Tag: claim-splitting

Landlord’s Double-Rent Holdover Claim Barred by Res Judicata – A Deep Cut (IL 2012)

A commercial lease dispute sets the backdrop for an appeals court’s nuanced discussion of statutory holdover damages and when res judicata and claim-splitting defeat a second lawsuit involving similar facts to and subject matter of an earlier case.

For many years, the tenant in Degrazia v. Levato operated “Jimbo’s” – a sports bar set in the shadow of U.S. Cellular Field (nka Guaranteed Rate Field) and perennial favorite watering hole for Chicago White Sox fans.

Lawsuit 1 – the 2006 Eviction Case

In 2006, plaintiff filed an eviction lawsuit when the lease expired and defendants refused to leave.  In addition to possession of the premises, the plaintiffs also sought to recover use and occupancy damages equal to double the monthly rent due under the lease through the eviction date.

The trial court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment motion in the 2006 eviction suit and struck defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff went back on an oral promise to renew the lease.  Defendant appealed and the trial court’s eviction order was affirmed.

Lawsuit 2 – the 2007 Damages Case

Plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit in 2007; this time for breach of lease.  In this second action, plaintiffs sought to recover statutory holdover damages under Section 9-202 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (the “FED Act”).  The court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion on the basis that plaintiff’s second lawsuit was barred by res judicata and the policy against claim-splitting.  The plaintiffs appealed.

Rules and Reasoning

For res judicata to foreclose a second lawsuit, three elements must be present:  (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of
causes of action; and (3) an identity of the parties or their privies.

Illinois courts also hew to the rule against splitting claims or causes of action. Under the claim-splitting rule, where a cause of action is entire and indivisible, a plaintiff cannot divide it by bringing separate lawsuits.  A plaintiff cannot sue for part of a claim in one action and then sue for the rest of the claim in a second suit.  Like res judicata, the claim-splitting rule aims to foster finality and protect litigants from multiple lawsuits.

The First District held that the trial court’s order in the 2006 lawsuit granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was a final order only on the issue of possession but not on plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees since the court expressly granted plaintiffs leave to file a fee petition.  And since there was no final order entered on plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in the 2006 case, plaintiffs could seek the same fees in the 2007 lawsuit.

The Court did, however, affirm summary judgment for the tenants on plaintiffs’ statutory holdover claim.  FED Act Section 9-202 provides that a tenant who willfully holds over after a lease expires is liable for double rent. 735 ILCS 5/9-202.

The Plaintiffs sought the same double rent in both the 2006 (eviction) and 2007 (damages) lawsuit and requested these damages in their summary judgment motion filed in the 2006 case.  The eviction judge in that 2006 case only allowed plaintiffs to recover statutory use and occupancy instead of statutory holdover rent.  The First District held that the use and occupancy order was final.  And since plaintiffs never appealed or challenged the use and occupancy order in the 2006 case, plaintiff’s 2007 Lawsuit was defeated by res judicata.

The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the forcible court (in the 2006 Lawsuit) was limited to ordering possession and unable to award statutory holdover damages.  It found that FED Act Section 9-106 expressly allows a landlord to join a rent claim and FED Sections 9-201 and 9-202 respectively allow a plaintiff to recover use and occupancy and holdover damages.  As a result, the First District found there was nothing that prevented the 2006 eviction case judge from awarding holdover rent if plaintiffs were able to show that defendants willfully held over after the lease expired.

Afterwords:

There is scant case law on Illinois’ holdover statute.  While an action for possession under the FED Act is, in theory, a limited, summary proceeding directed solely to the question of possession, the FED Act sections that allow a plaintiff to join a rent claim, to recover use and occupancy payments in addition to double holdover rent give shrewd lessee lawyer’s enough of an opening to argue issue or claim preclusion.

This case demonstrates that the best pleadings practice is for the landlord to join its double-rent claims in the eviction case and put the burden on the tenant to argue the holdover damages claim is beyond the scope of a FED action.  Otherwise, there is a real risk that the failure to join a holdover claim in the possession action will prevent holdover damages in a later lawsuit.

No Claim-Splitting or Res Judicata Issue Where Bank Refiles Breach of Note Claim After Prior DWP – From the Illinois Archives

BankFinancial, FSB v. Tandon, 2013 IL App (1st) 113152 serves as fairly recent reminder of the possible pitfalls that await a plaintiff who chooses to voluntarily dismiss or non-suit certain complaint counts when other counts of the complaint are involuntarily dismissed – such as by a motion to dismiss filed by a defendant.

The strategic reasons for taking a voluntary dismissal are several.  A non-suit can be a time-buying device when you get to trial and you realize you need more time to secure witnesses and strengthen your case.  Having some chronological breathing room to further develop your case can pay psychological and financial dividends for both client and lawyer.  But as BankFinancial amply illustrates, the right to voluntarily dismiss a claim and later refile it has limits.

In this breach of contract and mortgage foreclosure case, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint for mortgage foreclosure, breach of contract (the promissory note) and breach of guaranty in 2003.

In 2006, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure count and in 2008 the remaining claims were dismissed for want of prosecution (“DWP”).  A few month later, in January 2009, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit, repleading its breach of note and breach of guaranty claims.

The trial court dismissed the 2009 case based on res judicata and plaintiff appealed.

Held: reversed.

