Fraud In the Inducement and Fraudulent Concealment – Illinois Primer

hoodwinkIn Thorne v. Riggs, 2013 IL App (3d) 120244-U (September 3, 2013), the trial court rescinded a real estate contract and the Third District affirmed.  In doing so, the Court examined Illinois fraud in the inducement and fraudulent concealment law and discussed the “special relationship” fiduciary duty rule.

Facts: Plaintiffs sued two LLC members alleging they fraudulently induced them into investing in a realty development.  Plaintiffs claimed the defendants misstated the deal’s status, timing, and whether an easement existed on the property. After trial, the trial court rescinded the contract and ordered defendants to return plaintiffs’ $1.2M investment.

Holding: Appellate Court affirmed trial court.

Reasoning/rules:  Plaintiffs’ fraud claims were premised on defendants’ misrepresentations and concealing material information about the project.

To show fraud in the inducement,  a plaintiff  must show (1) a defendant’s false statement of material fact, (2) known or believed to be false by the defendant; (3) intended to induce the plaintiff to act; (4) plaintiff acted in reliance on the truth of the representation; and (5) resulting damage ¶ 45.

Fraudulent concealment requires a showing that: (1) defendant concealed a material fact under circumstances creating a duty to speak; (2) defendant intended to induce a false belief; (3) plaintiff couldn’t have discovered truth through reasonable inquiry or inspection (or was prevented from doing so); (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; (5) plaintiff would have acted differently if he was aware of the hidden information; and (6) damages. ¶ 62.

A fraudulent concealment plaintiff must also show a fiduciary relationship between him and the defendant.  Fiduciary relationships can exist (a) as a matter of law; or (b) where there is a special or confidential relationship.  The former (as a matter of law) category includes attorneys and clients, principals and agents and partners in a partnership and joint venturers in a joint venture.  Thorne, ¶ 63.

The “special relationship” fiduciary duty rule applies where one party puts trust and confidence in another who stands in a dominant position in terms of age, education, mental status or business acumen. (¶ 64).

Applying these elements, the Court held that the plaintiffs proved fraud in the inducement and fraudulent concealment at trial.

(1) Misrepresentation/concealment: defendants misrepresented status of the project and failed to alert plaintiffs that part of the property was subject to an easement and repurchase agreement (¶¶ 47-63);

(2) Knowledge of falsity – multiple witnesses testified that defendants knew of storm water issues affecting the parcels for several years but never told plaintiffs (¶¶ 52, 57);

(3) Justifiable reliance: defendants controlled the flow of information from the municipality concerning the project’s status.  Defendants divulged only selective information to plaintiffs concerning governmental requirements necessary to complete the project.  The defendants control of information made it reasonable for plaintiffs to rely on defendants.  (¶ 69, 82-83).

The court rejected defendants argument that the information was public record and therefore prevented a finding of justifiable reliance.  The court stressed that plaintiffs were neophyte investors who relied on defendants’ real estate experience.

Another factor relied on by the Court was the absence of record evidence that the easement or the storm water issues were recorded public documents.  (¶ 82).

(4) Fiduciary Duty: while plaintiffs were highly educated, they were real estate novices compared to defendants and completely relied on defendants’ expertise.  This led the Court to sustain the trial court’s “special relationship” fiduciary duty finding.  The Court also found that since defendants controlled the project information they received from the Municipality, they owed plaintiffs a precontractual fiduciary duty.  (¶ 69);

(5) Inducement – there was no other reason for defendants to represent that there were no impediments to plat approval other than to entice plaintiffs to sign the purchase agreement (¶¶ 73-75);

(6) Injury/Damages – plaintiff paid $1.2M for an investment that was promised not to exceed $550,000.  (¶¶ 85-86).

Take-aways: Both plaintiffs had multiple post-graduate degrees.  Still, the court found that they relied on and were in a vulnerable position compared to the defendants, experienced real estate developers.

Thorne also illustrates that where a defendant monopolizes the flow of a deal’s information from outside sources (i.e. a governmental agency), the plaintiff can establish the justifiable reliance prong of his fraud claim.


Illinois Court: LLC Member Can File Mechanics’ Lien Against Property Owned by That LLC

How meta is this fact pattern? Peabody-Waterside v. Islands of Waterside, LLC, 2013 IL App (5th) 120490, examines the distinction between LLC entity liability and an LLC member’s personal liability through the lens of a mechanics lien claim filed against an LLC by one of its own members.

Recall that Illinois law recognizes a clear line of demarcation between the LLC entity and its constituent members.

A judgment against a limited liability company (LLC) doesn’t equate to a judgment against an LLC member.  805 ILCS 180/10-10.  Similarly, a judgment against an LLC member isn’t binding on the LLC.  805 ILCS 180/30-20(a), (b).

A judgment creditor of an LLC member cannot look to LLC assets to satisfy the judgment.  Instead, the creditor must seek a “charging order” against the LLC’s distribution to the member – the member’s “distributional interest.”

In Peabody, the defendant LLC owned real estate that had a $7.5M mortgage on it.  That LLC was itself comprised of two separate LLCs, each holding a 50% interest in the defendant.  The plaintiff was one of the LLC members.

Plaintiff recorded a contractor’s lien against the LLC’s property for about $4.5M after the plaintiff did site preparation and grading work on the site under a written cost-plus construction contract with the LLC owner.  Plaintiff sued naming the owner LLC and the lender as defendants.

