Texas Arbitration Provision Sounds Death Knell For Illinois Salesman’s Suit Against Former Employer – IL ND

(“Isn’t that remarkable…..”)

The Plaintiff in Brne v. Inspired eLearning, 2017 WL 4263995, worked in sales for the corporate publisher defendant.  His employment contract called for arbitration in San Antonio, Texas.

When defendant failed to pay plaintiff his earned commissions, plaintiff sued in Federal court in his home state of Illinois under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 (“IWPCA”). Defendant moved for venue-based dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3)

The Illinois Northern District granted defendant’s motion and required the plaintiff to arbitrate in Texas.  A Rule 12(b)(3) motion is the proper vehicle to dismiss a case filed in the wrong venue. Once a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s venue choice, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish it filed in the proper district.  When plaintiff’s chosen venue is improper, the Court “shall dismiss [the case], or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Upholding the Texas arbitration clause, the Illinois Federal court noted the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements except when to do so would violate general contract enforceability rules (e.g. when arbitration agreement is the product of fraud, coercion, duress, etc.)

The Court then turned to plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable.  An agreement is substantively unconscionable where it is so one-sided, it “shocks the conscience” for a court to enforce the terms.

The plaintiff claimed the arbitration agreement’s cost-sharing provision and absence of fee-shifting rendered it substantively unconscionable.

Cost Sharing Provision

Under Texas and Illinois law, a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration is prohibitively expensive must provide individualized evidence to show it will likely be saddled with excessive costs during the course of the arbitration and is financially incapable of meeting those costs.  The fact that sharing arbitration costs might cut in to a plaintiff’s recovery isn’t enough: without specific evidence that clearly demonstrates arbitration is cost-prohibitive, a court will not strike down an arbitration cost-sharing provision as substantively unconscionable.  Since plaintiff failed to offer competent evidence that he was unable to shoulder half of the arbitration costs, his substantive unconscionability argument failed

Fee-Shifting Waiver

The plaintiff’s fee-shifting waiver argument fared better.  Plaintiff asserted  then argued that the arbitration agreement’s provision that each side pays their own fees deprived Plaintiff of his rights under the IWPCA (see above) which, among other things, allows a successful plaintiff to recover her attorneys’ fees. 820 ILCS 115/14.

The Court noted that contractual provisions against fee-shifting are not per se unconscionable and that the party challenging such a term must demonstrate concrete economic harm if it has to pay its own lawyer fees.  The court also noted that both Illinois and Texas courts look favorably on arbitration and that arbitration fee-shifting waivers are unconscionable only when they contradict a statute’s mandatory fee-shifting rights and the statute is central to the arbitrated dispute.

The court analogized the IWPCA to other states’ fee-shifting statutes and found the IWPCA’s attorneys’ fees section integral to the statute’s aim of protecting workers from getting stiffed by their employers.  The court then observed that IWPCA’s attorney’s fees provision encouraged non-breaching employees to pursue their rights against employers.  In view of the importance of the IWPCA’s attorneys’ fees provision, the Court ruled that the arbitration clause’s fee-shifting waiver clashed materially with the IWPCA and was substantively unconscionable.

However, since the arbitration agreement contained a severability clause (i.e. any provisions that were void, could be excised from the arbitration contract), the Court severed the fee-shifting waiver term and enforced the balance of the arbitration agreement.  As a result, plaintiff must still arbitrate against his ex-employer in Texas (and cannot litigate in Illinois).

Afterwords:

This case lies at the confluence of freedom of contract, the strong judicial policy favoring arbitration and when an arbitration clause conflicts with statutory fee-shifting language.  The court nullified the arbitration provision requiring each side to pay its own fees since that term clashed directly with opposing language in the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act.  Still, the court enforced the parties’ arbitration agreement – minus the fee provision.

The case also provides a useful synopsis of venue-based motions to dismiss in Federal court.

 

 

 

 

Contractual Arbitration Clauses and Unconscionability – IL 4th Dist. Case Note

Courts generally favor contractual arbitration clauses. The reason is that they (in theory at least) save litigants’ time and money and also reduce court congestion.

Arbitration provisions appear in varied business settings ranging from franchise agreements and personal services contracts to employment agreements and most everything in between.

Willis v. Captain D’s , 2015 IL App (5th) 140234-U examines an arbitration clause in the employment contract context and whether the clause is expansive enough to cover an employee’s sexual harassment claim involving a co-worker.

There, a plaintiff grocery store cashier signed an employment contract that contained broad arbitration language.  Claiming her co-employee sexually harassed her and the defendant did nothing to stop it, the plaintiff filed multiple state court tort claims without first demanding arbitration. The trial court denied the employer defendant’s motion to compel arbitration finding the plaintiff’s assault and battery claims did not arise out of her employment and were beyond the scope of arbitration.  Defendant appealed.

