduct involving trade or commerce under the CFA.  (¶¶ 81-82)

Computer-Generated Business Records: Document Retention vs. Creation

While it ultimately didn’t matter (the business records were cumulative evidence that didn’t impact the judgment amount), the Court found that bank statements offered into evidence did not meet the test for admissibility under Illinois evidence rules.

The proponent of computer-generated business records must show (1) the equipment that created a document is recognized as standard, and (2) the computer entries were made in the regular course of business at or reasonably near the happening of the event recorded.

Showing “mere retention” of a document isn’t enough: the offering party must produce evidence of a document’s creation to satisfy the business records admissibility standard.  Here, the plaintiff failed to offer foundational testimony concerning the creation of the seller’s bank statements and those statements shouldn’t have been admitted into evidence.

Take-aways:

1/ The Court has discretion to order that an equitable piercing the corporate veil claim be tried to a jury;

2/ Inadequate capitalization, non-functioning shareholders and commingling of funds are badges of fraud or injustice sufficient to support a piercing the corporate veil remedy;

3/ Computer-generated business records proponent must offer foundational testimony of a document’s creation to get the records in over a hearsay objection;

4/ False advertising data on a public website can constitute a deceptive practice under the consumer fraud statute.

 

 

Bank’s Business Records and Supporting Affidavit Satisfy Evidence Rules – IL 2nd Dist.

Because they’re so integral to commercial litigation, business records and the myriad evidentiary concerns intertwined with them, are a perennial favorite topic of this blog.

In earlier posts (here and here, I’ve featured US Bank, NA v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759 and Bank of America v. Land, 2013 IL App (5th) 120283, two cases that examine the foundation and authenticity requirements for admitting business records in evidence and probe the interplay between Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 and Illinois Evidence Rule 803(6).

We now can add Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Szpara, 2015 IL App (2d) 140331 to the Illinois business records cannon.  Harmonized, Avdic, Land and Bayview form a trilogy of key business records cases that are useful (if not required) reading for any commercial litigator.

Bayview’s facts parallel those of so many other business records cases: a mortgage foreclosing plaintiff tries to offer business records into evidence at trial or as support for a summary judgment motion and the defendant opposes the records’ admission.

Bayview’s bank plaintiff tried to get damages in evidence via a prove-up affidavit signed by a bank Vice President who didn’t actually create the records in the first place.  The defendant moved to strike the affidavit as lacking foundation.

Affirming summary judgment for the bank, the First District provides a cogent summary of the governing standards for summary judgment affidavits that are employed to get business records into evidence.

First, the court affirmed dismissal of the defendant’s fraud in the inducement affirmative defense – premised on the claim that a mortgage broker allied with the plaintiff made false statements concerning the defendant’s creditworthiness and value of the underlying property.

Fraud in the inducement is a species of common law fraud.  A fraud plaintiff in Illinois must show (1) a false statement of material fact, (2) knowledge or belief that the statement is false, (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting on the statement, (4) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false statement, and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from the reliance.  A colorable fraud claim must be specific with the plaintiff establishing the who, what, and when of the challenged statement.

The Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant’s fraud in the inducement defense was too vague and lacked the heightened specificity required under the law.  The defendant failed to sufficiently plead the misrepresentation and didn’t allege facts showing when the misstatement was made.  As a result, the defense was properly stricken on the bank’s motion. (¶¶ 34-35)

The court then found that the plaintiff’s business records – appended to a bank employee’s affidavit in support of the bank’s summary judgment motion –  were properly admitted into evidence and affirmed summary judgment for the bank.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 and Illinois Evidence Rule 803(6)(“Records of Regularly Conducted Activity”) provide that a business record can be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if (1) the record was made in the regular course of business and (2) was made at or near the time of the events documented in the records.

In  the context of a prove-up affidavit based on business records, the affiant doesn’t have to be the one who personally prepared the record; it’s enough that the affiant has basic familiarity with the records and the business processes used by the party relying on them.

