Tag: legal malpractice

Contractor’s Legal Malpractice Suit Can Go Forward In Case of (Alleged) Misfiled Mechanics’ Lien: IL 1st Dist.

Construction Systems, Inc. v. FagelHaber LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 141700, dramatically illustrates the perilous consequences that can flow from a construction contract’s failure to identify the contracting parties and shows the importance of clarity when drafting releases intended to protect parties from future liability.

The plaintiff contractor sued its former law firm (the Firm) for failing to properly perfect a mechanics lien against a mortgage lender on commercial property.  The plaintiff alleged that because of the Firm’s lien perfection failure, the plaintiff was forced to settled its claim for about $1.3M less than the lien’s worth (about $3M). 

In the underlying lien case, the plaintiff and defendant Firm got into a fee dispute and the Firm withdrew.  The Firm turned over its file to the plaintiff after the plaintiff made a partial payment of the outstanding fees (owed to defendant Firm) and signed a release (the “Release”). The Release, which referenced “known and unknown” claims and contained “without limitation” verbiage, was signed by the plaintiff in 2004.  Plaintiff filed the current malpractice suit in 2009.

The trial court entered summary judgment for the Firm on the basis that the Release immunized the Firm from future claims.  Plaintiff appealed.

Held: Reversed

Rules/Reasons:

Reversing summary judgment for the Firm, the First District first applied the relevant rules governing written releases in Illinois.

– a release is a contract and is governed by contract law;

– a release will be enforced as written where it’s clearly worded

– the scope and effect of a release is controlled by the intention of the parties;

– the intention of the parties is divined by reference to the words of the release and a release won’t be construed to defeat a claim that was not contemplated by the parties when they signed it;

– A “general” release will not apply to specific claims where a party is unaware of other (specific) claims;

– Where one party to a release owes the other a fiduciary duty (e.g. lawyer-client), the party owing the fiduciary duty has the burden of showing that it disclosed all relevant information to the other party.

(¶¶ 25-28).

Here, the court gave the Release a cramped construction.  It held that it didn’t apply to the malpractice suit since that case wasn’t filed until 5 years after the Release was signed and there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew that the Firm possibly flubbed the lien filing when it (the plaintiff) signed the Release.  This lack of evidence on the parties’ intent raised a disputed fact question that required denial of summary judgment.

Next, the court turned to the Firm’s judicial estoppel argument – that the plaintiff couldn’t sue for malpractice since it obtained a benefit in the underlying lawsuit (a settlement payment of $1.8M from the competing lender) by claiming it was an original contractor and not a subcontractor.  Judicial estoppel applies where (1) a party takes two positions under oath, (2) in separate legal proceedings, (3) the party successfully maintained the first position and obtained a benefit from it; and (4) the two positions are inconsistent.  (¶ 37).

The issue was paramount to the underlying lien case because if the plaintiff was a subcontractor, it had to comply with the 90-day notice requirement of Section 24 of the Lien Act.  But if it was a general or original contractor, plaintiff was excused from the 90-day notice requirement.  Based on this factual uncertainty, the court found the plaintiff had a right to pursue alternative arguments to salvage something of its approximately $3M lien claim.

The court also agreed with the plaintiff that it could recover prejudgment interest on the legal malpractice claim.  Since that claim flowed from the underlying allegation that the Firm failed to perfect plaintiff’s lien, and since Section 21 of the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act allows for prejudgment interest (770 ILCS 60/21), the plaintiff could add the interest it would have recovered to the damage claim versus the Firm. (¶ 48).

Afterwords:

1/ A broad release can still be narrowly interpreted to encompass only those claims that were likely in the release parties’ contemplation.  If a claim hadn’t come to fruition at the time a release is signed, the releasing party can argue that an expansive release doesn’t cover that inchoate claim;

2/ Judicial estoppel requires more than alternative pleadings or arguments.  Instead, the litigant must take two wholly contradictory statements and obtain a benefit from doing so.  What’s a “benefit” is open to interpretation.  Here, the plaintiff received $1.8M on its lien claim in the earlier litigation.  Still, this wasn’t a benefit in relation to the value of its lien – which exceeded $3M;

3/ If the underlying claim – be it common law or statutory – provides for pre-judgment interest, then the later malpractice suit stemming from that underlying claim can include pre-judgment interest in the damages calculation.

