Indy Skyline Photo Spat At Heart Of 7th Circuit’s Gloss on Affirmative Defenses, Res Judicata and Fed. Pleading Amendments – Bell v. Taylor (Part I)

Litigation over pictures of the Indianapolis skyline form the backdrop for the Seventh Circuit’s recent examination of the elements of a proper affirmative defense under Federal pleading rules and the concept of ‘finality’ for res judicata purposes in Bell v. Taylor.

There, several small businesses infringed plaintiff’s copyrights in two photographs of downtown Indianapolis: one taken at night, the other in daytime.  The defendants – an insurance company, a realtor, and a computer repair firm – all used at least one the plaintiff’s photos on company websites.  When the plaintiff couldn’t prove damages, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants and later dismissed a second lawsuit filed by the plaintiff against one of the defendants based on the same facts.  The plaintiff appealed.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment of the first lawsuit and dismissal of the second action on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Turning to the claims against the computer company defendant, the court noted that the defendant denied using the plaintiff’s daytime photo.  The defendant used only the nighttime photo.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to comply with Rule 8(b) by not asserting facts to support its denial that it used plaintiff’s daytime photo.

Rejecting this argument, the court noted that a proper affirmative defense limits or excuses a defendant’s liability even where the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.  If the facts that underlie an affirmative defense are proven true, they will defeat the plaintiff’s claim even if all of the complaint allegations are true.  A defendant’s contesting a plaintiff’s factual allegation is not an affirmative defense.  It is instead a simple denial.  Since the computer defendant denied it used the daytime photo, there was no affirmative matter involved and the defendant didn’t have to comply with Rule 8’s pleading requirements.

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s attempt to amend his complaint several months after pleadings closed.  In Federal court, the right to amend pleadings is broad but not absolute.  Where allowing an amendment would result in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, a court has discretion to refuse a request to amend a complaint.  FRCP 15(a)(2).  Here, the Court agreed with the lower court that the plaintiff showed a lack of diligence by waiting until well after the amending pleadings deadline passed.  The plaintiff’s failure to timely seek leave to amend its complaint supported the court’s denial of its motion.

The Court also affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s second lawsuit on res judicata grounds.  When the District Court entered summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s copyright and state law claims (conversion, unfair competition), plaintiff’s equitable relief claims (declaratory judgment and injunctive relief) were pending.  Because of this, the summary judgment order wasn’t final for purposes of appeal.  (Plaintiff could only appeal final orders – and until the court disposed of the equitable claims, the summary judgment order wasn’t final and appealable.)

Still, finality for res judicata purposes is different from appellate finality.  An order can be final and have preclusive effect under res judicata or collateral estoppel even where other claims remain.  This was the case here as plaintiff’s sole claim against the computer company defendant was for copyright infringement.  The pending equitable claims were directed to other defendants.  So the District Court’s summary judgment order on plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims was final as to the computer defendant.  This finality triggered res judicata and barred the plaintiff’s second lawsuit on the same facts.


The case’s academic value lies in its thorough summary of the pleading requirements for affirmative defenses and the factors guiding a court when determining whether to permit amendments to pleadings.  The case also stresses that finality for appeal purposes is not the same as for res judicata or collateral estoppel.  If an order disposes of a plaintiff’s claims against one but not all defendants, the order is still final as to that defendant and the plaintiff will be precluded from later filing a second lawsuit against that earlier victorious defendant.

Integration Clauses and the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing – An Illinois Case Note

In JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. East-West Logistics, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 121111, the Illinois First District affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff bank in its lawsuit for breach of a commercial guaranty.  In doing so, the Court re-emphasized the key rules governing affirmative defenses, the nature of a guarantor’s liability in Illinois and the content of a proper summary judgment affidavit.  Part I of this post examines the Court’s salient holdings on the court’s Section 2-615 dismissal of the defendant’s affirmative defenses.  Part II will focus on the Court’s dismissal of the guarantor’s fraud counterclaims and the Court’s discussion of summary judgment affidavits.


