Brannen v. Siefert: A (Legal Malpractice) Case Study (Ill. First Dist.)

image

The Featured Case: Brannen v. Siefert, 2013 IL App (1st) 122067, ¶ 52 (11.19.13)

 

The Facts: Plaintiffs – a land trustee and trust beneficiary – sued the Underlying Defendants, an attorney and his wife, for breach of a written real estate contract for the purchase of a home owned by the plaintiffs.  The strangely worded contract, drafted by Underlying Defendants, called for staggered payments of interest and principle over a several-year period to be credited towards the home’s purchase price.

The Underlying Defendants quickly breached and plaintiffs hired an attorney (the Former Attorneys) to collect the amounts owed under the contract.

The Former Attorneys (a solo practitioner and his professional corporation), unbeknownst to plaintiffs, declared a forfeiture of the contract by written notice to Underlying Defendants.  Several months later, the Underlying Defendants moved out.  At the time they vacated the property, the Underlying Defendants owed plaintiff about $150,000 and hadn’t made any payments for over two years.

The Underlying Case

Displeased with Former Attorneys’ performance, plaintiffs hired substitute counsel who filed a breach of contract suit against Underlying Defendants to recover past and future payments owed under the real estate contract.  The Underlying Defendants successfully moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on the Former Attorneys prior forfeiture notice.  The court found that the Underlying Defendants’ forfeiture remedy foreclosed a damages action by the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs then sued the Former Attorneys for legal malpractice.

The Malpractice Suit

The thrust of plaintiff’s malpractice suit was that the Former Attorneys committed professional negligence by giving up plaintiffs’ contract rights without first consulting them and by failing to explain the legal effect of that remedial choice.  The Former Attorneys argued they did explain how a forfeiture would impact plaintiffs’ rights and that cancelling the contract was the proper remedy since plaintiffs’ primary goal was to retake the property; not recover damages.

After a trial, a jury entered judgment against the Former Attorneys for $199,500 and they appealed.

Held: Affirmed.  

Rules/Reasoning:

In Illinois, a legal malpractice plaintiff must establish: (1) an attorney owed the plaintiff’s a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney breached that duty; (3) the attorney’s breach of duty proximately caused actual damages to the plaintiff.  Expert testimony is usually required to prove that an attorney breached his professional duties to his client.  ¶ 45, 61. 

A legal malpractice plaintiff must prove not only that he would have won the underlying case but that the underlying defendant was solvent enough to pay a judgment.  But the required solvency showing isn’t stringent: the plaintiff doesn’t have to prove a  defendant’s net worth but only needs to show the defendant’s ability to at least partially pay a judgment. ¶ 63.

The jury found the plaintiffs’ expert more believable than the Former Attorneys’.  Plaintiffs’ expert testified that contractual forfeiture was the wrong remedy since under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (the “Forcible Act”) a contract seller like plaintiffs can sue for both possession and money damages.  735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(5), 9-209 (plaintiff can sue for possession and damages).  The plaintiffs’ expert also testified that by declaring a forfeiture – when both Illinois law and the subject real estate contract allowed multiple remedies – the Former Attorneys prevented the plaintiffs from recovering nearly $150,000 in money damages.  ¶¶ 46-49.

The Court also found that plaintiffs established the Underlying Defendants’ solvency.  The trial evidence demonstrated that the Underlying Defendants could at least partially pay a judgment based on their income and other assets.  ¶ 65.  Because the plaintiffs proved each element of their legal malpractice case, the First District affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs.

Take-aways: (1) To win the legal malpractice ‘case within the case’, a malpractice plaintiff must prove he would have won the underlying case but doesn’t have to precisely prove the malpractice defendant’s net worth. It is enough to show that the defendant has a source of income and is able of paying all or part of a judgment; (2) The Forcible Act provides for possession and money damages to a contract home seller where a buyer breaches an installment sales contract; and (3) the forfeiture remedy should be exercised with extreme caution.  That’s because if you nullify a contract, it can bar a later action to recover money damages for breach of contract.

 

Contractor Invoices Not Hearsay Where Offered to Show “Effect On Recipient”

In In re 3RC Mechanical & Contracting Services, LLC v. Climatemp, Inc., 2013 WL 6172673 (N.D.Ill. 2013), the Debtor’s trustee sued the defendant for breach of a construction contract.

The defendant moved for summary judgment and supported the motion with its project manager’s affidavit and over 30 exhibits  – mainly invoices and bills.  The Trustee moved to strike about half of the exhibits on hearsay grounds.

Ruling: Motion denied.  

