Florida Series III: Parent Company’s Merger Doesn’t Impact Subsidiary’s Noncompete with M.D.

Collier HMA v. Menichello a medical noncompete dispute, considers whether a third party can enforce a noncompete after a merger.  Jettisoning the “changed corporate culture and mode of operation” test, the Florida appeals court applied basic principles of corporate law to determine whether a parent company’s merger necessarily meant its subsidiary merged too and couldn’t enforce a noncompete involving one of its staff doctors.

Halfway through a three-year employment contract between the plaintiff and doctor defendant, the plaintiff’s corporate parent was acquired by another entity.  The plaintiff-doctor employment contract contained a 12-month noncompete and specifically said it was not enforceable by third parties, successors or assignees of the parties.

After the acquisition, the doctor defendant quit and went to work for one of plaintiff’s competitors.  The plaintiff sued the doctor for violating the 12-month noncompete. The doctor defended by stating that the parent company’s merger with another entity made the plaintiff a successor under the law that could not enforce the restrictive covenant.  The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment for the doctor.  The employer appealed.

Held: Reversed.  Plaintiff employer can enforce the doctor’s noncompete.

Reasons:

Under Florida law, S. 542.335(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2012),  an employment contractual provision that authorizes a third-party beneficiary, assignee or successor to enforce a restrictive covenant is valid.

The statute is silent on the meaning of “successor” but case law defines it to mean “a corporation that, through amalgamation, consolidation or other assumption of interests, is vested with the rights and duties of an earlier corporation.”

Here, the plaintiff employer’s status did not change after its parent company’s merger.  Under the law, a parent corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its wholly-owned subsidiary.  As a corollary, a parent company cannot exercise rights of its subsidiary.

The subsidiary plaintiff here continued its existence after the merger as the same single member LLC and didn’t sell or transfer its assets to another entity.  Any change in company ownership several tiers up the corporate chain simply didn’t impact the doctor’s employment contract since plaintiff continued to operate and to employ the doctor.  As the lone signer of the employment contract that contained the noncompete, plaintiff could enforce it.

Afterwords:

The Court refused to apply the nebulous “culture and mode of operation” test which looks to the parties’ post-merger conduct (i.e., did the parties act as though the acquiring company was dictating the acquired company subsidiary’s actions?) to decide whether a third-party can enforce a noncompete.  Instead, the Court considered whether the plaintiff continued its operations (it did) in the wake of the parent company’s merger.

Under black-letter corporate law principles, the Court found that the plaintiff’s parent company’s merger had no impact on the plaintiff as “no other entity emerged from the transaction as a successor to [plaintiff].”  Summary judgment for the plaintiff reversed.

 

Medical Practice Break-Up Spawns Non-Compete Dispute

imageThe bitter breakup of a medical practice provides the setting for the Illinois Fifth District to consider the scope of a non-compete clause and how it impacts a minority shareholder’s buy-out rights.

Gingrich v. Midkiff, 2014 IL App (5th) 120332-U presents a dispute between two former partners in a medical corporation.  At the medical practice’s inception – in the late 1990s – the parties signed a stock purchase agreement that contained a 5-year/20-mile non-compete provision (the “Non-Compete”).

The Non-Compete only applied in two situations: (1) if a shareholder withdrew from the practice after giving the required written notice; or (2) where a shareholder was expelled from the practice.  The parties’ relationship quickly soured and in 2002, a decade-long cycle of litigation between the two doctors ensued.

The 2002 Lawsuit

A 2002 lawsuit between the parties culminated in the plaintiff buying defendant’s stock in the medical corporation.  The court in the 2002 case didn’t rule on whether the Non-Compete was enforceable.

The 2007 (and current) Lawsuit

In the 2007 case, plaintiff sued defendant alleging the defendant violated the Non-Compete by going to work for a rival practice within 20 miles of plaintiff’s office. 

The trial court dismissed.  It held that the Non-Compete didn’t apply because defendant didn’t withdraw and wasn’t expelled from the medical corporation.  Plaintiff appealed.

Ruling: Affirmed.

Reasoning:

The court rejected plaintiff’s law of the case (LOTC) argument.  The LOTC doctrine prevents relitigation of an issue of fact or law previously decided in the same case.  ¶ 14.  Its purpose is to avoid repetitive litigation of the same issues and to foster finality and consistency in litigation.  LOTC reflects the court’s preference to generally not reopen previously decided issues.

Here, there was no adjudication of the Non-Compete in the 2002 case.  The core issue litigated in that first suit was the valuation of defendant’s shares and whether plaintiff served a proper election to purchase those shares.

Since the cardinal issues in the 2002 and 2007 Lawsuits substantively differed, LOTC didn’t prevent defendant from challenging the Non-Compete in the 2007 case. ¶¶  17-19.

The court also found the Non-Compete wasn’t enforceable.  In Illinois, noncompetition clauses in the medical services context are heavily scrutinized and only validated where they have reasonable time and space limits.

¶¶ 22-24.

Finding the Non-Compete unambiguous, the Court held that the 5 year/20-mile strictures attached in only two circumstances: where a shareholder either (1) withdrew or (2) was expelled from the practice.  Here, defendant  didn’t withdraw and she wasn’t expelled.  As a result, the Non-Compete didn’t prevent the defendant from practicing within twenty miles of plaintiff’s office.  ¶¶ 25-29.

Afterwords: Clarity in contract drafting is critical.  The case illustrates that a Court won’t strain to find ambiguity where contract language is facially clear.  Gingrich also illustrates that a restrictive covenant will be construed in favor of permitting, instead of stifling, competition.  In hindsight, the plaintiff should have made it clear that if a shareholder departed the medical practice for any reason: whether voluntary, forced, or after a buy-out, the non-compete would still govern.