The guarantor (Defendant is the guarantor’s estate) signed a continuing guaranty in 2003 in which he guaranteed over $1M of a logistics company’s loan debt to plaintiff.  The guaranty provided that the plaintiff could proceed directly against the guarantor without first suing the principal debtor.

Plaintiff sued after the loan matured and the guarantor filed multiple affirmative defenses and counterclaims.  After the guarantor died, his Estate substituted in as defendant and prosecuted the defenses and counterclaims on the guarantor’s behalf.  The trial court struck all defenses and counterclaims and granted summary judgment for the bank in an amount exceeding $2M.  The court also denied the Estate’s motion to strike two of the lender’s summary judgment affidavits.  The Estate appealed

Held: affirmed:

Q: Why?!

A: The Court rejected the Estate’s affirmative defenses that the guaranty was extinguished.  The Estate’s affirmative defenses were deficient under Illinois fact-pleading rules.  In Illinois, an affirmative defense must allege facts with the same degree of specificity required to establish a cause of action.  An affirmative defense should not be stricken where well-pleaded facts raise the possibility that the party asserting the defense will prevail.

Illinois treats a guaranty like any other contract: the same formation and interpretation rules apply.  And while a guaranty is construed in favor of the guarantor (since he’s promising to answer for another’s debt), this rule only applies where there is ambiguity or doubt about a guaranty’s meaning.  Where the guaranty’s terms are clear, the terms should be enforced as written; with no need for outside evidence to interpret  the guaranty’s meaning.  A guarantor will be discharged where a creditor takes  action without the guarantor’s consent that either varies the terms of the underlying obligation or materially increases the guarantor’s risk. (¶¶ 32-33).


The Estate claimed that the guaranty was erases because the plaintiff increased the late guarantor’s liability by continuing to lend money to the corporate debtor knowing that it was in fiscal distress.  The Court disagreed and noted that the guaranty was “unconditional” and “unlimited” and the plaintiff was within its rights to continue lending monies to the corporate borrower without telling the guarantor.  The guarantor also waived any notice of the corporation’s default.  Illinois allows contractual waivers where they are clear and unambiguous.  (¶¶ 35-36).

The Court also upheld the trial court striking the Estate’s breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and integration clause  defenses.  Good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract, including guaranties.  A creditor has a good-faith obligation to inform the guarantor of any facts that will materially increase the guarantor’s risk beyond that which he intended to assume.  But parties are still entitled to enforce a contract to the letter and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can’t overrule the express terms of a written contract.

Here, the  duty of good faith and fair dealing didn’t alter the clear and expansive guaranty language.  The guaranty required  the decedent/guarantor to actively monitor the corporate debtor’s financial state.  As a result, the bank’s continued loans to the struggling corporate borrower without informing the guarantor didn’t violate the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (¶¶47-52).

The Court also rejected the Estate’s claim that an integration clause in the underlying loan agreement (between the bank and the corporation) terminated the deceased’s guaranty obligations.  An integration clause  manifests the parties’ intent to protect against misinterpretations of a contract that might arise from extrinsic evidence.  It bars from consideration any evidence outside of the contract that tries to explain a certain term’s meaning. 

Here, since the deceased wasn’t party to the underlying loan contract (it was between the  bank and a corporation), he couldn’t rely on that contract’s integration clause to affect his guaranty obligations.  As a result, the loan agreement integration clause didn’t impact the guarantor’s obligations.  (¶¶ 59-63).

Conclusion: East-West Logistics presents a thorough summary of Illinois’ pleading rules for affirmative defenses and the substantive law on written guaranty construction and enforcement.  Even though a guarantor is a proverbial “favorite” of the law, a guaranty will still be enforced as written – no matter how seemingly  harsh the terms are.  The case reaffirms the proposition that a breach of implied duty of good faith defense can’t override clear, countervailing language in a written contract.  It’s also post-worthy for its discussion of the purpose and scope of integration clauses in written contracts.