 

Key Rules:

– summary judgment evidence (either for or against) must be admissible at trial;

– copies of documents can’t simply be “slapped on the back of a party’s statement of facts or its response” with a statement that the documents are “true and correct”;

– a summary judgment affidavit which refers to documents must lay the necessary foundation for those documents;

– ‘hearsay within hearsay’ is not admissible unless each layer of hearsay is properly admitted under a hearsay exception;

– documents generated by third parties can sometimes qualify as admissible business records where they are integrated into the proponent’s own business records and the business relies on those third party records**;

– a statement is hearsay only if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted;

– a statement isn’t hearsay if it’s offered to show its effect on the witness;

– out-of-court invoices are not hearsay where they are offered to show their amount only (not for their contents’ truth)

¶¶ 2-3; FRE 801(c)(2), 803(6).

Applying these rules, the Court found that the bills and invoices appended to the defendant’s affidavit were not offered for their truth.  That is, the contractor didn’t offer the invoices to prove to the court that the third party vendors and contractors actually performed the work contained on the invoices. 

Instead, the invoices were offered to show their effect on the project manager and to illustrate why he charged certain the amounts in question.

The invoices substantiated the affidavit testimony that the defendant had to hire substitute subcontractors after the Debtor failed to perform and went out of business.  ¶¶ 2-3.

The Court also emphasized that the project manager had hands-on involvement with the projects in question and spoke from personal knowledge about what work was was completed on the jobs.  ¶ 3.

Comments: The hearsay (offered for the truth) vs. non-hearsay (to show effect on listener/witness) distinction is a fine-line one.  The effect-on-the-listener/witness rule seems amorphous in that whenever someone attaches a third party’s records to an affidavit, all he has to argue is that the invoices are offered purely to show there impact on the listener/witness.  

The evidence rules laid out in this case should prove helpful to business litigants who are trying to get a third party’s records before a court or jury over a hearsay objection.

 

Illinois Wage Payment Act Doesn’t Apply to Future Payments – Ill. 1st Dist.

moneyIt’s likely a sign of the economic times that there seems to be an uptick* in published cases involving the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 (IWPCA).

The IWPCA offers a powerful remedy for unpaid wages allowing a separated employee to recover money damages from his ex-employer.  Specifically, the IWPCA plaintiff can recover unpaid wages, plus monthly interest at 2%  and attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing his employment contract rights.

Majmudar v. House of Spices (India), Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 130292 examines whether a Wage Act claim applies to unpaid future payments under a multi-year employment contract.  The answer? No, it doesn’t.

In Majmudar, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a five-year written employment contract totaling about $625K plus some additional benefits.  The defendant fired the plaintiff just 15 months into the 60-month term and plaintiff sued under the IWPCA.

After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on his breach of contract count but found for the defendant employer on the Wage Act claim.

On the breach of contract count, the court found that the employer defendant prematurely breached the 5-year contract by firing the plaintiff with 45 months left on the contract. But the court only awarded the plaintiff $173K, less than two years’ worth of payments.

The court found the plaintiff failed to make reasonable efforts to find substitute employment and so didn’t mitigate his damages.

On the IWPCA count, the trial court sided with the defendant on the basis that the statute doesn’t allow recovery for future payments.  Plaintiff appealed.

Affirming the trial court, the First District focused on the IWPCA language allowing a plaintiff to recover earned wages or final compensation.  “Wages” are broadly defined as any compensation owed by an employer to an employee pursuant to an employment contract.

  “Final compensation” means wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of unused vacation pay, holiday pay and any other contractual compensation owed to a separated (as opposed to current) employee.   ¶¶ 11-12, 820 ILCS 115/2. 

The IWPCA requires an employer to pay final compensation to the separated employee by the next scheduled payday and to pay current employees (bi-weekly or semi-monthly) no later than 13 days after the end of the last pay period.  820 ILCS 115/4, 5.

In rejecting plaintiff’s claim for 45 months of future payments, the Court looked to dictionary (Black’s and Merriam-Webster’s) definitions of “compensation” (payment received in return for service rendered) and “owe” (to be obligated to pay for something received) for guidance.

Applying these definitions, the Court held that once the defendant terminated the employment contract, the defendant no longer received anything of value from the plaintiff.

This led the Court to squarely hold that unpaid future wages under a terminated contract are not “final compensation” and cannot be recovered under the Wage Act.  ¶ 15.

Comments: For such a high-dollar contract, the details were surprisingly sparse.

The plaintiff could have pressed for a contract term that said if the employer untimely terminated the contract, plaintiff could accelerate the remaining payments under thr contract.

Majmudar gives the IWPCA a narrow reading – applying it to wages previously earned by a separated employee; not to future payments owed on a terminated contract.