Q: Why?

A: Res judicata’s central purpose is to preclude parties from contesting matters they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.  To further this purpose, a final judgment on the merits is required to trigger res judicata’s application.  A “final judgment” is one that terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits.

A voluntary dismissal of a case or a DWP is, by definition, NOT a final judgment since when a case is DWPd, the court doesn’t reach the merits of a case. 

After a DWP, Code Section 13-217 allows party one year to refile an action within one year and the DWP order doesn’t become final until the one year refilling period expires. (¶¶ 29-30).

Illinois also disallows the related doctrine of claim splitting. Claim splitting applies where a plaintiff tries to refile a claim that he previously voluntarily dismissed in an earlier proceeding AFTER another count of the complaint in that prior action was involuntarily dismissed.

So, if in Case No. 1, a plaintiff’s negligence claim is (involuntarily) dismissed on a defendant’s motion and then plaintiff voluntarily non-suits his remaining breach of contract claim, the plaintiff cannot later file the breach of contract claim in a new action.  This will be deemed impermissible claim splitting because it subverts the law’s desire for finality and efficiency.

Applying these rules, the court held that the plaintiff could properly refile its breach of note and guaranty claims. The voluntary dismissal of the foreclosure count wasn’t a final judgment nor was the DWP of the note and guaranty counts.  The DWP order didn’t become final until a year elapsed from the DWP order date.  Since the plaintiff refiled its note and guaranty counts within a year of the DWP, the refiled action was timely.  As a result, the plaintiff’s refiled suit wasn’t barred by res judicata or the claim splitting rule.

Afterwords:

This case crystallizes the proposition that if a plaintiff non-suits a complaint count or gets a claim(s) DWPd, he can refile the dismissed claims within one year and avoid any dismissal motion based on res judicata.

If a plaintiff non-suits one claim after a different complaint claim is involuntarily dismissed, he will likely be barred from refilling the non-suited claim in a second action under res judicata and claim-splitting rules.  In such a setting, the plaintiff should either litigate the remaining count(s) (the count(s) that isn’t (aren’t) dismissed) to judgment or ask the court for a finding that he can immediately appeal the order dismissing the involuntarily dismissed claim.

Other References:

Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462 (2008)

Rein v. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325 (1996)

 

N.D.Ill. Examines Res Judicata and Claim-Splitting Doctrines

In Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2013 WL 4401375, the Northern District of Illinois examined the reach of the res judicata and claim-splitting doctrines in an employment discrimination suit. 

In 2012, the plaintiff sued T-Mobile, his former employer, for employment discrimination and for violating the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the “TCA”), which outlaws employers accessing “customers’ proprietary network information” (basically, “cell phone records”) without the customer’s consent.  Plaintiff’s TCA count claimed the defendant accessed plaintiff’s cell phone records without his permission while looking into plaintiff’s EEOC claim against the telecom giant. 

This was plaintiff’s second discrimination suit against T-Mobile. In 2011, he filed similar Federal employment discrimination claims (but not a TCA claim) which were defeated on T-Mobile’s summary judgment motion.  After plaintiff filed his second action in 2012, T-Mobile moved to dismiss on the basis of res judicata and improper claim-splitting.  T-Mobile argued that plaintiff’s 2012 case was based on the same operative facts as his 2011 suit (which T-Mobile won on summary judgment) and so the 2012 case was defeated by res judicata’s and claim-splitting.

Held: The Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s TCA claim and granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.

Reasoning/Rules: 

Res judicata and claim-splitting both aim to prevent repetitive and duplicative litigation; ensuring that all factually-related claims are brought in a single case. 

Res judicata’s elements:

(1) an identity of causes of actions (that is, the second claim is based on the same core of operative facts as the previously litigated “first” claim);

(2) identity of parties or their privies (a fact-specific inquiry decided on case-by-case basis); and

(3) a final judgment on the merits (final judgment = judgment based on the parties’ legal rights as opposed to matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction or form)  

Claim-Splitting Doctrine

Related to res judicata, claim-splitting differs in only a single sense: while res judicata contemplates a final judgment and separate, sequential lawsuits, claim-splitting applies to two currently pending lawsuits that have not yet reached the final judgment stage.  The claim-splitting doctrine provides the basis for dismissal where two pending lawsuits are duplicative of  one another.    

The ‘Single Core of Operative Facts’ Element 

The Court held that plaintiff’s TCA claims (based on T-Mobile’s (alleged) cell phone snooping) were not barred by res judicata or claim-splitting.  While both the 2011 and 2012 suits pled T-Mobile’s discriminatory conduct, only the 2012 suit alleged T-Mobile violated the TCA’s privacy provisions by scouring plaintiff’s cell phone.  As a result, the Court found that the core of underlying facts giving rise to the 2011 suit (which exclusively involved employment discrimination claims) differed from the 2012 suit (which additionally involved T-Mobile’s violation of the TCA).  *5-6. 

Take-aways: Res judicata and claim-splitting are properly brought as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  The Tank Court gives content to the same claim/same core of operative facts element of res judicata/claim-splitting and shows a willingness to look into factual differences between two separate lawsuits which look on the same on the surface.

Tank provides ammunition to litigants opposing res judicata or claim-splitting pleadings motions by highlighting what a court should focus on when analyzing the same cause/identity of cause action element of the defenses.