British Firm’s Multi-Million Dollar Trade Secrets Verdict Upheld Against Illinois Construction Equipment Juggernaut – IL Fed Court

Refusing to set aside a $73-plus million jury verdict for a small British equipment manufacturer against construction giant Caterpillar, Inc., a Federal court recently examined the contours of the Illinois trade secrets statute and the scope of damages for trade secrets violations.

The plaintiff in Miller UK, Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2017 WL 1196963 (N.D.Ill. 2017) manufactured a coupler device that streamlined the earthmoving and excavation process.  Plaintiff’s predecessor and Caterpillar entered into a 1999 supply contract where plaintiff furnished the coupler to Caterpillar who would, in turn, sell it under its own name through a network of dealers.

The plaintiff sued when Caterpillar terminated the agreement and began marketing its own coupler – the Center-Lock – which bore an uncanny resemblance to plaintiff’s coupler design.

After a multi-week trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on its trade secrets claim and for Caterpillar’s on its defamation counterclaim for $1 million – a paltry sum dwarfed by the plaintiff’s outsized damages verdict.

The Court first assessed whether the plaintiff’s three-dimensional computerized drawings deserved trade secrets protection.

The Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), 765 ILCS 1065/1, defines a trade secret as encompassing information, technical or non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers that (1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.

Misappropriation means “disclosure” or “use” of a trade secret by someone who lacks express or implied consent to do so and where he/she knows or should know that knowledge of the trade secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.  Intentional conduct, howver, isn’t required: misappropriation can result from a defendant’s negligent or unintentional conduct.

Recoverable trade secret damages include actual loss caused by the misappropriation and unjust enrichment enjoyed by the misappropriator.  Where willful and malicious conduct is shown, the plaintiff can also recover punitive damages.  765 ILCS 1065/4.

In agreeing that the plaintiff’s coupler drawings were trade secrets, the Court noted plaintiff’s expansive use of confidentiality agreements when they furnished the drawings to Caterpillar and credited plaintiff’s trial testimony that the parties’ expectation was for the drawings to be kept secret.

The Court also upheld its trial rulings excluding certain evidence offered by Caterpillar.  One item of evidence rejected by the court as hearsay was a slide presentation prepared by Caterpillar to show how its coupler differed from plaintiff’s and didn’t utilize plaintiff’s confidential data.

Hearsay prevents a litigant from using out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  An exception to the hearsay rule applies where an out-of-court statement (1) is consistent with a declarant’s trial testimony, (2) the party offering the statement did so to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive against the declarant, (3) the statement was made before the declarant had a motive for fabrication, and (4) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination.

Since the slide show was made as a direct response to plaintiff’s claim that Caterpillar used plaintiff’s confidential information, the statement (the slide show) was made after Caterpillar had a motive to fabricate the slide show.

The Court then affirmed the jury’s $1M verdict on Caterpillar’s defamation counter-claim based on plaintiff’s falsely implying that Caterpillar’s coupler failed standard safety tests in written and video submissions sent to Caterpillar’s equipment dealers.  The plaintiff’s letter and enclosed DVD showed a Caterpillar coupler bucket breaking apart and decapitating a life-size dummy. (Ouch!)  The obvious implication being that Caterpillar’s coupler is unsafe.

The Court agreed with the jury that the plaintiff’s conduct was actionable as per se defamation.  A quintessential defamation per se action is one alleging a plaintiff’s lack of ability or integrity in one’s business.  With per se defamation, damages are presumed – meaning, the plaintiff doesn’t have to prove mathematical (actual) monetary loss.

Instead, all that’s required is the damages assessed “not be considered substantial.”  Looking to an earlier case where the court awarded $1M for defamatory statements in tobacco litigation, the Court found that the jury’s verdict against the plaintiff coupler maker here was proper.

Afterwords:

The wide use of confidentiality agreements and evidence of oral pledges of secrecy can serve as sufficient evidence of an item’s confidential nature for purposes of trade secrets liability.  Trade secrets damages can include actual profits lost by a plaintiff, the amount the defendant (the party misappropriating the trade secrets) was unjustly enriched through the use of plaintiff’s trade secrets and, in some egregious cases, punitive damages.

The case also shows that a jury has wide latitude to fashion general damage awards in per se defamation suits.  This is especially so in cases involving deep-pocketed defendants.

 

Employees’ Facebook Gripe Session Is Protected ‘Concerted’ Activity: Retaliation Firing Violates NLRA

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It’s against a cultural backdrop of social media ubiquity and nonexistent online anonymity that today’s post vividly illustrates the tricky intersecting legal issues involving employee free speech rights and online privacy concerns.

In Three D, LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31 (August 22, 2014), a Facebook on-employee group gripe session turned ugly for two of the participants when their boss – a sports bar owner – fired them after he found out they trashed him in a group message.

Seems the employees were upset that their employer miscalculated their income tax withholding amounts so they decided to air their grievances on Facebook.  One employee (a claimant in the NLRB proceeding) blasted her employer (“what an asshole!”) while the other claimant said nothing: all she did was  “like” another participant’s (an ex-employee) hostile comment about the tax mishap.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board” ) found that the employer violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “Act”) by firing the employees for their Facebook activity.  The Board held the employees’ discussion was protected “concerted activity” that involved improving employment conditions.  By firing the employees for protected activity, the employer violated the Act.

Reasons:

Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity for their “mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. s. 157.  This Section extends to social media comments that address improving workplace conditions or that vocalize legitimate employment concerns.

NLRA Section 8 outlaws an employer’s attempt to interfere with an employee’s exercise of concerted activity rights.  29 U.S.C. s. 158.

An employee’s concerted activity rights aren’t unlimited, though.  The law recognizes that where an employee disparages an employer’s products or services or defames an employer, the employee’s conduct loses the Act’s protection.

For an employee communication to meet the defamation or disparagement test, the challenged statement must be false, malicious (knowingly or recklessly false) and it must cause damage.

The Board ruled that the employee comments were part of an conversation involving  a legitimate workplace concern – employee tax liability.

The Board also found the simple act of “liking” a group member’s derisive comments about the boss merited Federal protection since it involved the other Facebook participants’ work-related concerns and opinions.

The Board rejected the employer’s argument that the “what an asshole” comment was defamatory and unprotected as a result.  The Board stated that while the comment was certainly rude, it was protected as rhetorical hyperbole.

The Facebook invective wasn’t factual enough (after all, how do you objectively verify if someone is an a-hole?) to constitute  defamation.  And since neither employee claimant disparaged the sports bar’s services, the activity was protected.

The Board also struck the employer’s Internet policy on the basis that it encroached on employees’ protected rights under the NLRA.  An employer social media policy violates the NLRA when it chills an employee’s concerted activity rights.

Here, the employer’s Web policy outlawed, among more specific items, “inappropriate” Internet use.  The Board found the policy’s reference to “inappropriate” social media discussions was too vague and overbroad and could reasonably be viewed as punishing protected activity.

Afterwords:

– The Board extends concerted employee activity to social media communications;

– An argument can be made in the wake of this decision that as long as an employee couches his inflammatory rhetoric beneath a veneer of legitimate workplace concerns, an employee’s comments are protected from employer retaliation.