LLC Member Not Liable For Fraud Carried Out On Behalf of LLC

The First District expansively construed Section 10-10 of the Illinois LLC statute (805 ILCS 180/10-10) to immunize LLC managers and members from personal liability for misdeeds carried out on the LLC’s behalf.

In Dass v. Yale, 2013 IL App (1st) 122520, the plaintiffs sued an LLC member (along with a general contractor and sales agent) for construction defects in their Chicago condominium.  They alleged the defendant LLC member made multiple misrepresentations in various written sales documents concerning the property’s roof and plumbing condition and past problems with leaking. 

After getting an uncollectable default judgment against the dissolved general contractor, the plaintiffs focused their case on the individual LLC member.  The Court granted the LLC member’s section 2-619 motion and the plaintiffs appealed.

Held: Affirmed.  Section 10-10 of the LLC Act provides that LLC members are not individually liable for actions taken on behalf of the LLC.

Rules/Reasoning:

Section 10-10 of the Illinois LLC Act plainly provides that liabilities of an LLC – arising in contract or tort – belong solely to the LLC and that LLC members or managers aren’t personally liable for LLC liabilities. 

Members of an LLC can only be personally responsible for LLC liabilities where (a) the LLC articles of organization explicitly provide for personal liability; and (b) the member(s) consents in writing to be personally bound by the articles’ section that imposes personal liability on the member(s). 

In addition, an LLC’s failure to follow corporate formalities in its business is not a basis for imposing personal liability on LLC members or managers. ¶37

Here, the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations against the defendant LLC member were premised on conduct he engaged in while carrying out his marketing efforts on behalf of the LLC.  The plaintiffs’ assertion that the defendant misrepresented the property’s condition and its construction materials alleged conduct occurring in the course of the LLC trying to sell the property.

 Since there was no evidence that the LLC’s organizing papers provided for personal liability or that the defendant consented in writing to liability, Section 10-10 of the LLC  Act clearly immunized the defendant from the plaintiffs’ fraud claims.  (¶¶38-39).

Two cases that figure prominently in the Dass analysis are Carrollo v. Irwin, 2011 IL App (1st) 102765 and Puleo v. Topel (368 Ill.App.3d 63) which, respectively, hold that LLC members aren’t individually liable for obligations occurring prior to LLC formation (Carrollo) or after LLC dissolution (Puleo).  

Dass, Carrollo and Puleo form a three-part case continuum on the issue of an LLC member’s liability for actions taken before, during and after an LLC’s formation and dissolution.  The synthesized holding of the three cases underscores that actions of LLC personnel will not give rise to personal liability; even for intentional torts (i.e., fraud). (¶¶ 39-44).  The LLC Act gives members of unformed LLCs more protection than officers of unformed corporations).

Take-away: A harsh result for plaintiffs trying to sue LLC members for acts taken under the auspices of the LLC.  Dass stands for clear proposition that until the legislature amends the LLC Act, LLC members and managers’ acts are protected – as long as they’re taken in connection with the carrying out the LLC’s business.

 Had the plaintiffs claimed that the LLC member committed fraud individually (and unrelated to his LLC duties), the result may have been different.  

 

Non-Shareholder of ‘Belly Up’ Bakery Can Be Personally Liable on Piercing Claim – IL Court Rules

I’ve seen no hard data to support this but it seems that piercing the corporate veil – as a concept – has seeped into the cultural lexicon and consciousness.  I say this because many people – lawyers and nonlawyers alike – appear to have at least a nodding acquaintance with piercing.  Over and over I hear some variation of:  “Oh, that company’s out of business you say?  Just do that piercing thing.”  (Sigh) If only it were that easy.

Yet, for its perceived prominence in legal and business circles, veil-piercing’s mechanics and elements remain largely shrouded in mystery.  Piercing breeds misinformation and a flurry of questions: is piercing a remedy or a cause of action?  Whom should you sue? Do you sue the officers, directors, employees, shareholders? All of them?  Can you pierce in post-judgment enforcement proceedings?  Or do you have to file a new lawsuit once you find out a company is out of business?  The cases are inconsistent and unclear on these important veil-piercing questions.  See http://paulporvaznik.com/piercing-the-corporate-veil-in-illinois/71 (discussion of piercing generally).

The First District recently answered some of these questions in Buckley v. Abuzir, 2014 IL App (1st) 130469, a trade secrets-cum-veil-piercing case involving rival Chicago-land bakeries.  The plaintiff sued a corporate defendant (a competing bakery) alleging it hired away plaintiff’s top employee and stole plaintiff’s customers and secret recipes.  The court entered a default judgment of over $400,000 against the corporate defendant on the plaintiff’s trade secrets claim.  When collection efforts failed because the corporation was defunct, plaintiff filed a piercing claim against the individual that funded and controlled the judgment corporate debtor.

The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss under Code Section 2-615 on the basis that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to make out a piercing case and because the individual defendant wasn’t a shareholder, director or officer of the corporate debtor.  Plaintiff appealed.

Held: Reversed.  Plaintiff sufficiently pled grounds for piercing under fact-pleading rules and a veil-piercing claim can be brought against a nonshareholder.

Rules/Reasoning:

In reversing the trial court’s dismissal order, the First District aligned itself with multiple jurisdictions which allow a piercing remedy against nonshareholders of a defunct corporation.  The Court’s analysis was informed by the salient piercing principles:

Corporate Formation and The Basic Nature of Veil-Piercing

– A corporation is a separate entity from its constituent shareholders, directors and officers and the whole purpose of incorporating is to shield shareholders from unlimited personal liability;

– Veil-piercing applies where a corporation is dominated by an individual or entity to such an extent that the “separate identity” doesn’t exist and it’s a sham to continue to recognize a separation between company and the controlling agent;

– piercing the corporate veil is not a cause of action; instead, it is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action (here, the underlying cause of action was the trade secrets claim plaintiff initially filed against the competing bakery concern);

– BUT, a plaintiff may bring a separate piercing action to pierce the corporate veil for a judgment previously entered against a corporation;

– Veil-piercing applies almost exclusively in disputes involving close corporations (think Mom and Pop businesses) or one-man corporations.

