Truthful Information Can’t Support An Intentional Interference With Employment Suit – IL Court

 

 

The Illinois First District recently discussed the contours of pre-suit discovery requests in cases that implicate fee speech concerns and whether truthful information can ever support an intentional interference with employment claim.

After relocating from another state to take a compliance role with a large bank, the plaintiff in Calabro v. Northern Trust Corporation, 2017 IL App (1st) 163079-U, was fired after only two weeks on the job for failing to disclose his forced removal from a prior compliance position.

When the defendant refused to identify the person who informed it of plaintiff’s prior firing, plaintiff sued to unearth the informant’s identity.  Plaintiff planned to sue that person for intentional interference with plaintiff’s employment contract.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s petition for pre-suit discovery and the plaintiff appealed.

Affirming, the Court construed pre-suit discovery request under Supreme Court Rule 224 narrowly.  That rule allows a petitioner to discover the identity of someone who may be responsible in damages to petitioner.

To initiate a request for discovery under Rule 224, the petitioner files a verified petition that names as defendant the person(s) from whom discovery is sought and states why discovery (along with a description of the discovery sought) is necessary.  An order granting a Rule 224 petition is limited to allowing the plaintiff to learn the identity of the responsible party or to at least depose him/her.

To show that discovery is necessary, the petitioner must present sufficient allegations of actionable harm to survive a Section 2-615 motion to dismiss.  That is, the petition must state sufficient facts to state a recognized cause of action.

But Rule 224 limits discovery to the identity of someone who may be responsible to the petitioner.  A petitioner cannot use Rule 224 to engage in a “vague and speculative quest to determine whether a cause of action actually exists.”

Here, the petitioner didn’t know what was actually said by the third party who alerted defendant to petitioner’s prior compliance role ouster.  The Court viewed this as petitioner’s tacit admission he didn’t know whether he possessed a valid interference claim.

The Court then focused on the veracity of the third-party’s statement.  To be actionable, an intentional interference claim requires the supply of false data about a plaintiff.  Accurate and truthful information, no matter how harmful, cannot underlie an intentional interference action. This is because allowing someone to sue another for imparting truthful information would raise First Amendment problems and discourage dissemination of accurate facts.

Truthful statement immunity is also supported by Section 772 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which makes clear that one who purposely causes another not to perform a contract or enter into a business relationship is not liable for improper interference where that person gives truthful information.  And while the Court pointed out that the Restatement hadn’t been formally adopted the Illinois Supreme Court, appeals courts still looked to the Restatement for guidance on tortious interference questions.  (¶¶ 18-19).

Afterwords:

This case portrays an interesting application of Rule 224 – a device often employed in the personal injury context instead of in the commercial or employment law arenas.  While the rule provides a valuable tool for plaintiffs trying to identify possible defendants, it doesn’t give a petitioner a blank check to engage in wide-ranging, “fishing expedition” requests.  The discovery petitioner must still state a colorable claim as a precondition to obtaining a pre-suit discovery order from the court.

Calabro also vaunts the importance of free speech in our society.  After all, the petitioner’s intentional interference claim was predicated on a true statement – the petitioner was fired from a former compliance role.  The Court makes clear that a valid interference action requires a false statement and that accurate information isn’t actionable interference.

Clearly, the Court viewed the potential for chilling truthful information as more concerning than an individual’s private contract rights with an employer.