The prior lender moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s lien claim.  It (the lender) argued that since the plaintiff – as 50% member of the owner entity – was in effect a “joint owner” of the property, it couldn’t lien its own property.  The trial court agreed and entered judgment for the lender. The plaintiff appealed.

Result: Reversed.

Q: Why?

A: The general rule is that a contractor can’t lien its own property. ¶ 8.  For example, a joint venturer can’t lien property owned by the joint venture.  That’s because joint venturers are each viewed as co-owners of the joint venture’s property and the law doesn’t allow a co-owner to lien his own property.

Not so with an LLC.  Where property is titled in an LLC, the members do not have ownership interests in the property.  An LLC has an independent legal existence from its members and managers.  Any real or personal property that an LLC owns is owned by the LLC; not its members.

Membership in an LLC does not confer an ownership interest in the LLC’s real or personal property.  An LLC member is not a co-owner of LLC property and has no transferable interest in it.  805 ILCS 180/30-1.

Here, since the liened property was owned by the LLC, plaintiff – a member – wasn’t a joint owner of the property.  In addition, contrary to the lender’s argument, there was no evidence of fraud or collusion between the plaintiff, the other LLC’s other member and the LLC property owner.  ¶¶ 10-11.  As a result, plaintiff’s mechanics lien was valid.

Take-aways: Peabody-Waterside provides solid example of a court recognizing the separate, independent existence of an LLC from its members.

The Court also shows a willingness to look at “policy” reasons or equitable concerns in reaching its holding: it discussed how the plaintiff had a standard cost-plus contract with the owner, that it performed over $4.5M worth of services that enhanced the land and wasn’t paid.

Taken together, these factors weighed in favor of allowing the plaintiff’s lien.

Construction Manager Who ‘Controls’ Site Can Be Liable For Subcontractor Employee’s Injury

Calloway v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2013 WL 4428894 (1st Dist. 2013) examines a construction manager’s negligence liability to a subcontractor’s employee where the construction manager entrusts work to the subcontractor but still exercises some control over its work.

Facts: A father and son were piping installers for a subcontractor on a construction project managed by the defendant.  They sustained fatal (father) and permanent (son) injuries when a trench wall collapsed. The father’s estate sued the defendant for wrongful death and the son sued for negligence.

Held: The First District upheld the jury verdict of over $8M for the son and just over $1M for the Estate (after a 49% damages reduction for contributory negligence) against the defendant.


Affirming the jury verdict, the court held that the defendant construction manager entrusted the underground piping work to the subcontractor (the father and son’s employer).  However, it also exercised a sufficient amount of supervisory control over the subcontractor and was responsible for overall project safety.  These rules were integral to the court’s decision:

one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s acts or omissions;

– If the employer retains control over the operative detail of the contractor’s work, the employer is liable under agency law principles (i.e. respondeat superior);

– if the employer retains only supervisory control – such as power to direct timing of the work or to forbid the work from being done in a potentially harmful way – the employer can be liable unless he exercises that control with reasonable care to prevent injury to others;

– when a contractor entrusts part of work to a subcontractor but superintends the entire job through a foreman, the entrusting contractor can be liable if  he (1) fails to prevent the subcontractor from jeopardizing the safety of others; (2) knows or should know that the subcontractor is engaging in unreasonable dangerous activity; and (3) has the opportunity to prevent the dangerous activity by exercising his retained power of control;

– a principal contractor’s right to order work stopped or started, to inspect its progress or receive reports, or make recommendations is not enough – standing alone – to confer liability on the principal contractor;

– the key inquiry in determining whether a contractor owes a duty of care under negligence rules turns on whether the contractor retains control or the right to supervise the contractor.

¶¶ 47-50; Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 414

The court found that defendant entrusted the underground piping work to plaintiffs’ employer and did more than just administrative work on the job.  The contract documents gave defendant the authority to act as the owner’s agent and afforded it wide latitude in bidding and choosing contractors on the project.  ¶¶ 60-63.

The court cited as support for its findings the evidence that defendant was in charge of overall project safety and even produced safety videos and published safety protocols.  Several witnesses also testified that defendant had day-to-day control over the project and actively monitored its progress.  ¶¶ 68-75.

Witness Discovery Deposition Admitted Into Evidence As A Party Admission

The court affirmed the trial court’s allowing defendant’s former employee’s discovery deposition to be read to the jury.  Rule 212(a)(5) allows a discovery deposition to be used at trial where the deponent isn’t a retained expert, his evidence deposition hasn’t been taken and he can’t testify due to death or infirmity.  SCR 212(a)(5).

The First District found that Rule 212(a)(5) didn’t apply since the deponent wasn’t dead or sick. He was just out of the country.  However, under Rule 212(a)(2) and (3), the discovery deposition was properly read to the jury as a party admission.  These sections specifically allow discovery depositions to come into evidence as party admissions.  A statement is not hearsay if (1) it’s a statement offered against a party; (2) is a statement by the party’s agent (3) concerning a matter within the scope of the agency and (4) is made during the existence of the relationship.  ¶ 88.

The court found that the deposition met all of the rule’s requirements for a party admission and was properly read to the jury.  ¶ 89.

Conclusion: Calloway discusses an entire gamut of important and recurring substantive, procedural and evidentiary topics including compensable damages, contributory negligence, the Dead Mans’ Act, the hearsay rule and exceptions, proper discovery sanctions and the importance of jury instructions.  The case is especially instructive on the entrustment rule – derived from Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Calloway makes clear that regardless what the contract documents say, if a construction manager retains a sufficient level of supervisory or “superintending” control over a project, it can be subject to negligence liability to third parties if it fails to exercise reasonable care.