Quantum Meruit Basics – Illinois Law

QMQuantum meruit (Latin derivation: “as much as he deserved”) has repeatedly saved the day in situations where my client has performed services for a defendant but there is a contractual defect (such as missing price terms or an unclear completion date)that makes suing under a breach of contract impossible.  Time and again, quantum meruit has proved to be a valuable fallback or “Plan B” to a failed breach of express contract claim.  The remedy has ensured that my client at least gets something in situations where it would normally get nothing.

I’ve found quantum meruit to be especially useful in view of the realities of modern-day business transactions.  In my experience, it seems that contracts are often entered into by people (usually non-lawyers) who are bound and determined to get a deal done.  No matter what.  This single-mindedness of purpose often results in a myopic focus on finalizing the agreement instead of a meaningful consideration of a deal’s details or the possible consequences that could flow from a future breach.  It’s no surprise then, that key contract terms are often omitted, agreements aren’t signed, or are signed by the wrong parties.

Bernstein and Grazian, P.C. v. Grazian and Volpe, P.C., 402 Ill.App.3d 961 (1st Dist. 2010) provides a good summary of  quantum meruit’s pleading and proof elements.  The case is a partnership dispute between two law firms fighting over  – what else? – fees.  The plaintiffs (a dissolved law firm and representative of a deceased partner of that firm) filed suit for monetary and injunctive relief against defendants,  two former law partners of the plaintiff firm and those partners’ current firm. 

The trial court ruled against plaintiffs on breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims but entered judgment for plaintiffs on a quantum meruit theory – awarding them 10% of the attorneys’ fees collected on open files which defendants’ firm assumed after plaintiff firm’s dissolution.  Id. at 965-966.   The First District reversed.  It held that there was insufficient evidence for the court to award 10% of attorneys’ fees earned on all pending cases which were formerly plaintiff’s (and were now defendants’ cases).  Volpe, 402 Ill.App.3d at 980. 

The black letter quantum meruit elements: (1) plaintiff performed a service to benefit the defendant; (2) he did not perform the  service gratuitously; (3) defendant accepted plaintiff’s service; and (4) no contract existed to prescribe payment for this service. 

The quantum meruit plaintiff has the burden of proving that valuable services were rendered by him, that the services were received by defendant, and the circumstances are such that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain the benefits of plaintiff’s services.  The measure of quantum meruit recovery is the “reasonable value of work” and the plaintiff must show that its uncompensated services were of measurable benefit to defendant.  Volpe, 402 Ill.App.3d at 979. 

The Court held that while defendants did benefit from plaintiff’s legal services, plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to substantiate the trial court’s quantum meruit award.  Id. at 979-80.  The plaintiff didn’t offer the court any basis to quantify the value of the plaintiff’s services.  As a result, the plaintiffs ended up with nothing.

Conclusion – I always file quantum meruit as an alternative claim to a breach of contract claim.  Illinois  Code Sections 2-604 and 2-613 permit alternative pleading.  This does two things: (1) it ensures that my client at least gets something in the event of a contract defect or if my client is in breach; and (2) it mitigates the all-or-nothing nature of only proceeding on a breach of contract theory.  When pleading quantum meruit, I also make sure I don’t incorporate by reference my breach of contract allegations.  

By definition, quantum meruit can’t co-exist with a breach of express contract claim.  Some firms love (and I do mean love) to file motions to strike complaints on this basis.  The Volpe case ( and others like it) shows that a quantum meruit plaintiff must do more than simply allege that he benefitted a defendant.  Instead, the plaintiff must produce competent evidence that quantifies the monetary value of plaintiff’s services.

 

7th Circuit Tackles Registering State Court Judgments In Fed. Court, Removal Jurisdiction

GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Company, Inc., 2013 WL 1846541 (7th Cir. 2013) examines Federal jurisdiction and removal practice and how those rules impact creditors’ rights in post-judgment proceedings. 

Facts and Procedural History: Plaintiff obtained a multi-million dollar judgment in North Carolina state court against Defendant.  

The defendant then secretly transferred several million dollars to a Chicago bank that recorded liens against the funds and all other defendant assets.

When plaintiff found out about the transfer, it registered the NC judgment in Illinois and issued a third-party citation against the bank to whom defendant transferred its assets.