Buckley, ¶¶ 7-9, 12.

Veil-Piercing’s Elements

The Court also stated and applied Illinois’ familiar veil-piercing elements:

– Illinois courts will pierce the corporate veil where (1) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the component dominant parties doesn’t exist and (2) adhering to the concept of separation between corporate entity and dominant agent would promote injustice or inequitable circumstances;

-the unity of interest element (number (1) above)) alone involves a multi-factored analysis of whether there is evidence of (i) inadequate capitalization; (ii, iii) a failure to issue stock, failure to observe corporate formalities; (iv)-(vi) nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of the corporate debtor, non-functioning corporate officers, (vii)-(xi), absence of corporate records, commingling of funds, diversion of corporate assets to shareholders instead of creditor’s, no arm’s-length dealings with related entities; and whether the corporation is a façade or front from the dominant shareholders.

Application:

The Complaint, while sparse and conclusory, alleged enough facts to satisfy the two overarching piercing elements.  On the unity of interest piercing element, the First District exhaustively (an understatement) canvassed over 20 states’ piercing decisions that permit a piercing plaintiff to bind a nonshareholder to a failed corporation’s judgment debt.  The First District aligned itself with those jurisdiction that allow piercing against individuals who aren’t officers, directors, shareholder or employees of a corporation.  All that’s required is that the defendant be an “equitable” or de facto owner.  If the individual controls a company “behind the scenes” and makes the key funding, hiring and firing decisions, then that individual’s personal assets can be reached via a piercing claim.

The plaintiff’s complaint allegations met the main unity of interest criteria: he hired, fired, funded and managed the corporation that plaintiff sued in the underlying trade secrets case.  The “officers” of that corporation had little or nothing to do with the day-to-day operations of the corporation.  The plaintiff also alleged that the corporation issued no stock and had no shareholders.  If this was true, then defendant not being a shareholder is an illusory defense: there are no shareholders.  (¶¶ 15-33).

The Court also sustained plaintiff’s promotion-of-injustice element allegations.  While the plaintiff’s unadorned allegations were conclusory, they still contained just enough facts to state a piercing claim under Illinois pleading rules.  Plaintiff alleged that the defendant hired away plaintiff’s key employee to gain access to secret recipes and data to unfairly compete with and siphon business from the plaintiff.  These allegations were enough (but not by much) to plead that refusing to pierce would result in unfairness to the plaintiff.  (¶¶ 34-41).

Take-aways: Even though the ultimate ruling is simply a reversal of a Section 2-615 pleadings motion to dismiss, the case’s importance lies in its endorsement of using piercing to reach assets of individuals who aren’t corporate officers, shareholders or employees yet in reality, control and fund the corporate entity.  It’s important to recognize though that the Court didn’t rule on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.  All that is settled is that a plaintiff can allege facts against an “equitable owner”/nonshareholder of a corporation that can lead to personal liability for that nonshareholder.

Creditor Rights In and To a Debtor’s Joint Bank Account – Part II

In re Kuhl, 2012 WL 5935101 (S.D.Ill. 2012) provides a recent synopsis of the rules governing creditor attempts to attach a debtor’s joint bank account.  In it, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sought turnover of the bankrupt debtor’s funds held in three separate joint accounts with her husband.  The debtor challenged the trustee’s turnover motion, claiming that the funds in all three accounts belonged to her non-debtor husband (and not to her).  The court denied the trustee’s motion on two of the accounts and ordered the turnover of 50% (just over $8,000) of the funds in the third account.

In Illinois, a presumption exists that each owner of a joint bank account owns all of the account funds. Once that presumption is established, the burden shifts to the debtor and non-debtor to prove what part, if any, of the account funds belong to the non-debtor and as a result, are exempt from garnishment. 

The factors a court considers to determine ownership of joint bank account monies include: (1) who controls the account funds; (2) the source of the funds (who contributed what to the account?); (3) whether any contribution to the account was a gift to the other account holder; (4) who paid taxes on earnings from the account; and (5) the purpose for which the account was set up.  The first two factors – control and source of funds – are the main factors that dominate the court’s analysis.  Kuhl, at *2.

Here, the non-debtor (debtor’s husband) exclusively funded the three accounts.  Two of the accounts were set up exclusively to pay the non-debtor’s truck payment and the couples’ joint health insurance premiums, respectively.  Because of this, the court found that the debtor didn’t sufficiently control these two accounts and it denied the trustee’s turnover request directed to these accounts.

But the third account was a closer call.  This account had just over $16,000 and was funded solely by the non-debtor husband.  However, the debtor clearly controlled the funds and freely made withdrawals from the account to pay her personal expenses including at Target and Wal-Mart.  Since it was clear that debtor’s use of these account funds clearly benefitted her individually, the Court found that the Trustee was entitled to at least some of the funds.  The Court held that the Trustee was entitled to one-half of the total funds in the account – just over $8,000.  Kuhl, at *3.

Afterwords: This case provides a good summary of the rules that dictate if and when a creditor can attach a joint bank account.  Clearly, the key factors are control (who controls the account?) over the account and contributions (who funded it?) to the account.  Where control and contributions are vested in two separate parties – one debtor, the other a non-debtor – this case shows that the Court can order a “split the baby” distribution so that the creditor gets half the funds while the contributing non-debtor gets to keep the other half.