 

 

Legal Malpractice Claims: Elements and Damages: Illinois Case Snippets (2015)

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Two First District cases – one published, the other not – decided some eight days apart in April 2015, provide good capsule summaries of the pleading and proof elements of a legal malpractice claim in Illinois, the nature and reach of the attorney-client relationship (“A-C Relationship”) and the universe of possible damages that a plaintiff can recover in legal malpractice suits.

The plaintiff in Tuckaway Development, LLC v. Schain, Burney, Ross & Citron, Ltd., 2015 IL App (1st) 140621-U asked for over $1M but was awarded just over $1,000 in a case involving a late-recorded mortgage in connection with a related real estate deal.  Meriturn Partners, LLC v. Banner and Witcoff, Ltd.’s plaintiff (2015 IL App (1st) 131883) fared much better.  There, a jury awarded the private equity firm plaintiff a cool $6M in a case involving an intellectual property lawyer’s misguided advice concerning patents owned by a waste disposal company the plaintiff planned to invest in.

Here are some key legal malpractice points distilled from the two cases:

1/ To win a legal malpractice suit, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an A-C Relationship;

2/ An A-C Relationship requires both the attorney and client to consent to the relationship’s formation;

3/ That consent (to the formation of an A-C Relationship) can be express (by words) or implied (by conduct);

4/ A client can’t unilaterally create an A-C Relationship and his subjective belief that such a relationship exists isn’t enough to bind the attorney;

5/ Where an attorney knows a person is relying on his services or advice, an A-C Relationship exists;

6/ In some cases, third-party non-clients can establish that an attorney owes contractual duties to them (the third parties);

7/ An attorney’s obligations can extend to third-party non-clients where they are intended beneficiaries of the attorneys’ services;

8/ The measure of damages in an attorney malpractice suit are those damages that would put plaintiff in a position he would have been in had the attorney not been negligent;

9/ Legal malpractice damages present a question for a jury and that damage assessment is entitled to great deference;

10/ Absent evidence that the jury failed to follow the law, considered erroneous evidence or that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, an appeals court can’t negate the verdict.

Tuckaway, ¶¶ 28-30; Meriturn, ¶¶ 10, 18.

In Meriturn, the court ruled that the IP lawyer’s duties extended to third party investors even though he never signed a contract with them. The key evidence supporting the finding included testimony and e-mails that showed that the lawyer knew that outside investors were relying on his patent opinions and also illustrated some direct communications between the lawyer and the (non-client) third party investors.  

The lawyer’s failure to limit the scope of his representation to the plaintiff investment firm made it easy for the court to find the lawyer’s fiduciary duties extended beyond his immediate client, the plaintiff.  

The court also upheld the jury’s $6M damage verdict in Meriturn against the plaintiff’s claim that it was too low (the plaintiff sought over $23M,)  While the plaintiff sought lost profits (profits lost as a result of the investment going bad due to the bad patent advice), those damages were foreclosed by the “new business” rule.  

Since the plaintiff’s investment in the waste disposal company was a new venture for both the plaintiff and the company, any claimed lost profits were purely speculative and couldn’t be recovered.

Tuckaway’s paltry damages sum awarded to the plaintiff was also supported by the evidence.  There, the lawyer defendant offered uncontested expert testimony that the property that was subject of the late mortgage recording was worth next to nothing since it was already encumbered by a prior mortgage.  

As a result, the jury’s damage amount – some 800 times less than was claimed by the plaintiff – was supported by the evidence.

Take-aways:

1/ An attorney who doesn’t clearly define and limit the scope of his representation can find himself owing duties to third party “strangers” to his attorney-client agreement;

2/ A jury is given wide latitude in fashioning damage awards.  Unless there is obvious error or where it’s clear they considered improper evidence, their damage assessment will be sustained.