Held: Reversed

In finding that plaintiff’s claims fell within scope of the arbitration clause, the court announced the key rules that govern arbitrability:

Under the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act, 710 ILCS 5/1 et seq., parties are bound to arbitrate the issues they agreed to arbitrate;

– A court (not an arbitrator) decides whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration;

– The two main arbitrability issues are (1) whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration agreement, and (2) whether an arbitration provision applies to a particular type of controversy;

– Where two parties mutually agree to arbitrate, there is sufficient consideration to bind each side to the arbitration provision;

– Inclusion of the phrase “arising out of” or “related to” in connection with an arbitration agreement denotes broad application of the arbitration agreement;

– An arbitration clause will be deemed procedurally unconscionable where it’s difficult to find, read or understand and where a party didn’t have reasonable opportunity to appreciate the clause;

Substantive unconscionability will negate an arbitration agreement where it’s terms are blatantly skewed in one side’s favor to the exclusion of the weaker contracting party or where arbitrating would impose substantial costs on a party;

– Continued employment after notice of an arbitration agreement is sufficient consideration to enforce the agreement.

(¶¶ 12-32)

Validating the arbitration clause, the court held that it was supported by consideration. It found the employer’s promise to employ the plaintiff and to keep employing her in exchange for plaintiff signing the employment contract was sufficient to bind the plaintiff to the arbitration agreement.

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s unconscionability arguments. On the procedural unconscionability front, the court found that the plaintiff had two separate occasions to review and accept the arbitration agreement (plaintiff was previously hired a few years ago by the same defendant) and the arbitration language conspicuously appeared in all-caps. It wasn’t buried in a maze of fine print.

Substantively, the court found that the plaintiff failed to support her claim that submitting to arbitration was cost-prohibitive – especially since the court filing fee exceeds the contractual arbitration fee.

The court also found that the arbitration agreement encompassed the plaintiff’s claims. While her assault and battery claims were against an individual employee, her remaining claims against the corporate defendant sounded in negligent hiring, retention and supervision. In light of the arbitration clause’s sweeping language, these claims clearly fell within the reach of the arbitration clause.

Take-aways:

– The court (not an arbitrator) determines whether a dispute is subject to arbitration;

– A promise of employment conditioned on employee signing arbitration agreement will likely meet requirements of a valid contract;

– Broad arbitration language that contains “arising out of” and “related to” phrasing will constitute strong support for a broad application of an arbitration clause.

Illinois Wage Payment Act Doesn’t Apply to Future Payments – Ill. 1st Dist.

moneyIt’s likely a sign of the economic times that there seems to be an uptick* in published cases involving the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 (IWPCA).

The IWPCA offers a powerful remedy for unpaid wages allowing a separated employee to recover money damages from his ex-employer.  Specifically, the IWPCA plaintiff can recover unpaid wages, plus monthly interest at 2%  and attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing his employment contract rights.

Majmudar v. House of Spices (India), Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 130292 examines whether a Wage Act claim applies to unpaid future payments under a multi-year employment contract.  The answer? No, it doesn’t.

In Majmudar, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a five-year written employment contract totaling about $625K plus some additional benefits.  The defendant fired the plaintiff just 15 months into the 60-month term and plaintiff sued under the IWPCA.

After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on his breach of contract count but found for the defendant employer on the Wage Act claim.

On the breach of contract count, the court found that the employer defendant prematurely breached the 5-year contract by firing the plaintiff with 45 months left on the contract. But the court only awarded the plaintiff $173K, less than two years’ worth of payments.

The court found the plaintiff failed to make reasonable efforts to find substitute employment and so didn’t mitigate his damages.

On the IWPCA count, the trial court sided with the defendant on the basis that the statute doesn’t allow recovery for future payments.  Plaintiff appealed.

Affirming the trial court, the First District focused on the IWPCA language allowing a plaintiff to recover earned wages or final compensation.  Wages” are broadly defined as any compensation owed by an employer to an employee pursuant to an employment contract.

  “Final compensation” means wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of unused vacation pay, holiday pay and any other contractual compensation owed to a separated (as opposed to current) employee  ¶¶ 11-12, 820 ILCS 115/2. 

The IWPCA requires an employer to pay final compensation to the separated employee by the next scheduled payday and to pay current employees (bi-weekly or semi-monthly) no later than 13 days after the end of the last pay period.  820 ILCS 115/4, 5.

In rejecting plaintiff’s claim for 45 months of future payments, the Court looked to dictionary (Black’s and Merriam-Webster’s) definitions of “compensation” (payment received in return for service rendered) and “owe” (to be obligated to pay for something received) for guidance.

Applying these definitions, the Court held that once the defendant terminated the employment contract, the defendant no longer received anything of value from the plaintiff.

This led the Court to squarely hold that unpaid future wages under a terminated contract are not “final compensation” and cannot be recovered under the Wage Act.  ¶ 15.

Comments: For such a high-dollar contract, the details were surprisingly sparse.

The plaintiff could have pressed for a contract term that said if the employer untimely terminated the contract, plaintiff could accelerate the remaining payments under thr contract.

Majmudar gives the IWPCA a narrow reading – applying it to wages previously earned by a separated employee; not to future payments owed on a terminated contract.