Under Evidence Rule 803(6), the lack of personal knowledge of someone signing an affidavit does not affect the admissibility of a given document, although it could affect the (evidentiary) weight given to that document.   (¶42).

The bank’s Vice President in Bayview testified in her prove-up affidavit that she had access to the business records relating to defendant’s loan, that she reviewed the records, had personal knowledge of how the plaintiff kept and prepared them and that the plaintiff’s regular practice was to keep loan records like the ones attached to the affidavit.

The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the affidavit was deficient since the bank agent wasn’t who created the attached loan records.  Citing to Avdic and Land, the Court found that, in the aggregate, the bank agent affidavit testimony sufficiently met the foundation and authenticity requirements to get the business records in evidence. (¶¶ 41-46)

Afterwords:

This case contains salutary discussion and rulings for plaintiff creditors as it streamlines the process of getting business records into evidence at the summary judgment stage and later, at trial.

Bayview reaffirms the key holdings from Avdic, Land and business records cases like them that an agent who had nothing to do with preparing underlying business records can still attest to the records’ validity and authenticity provided she can vouch for their validity and is familiar with the mode of the records’ creation.

Process Server’s Return of Service Qualifies As Public Records and ‘Regularly Conducted Business Activity’ Hearsay Exceptions – Florida Appeals Court

My experience with the hearsay evidence rules usually involves trying to get a business record like an invoice or spreadsheet into evidence at trial or on summary judgment.  The business records hearsay exception is found at Illinois Evidence Rule 803(6) and mirrors the Federal counterpart.  “Exception” in the context of hearsay evidence means a document is hearsay (an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted) and would normally be excluded but still gets in evidence because the document (or other piece of evidence) has an element of reliability that satisfies the court that the document is what it appears to be.

Occasionally though, I’ve found that a working knowledge of some of the more obscure (to me at least) hearsay exceptions can in some cases lead to a victory or at least resurrect a rapidly flagging case.

Davidian v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2015 WL 5827124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Oct.%202015/10-7-15/4D14-2431.op.pdf) a recent Florida appeals court decision, examines some hearsay exceptions as they apply to a process server’s sworn return of service and the persons served are challenging service.

Chase Bank filed a foreclosure suit against defendants/appellants (a husband and wife) and filed returns of service signed by Chase’s process server who certified that he served both appellants at the same time on the same date. The appellants moved to quash service of process on the grounds they were never served. The trial court denied the motion leading to this appeal.

The appeals court affirmed.  It held the appellants failed to show by clear and convincing proof that the returns of service were deficient.

In Florida, the burden of proving proper service of process is on the suing party and the return of service is evidence of whether service was validly made.  A return of service is presumed to be valid and the party contesting service must overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.  A return of service is technically hearsay since it’s an out-of-court statement used to show its truth – that service of summons was in fact made on a party.

Two hearsay rule exceptions recognized not only by Florida courts but various state and Federal courts include the public records and the “regularly conducted business activity” exceptions.  Fla. Stat. s. 90.801, 803(6), (8).

Here, the court found the service return admissible under both exceptions.  The return was a public record – presumably because it was filed as part of the case record.  The return also qualified as evidence of regularly conducted business activity since the process server stated in his affidavit that was his regular practice to prepare such an affidavit detailing the date, time and manner of service.

The appeals court also rejected appellants’ argument that the service returns were defeated by their counter-affidavits in which they denied receiving the summons and complaint.  When faced with a service return and a defendant claiming he/she wasn’t served, the court makes a credibility determination after an evidentiary hearing.   Factual determinations are typically not disturbed on appeal.  The court found that the trial court was in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and upheld the motion to quash’s denial.

Take-aways:

This case presents application of hearsay exceptions in an unorthodox factual setting.  The court expanded the scope of the public records and regularly-conducted-business-activity exceptions to encompass a process server’s return of service.  This case and others  like it validate process servers’ sworn returns and make it easier for plaintiffs to clear service of process hurdles where a defendant claims to have never been served.