 

Brannen v. Siefert: A (Legal Malpractice) Case Study (Ill. First Dist.)

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The Featured Case: Brannen v. Siefert, 2013 IL App (1st) 122067, ¶ 52 (11.19.13)

 

The Facts: Plaintiffs – a land trustee and trust beneficiary – sued the Underlying Defendants, an attorney and his wife, for breach of a written real estate contract for the purchase of a home owned by the plaintiffs.  The strangely worded contract, drafted by Underlying Defendants, called for staggered payments of interest and principle over a several-year period to be credited towards the home’s purchase price.

The Underlying Defendants quickly breached and plaintiffs hired an attorney (the Former Attorneys) to collect the amounts owed under the contract.

The Former Attorneys (a solo practitioner and his professional corporation), unbeknownst to plaintiffs, declared a forfeiture of the contract by written notice to Underlying Defendants.  Several months later, the Underlying Defendants moved out.  At the time they vacated the property, the Underlying Defendants owed plaintiff about $150,000 and hadn’t made any payments for over two years.

The Underlying Case

Displeased with Former Attorneys’ performance, plaintiffs hired substitute counsel who filed a breach of contract suit against Underlying Defendants to recover past and future payments owed under the real estate contract.  The Underlying Defendants successfully moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on the Former Attorneys prior forfeiture notice.  The court found that the Underlying Defendants’ forfeiture remedy foreclosed a damages action by the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs then sued the Former Attorneys for legal malpractice.

The Malpractice Suit

The thrust of plaintiff’s malpractice suit was that the Former Attorneys committed professional negligence by giving up plaintiffs’ contract rights without first consulting them and by failing to explain the legal effect of that remedial choice.  The Former Attorneys argued they did explain how a forfeiture would impact plaintiffs’ rights and that cancelling the contract was the proper remedy since plaintiffs’ primary goal was to retake the property; not recover damages.

After a trial, a jury entered judgment against the Former Attorneys for $199,500 and they appealed.

Held: Affirmed.  

Rules/Reasoning:

In Illinois, a legal malpractice plaintiff must establish: (1) an attorney owed the plaintiff’s a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney breached that duty; (3) the attorney’s breach of duty proximately caused actual damages to the plaintiff.  Expert testimony is usually required to prove that an attorney breached his professional duties to his client.  ¶ 45, 61. 

A legal malpractice plaintiff must prove not only that he would have won the underlying case but that the underlying defendant was solvent enough to pay a judgment.  But the required solvency showing isn’t stringent: the plaintiff doesn’t have to prove a  defendant’s net worth but only needs to show the defendant’s ability to at least partially pay a judgment. ¶ 63.

The jury found the plaintiffs’ expert more believable than the Former Attorneys’.  Plaintiffs’ expert testified that contractual forfeiture was the wrong remedy since under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (the “Forcible Act”) a contract seller like plaintiffs can sue for both possession and money damages.  735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(5), 9-209 (plaintiff can sue for possession and damages).  The plaintiffs’ expert also testified that by declaring a forfeiture – when both Illinois law and the subject real estate contract allowed multiple remedies – the Former Attorneys prevented the plaintiffs from recovering nearly $150,000 in money damages.  ¶¶ 46-49.

The Court also found that plaintiffs established the Underlying Defendants’ solvency.  The trial evidence demonstrated that the Underlying Defendants could at least partially pay a judgment based on their income and other assets.  ¶ 65.  Because the plaintiffs proved each element of their legal malpractice case, the First District affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs.

Take-aways: (1) To win the legal malpractice ‘case within the case’, a malpractice plaintiff must prove he would have won the underlying case but doesn’t have to precisely prove the malpractice defendant’s net worth. It is enough to show that the defendant has a source of income and is able of paying all or part of a judgment; (2) The Forcible Act provides for possession and money damages to a contract home seller where a buyer breaches an installment sales contract; and (3) the forfeiture remedy should be exercised with extreme caution.  That’s because if you nullify a contract, it can bar a later action to recover money damages for breach of contract.