The judgment debtor (and defendant in the NC state court case) moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois under diversity jurisdiction rules.  

Plaintiff objected to removal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and sought remand back to NC state court.  The Northern District denied Plaintiff’s remand attempt and kept the case. 

Held: Reversed.  The District Court should have granted plaintiff’s motion for remand based on the “forum defendant” rule.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 

Rules/Reasoning: The Northern District had original jurisdiction over the action since there was complete diversity  among the parties: plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation, defendant is a Tennessee corporation, and the third-party respondent bank is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Illinois. 

The Seventh Circuit also held that the District Court had jurisdiction to enforce a state court judgment under section 28 U.S.C. § 1963, which permits a Federal court to register the judgment of another “district court.” 

Giving a broad reading to Section 1963, the Court noted that several state courts use the “district court” moniker.  Because of this, the Court held that the Illinois Northern District could register the NC state court judgment.  *8

But the argument that carried the day for the Plaintiff was the “forum defendant” rule.  This rule states that “a civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 

But the forum defendant rule involves a statutory defect rather than a jurisdictional one: meaning that the defect is waived if not objected to within 30 days of the removal notice. (*9), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)(motion to remand – other than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction – must be brought within 30 days after filing the notice of removal). 

Since the bank’s principal place of business was Illinois, it clearly met the “forum” component of the “forum defendant” test.  The Court also held that the bank was a “defendant” within the rule because its interest in the defendants assets were completely opposed to the plaintiff’s interest. (*11-14). 

Lastly, the Court found that Plaintiff properly objected to removal within 30 days – as evidenced by its motion to reconsider filed 16 days after the Northern District denied its remand motion. 

Take-away:

– If an Illinois party is sued by a foreign plaintiff and the damages exceed $75K, removal isn’t proper.  However, if the plaintiff fails to timely seek a remand, he will have waived the defect and the removal will stand;

– a foreign state court judgment can arguably be registered in a Federal District Court.

 

 

The Fifield Case: Two Years of Continuous Employment = Sufficient Consideration to Enforce Restrictive Covenants

In Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc. 2013 IL App (1st) 120327, http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/1stDistrict/1120327.pdf the Court squarely held that two years of continued employment is required to uphold a noncompetition or nonsolicitation provision.

 Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff resigned about three months after starting his job as an insurance salesman and went to work for a competing firm.  He preemptively sued his former employer seeking a declaration that the noncompete he signed wasn’t enforceable. employment contract were unenforceable.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment   for the plaintiff.  The employer appealed.

Held: Affirmed. 

Rules/Reasoning:

Court rejected the employer’s two main arguments: that (1) the two-year consideration rule didn’t apply because the Plaintiff signed the restrictive covenants before he was hired (and so this wasn’t really a post-employment restriction at all); and (2) the offer of employment itself was sufficient consideration to support the noncompete and nonsolicitation provisions – since Plaintiff was free to refuse to sign the employment contract and go work somewhere else. 

The Court held it didn’t matter whether Plaintiff signed the covenants before or after he was hired since at-will employment can constitute an “illusory benefit” as the employer can fire (and the employee can quit) at any time for any reason.

The Court also held that the two years of continued employment consideration rule applies even where an employee resigns on his own (like Plaintiff).  Fifield, ¶ 19.  And since Plaintiff was only employed for a little more than 3 months after he signed the noncompete, this fell far chronologically short of the requisite two-year period.  Fifield, ¶ 19.  In addition, the “first-year provision” (Plaintiff’s firing without cause during first employment year nullifies restrictive covenants) didn’t affect the Court’s analysis: “at most, [Plaintiff’s] employment was only protected for one year, which is still inadequate under Illinois law.”  Id.

 Take-away: Fifield could spell trouble for employers because it seems to open the door for employees to breach restrictive covenants with impunity – so long as they resign within two years of their start date.  The case also shows that courts may view at-will employment as “illusory benefit” and deem such employment insufficient consideration to enforce post-employment restrictions.  In addition, based on the Court’s discussion of the “first year provision”, employers may be well-served by providing that restrictive covenants won’t bind the employee if he’s fired without cause within two years of his start date.  This would seem to make it easier for an employer to argue that post-employment restrictions are enforceable.