‘Inquiry Notice’ Element of Discovery Rule Dooms Plaintiff’s Fraud in Inducement Claim – IL First Dist.

The First District recently discussed the reach of the discovery rule in the course of dismissing a plaintiff’s fraud claims on statute of limitations grounds.

The plaintiff in Cox v. Jed Capital, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 153397-U, brought a slew of business tort claims when he claimed his former employer understated its value in an earlier buy-out of the plaintiff’s LLC interest.

Plaintiff’s 2007 lawsuit settled a year later and was the culmination of settlement discussions in which the defendants (the former employer’s owner and manager) produced conflicting financial statements.  The plaintiff went forward with the settlement anyway and released the defendants for a $15,000 payment.

In 2014, after reading a Wall Street Journal article that featured his former firm, plaintiff learned the company was possibly worth much more than was previously disclosed to him.  Plaintiff sued in 2015 for fraud in the inducement, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.

The trial court dismissed the claims on the basis they were time-barred by the five-year limitations period and the plaintiff appealed.  He argued that the discovery rule tolled the limitations period and saved his claims since he didn’t learn the full extent of his injuries until he read the 2014 article.

Result: Dismissal of plaintiff’s claims affirmed.

Q: Why?

A: A fraud claim is subject to Illinois’ five-year statute of limitations codified at Section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Since the underlying financial documents were provided to the plaintiff in 2008 and plaintiff sued seven years later in 2015.  As a result, plaintiff’s claim was time-barred unless the discovery rule applies.

In Illinois, the discovery rule stops the limitations period from running until the injured party knows or reasonably should know he has been injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused.

A plaintiff who learns he has suffered from a wrongfully caused injury has a duty to investigate further concerning any cause of action he may have.  The limitations period starts running once a plaintiff is put on “inquiry notice” of his claim.  Inquiry notice means a party knows or reasonably should know both that (a) an injury has occurred and (b) it (the injury) was wrongfully caused.  (¶ 34)

Fraud in the inducement occurs where a defendant makes a false statement, with knowledge of or belief in its falsity, with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting on the falsity of the statement, plaintiff reasonably relied on the false statement and plaintiff suffered damages from that reliance.

Plaintiff alleged the defendants furnished flawed financial statements to induce plaintiff’s consent to settle an earlier lawsuit for a fraction of what he would have demanded had he known his ex-employer’s true value.  The Court held that since the plaintiff received the conflicting financial reports from defendants in 2008 and waited seven years to sue, his fraud in the inducement claim was untimely and properly dismissed.

Afterwords:

This case paints a vivid portrait of the unforgiving nature of statutes of limitation.  A plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the discovery rule preserves otherwise stale claims.  If a plaintiff is put on inquiry notice that it may have been harmed (or lied to as the plaintiff said here), it has a duty to investigate and file suit as quickly as possible.  Otherwise, a plaintiff risks having the court reject its claims as too late.

‘Domicile’ vs. ‘Residence’ vs. ‘Citizenship’ in Federal Court Jurisdiction – More Semantic Hairsplitting?

Strabala v. Zhang, 318 F.R.D. 81 (Ill. N.D. 2016), featured here for its detailed discussion of e-mail evidence, provides an equally thorough analysis of the differences between residence and domicile in the Federal court jurisdiction calculus.

In the Federal litigation scheme, the party asserting Federal court jurisdiction bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

The plaintiff here alleged that the Northern District had original jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) – the diversity of citizenship statute that vests Federal courts with jurisdiction over claims between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.”

The defendants were unquestionably Chinese citizens – a foreign state under Section 1332.  The plaintiff’s citizenship, though, was unclear.  While plaintiff claimed he was a citizen of Illinois, the defendants disputed this; they pointed to the plaintiff’s home in China as proof that he wasn’t really an Illinois citizen and so was stateless.  A “stateless” citizen can’t invoke Federal court diversity jurisdiction.

Though colloquially used interchangeably, under Federal law, the terms citizenship and residence have important differences.  Citizenship equals domicile, not residence.  The term residence denotes where a person lives while domicile carries both a physical and mental dimension.

Domicile is “the place where that individual has a true, fixed home and principal establishment” and the place where the person intends to eventually return.  A person can have multiple residences but only one domicile.

Objective factors a court considers to determine domicile include “current residence, voting registration and voting practices, location of personal and real property, location of financial accounts, membership in unions and other associations, place of employment, driver’s license and automobile registration, and tax payments.”  But no lone citizenship/domicile factor is conclusive; each case turns on its own facts.

Applying these factors, the Court noted that since plaintiff was based in Illinois from the late 1980s through 2006 (when plaintiff moved first to Houston, TX then to Shanghai), the Court required defendants to show that plaintiff not only currently lived outside of Illinois but also had no intention of returning to Illinois.

The Court credited the plaintiff’s declaration (sworn statement) of intent to keep an Illinois domicile.  Other factors weighing in favor of finding subject matter jurisdiction included (1) plaintiff and his wife never sold there Chicago condominium or removed furniture from it when they moved to Houston in 2006, (2) for several months they lived in corporate housing provided by plaintiff’s Houston employer (an architecture firm), (3) plaintiff’s wife divided her time equally between Chicago and Houston while plaintiff spent about 50% of his time in Shanghai, 40% in Houston and 10% in Chicago.

The plaintiff’s Texas drivers’ license and Houston condo purchase weren’t enough to tilt the citizenship question to the defendants (who, again, argued that the plaintiff wasn’t an Illinois citizen) since the plaintiff swore under oath that he intended to keep an Illinois domicile and defendant had no facts to refute this.

Rejecting the defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s domicile was Shanghai, the Court focused on the following facts: (1) plaintiff lived in a furnished hotel with a lease of one year or less and owned no real property or car in Shanghai, (2) plaintiff’s Chinese work permit had to be renewed annually; and (3) plaintiff’s wife spent six months out of the year in Chicago.

Other pro-Illinois domicile factors cited by the Court included the plaintiff’s testimony (via declaration) that he has had a landline telephone number with a Chicago area code for over two decades and plaintiff’s LinkedIn profile that listed his employment locations as Shanghai, Seoul, and Chicago.

Afterwords:

For Federal subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship to attach, the plaintiff must be a citizen of a State (as opposed to a foreign country).  This case provides an exhaustive application of the various factors a court considers when deciding the site of a Federal plaintiff’s domicile in a complex fact pattern and emphasizes the differences between residence and domicile.

 

 

The Illinois Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Lien Statute: A Top 10 List

The Illinois Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Lien Act, 770 ILCS 15/1 (the “Act”), provides a broker whose owed commission money with a strong remedy against a breaching property owner, buyer or tenant. Here are some of the Act’s key provisions:

1. What It Applies To:

“Commercial real estate.”  This is defined as any real estate in Illinois other than (i) real estate containing one to six residential units, (ii) real estate on which no buildings or structures are located, or (iii) real estate classified as farmland under the Property Tax Code.  770 ILCS 15/15

2. What It Doesn’t Apply To:

Real estate that isn’t “commercial”, including single family residential units like condominiums, townhouses, or homes in a subdivision when sold conveyed on a unit-by-unit basis.

3. Is Written Agreement Required? Yes.  770 ILCS 15/10.

4. When Does it Attach?:
The lien attaches when two things happen: (1) the broker becomes entitled to a fee or commission under a written instrument signed by the owner, buyer, tenant (or their agent); and (2) the broker records a notice of lien in the Recorder’s Office of the county where the commercial real estate is located.

5. Does the Lien Relate Back? No.   Unlike mechanics liens, the broker lien does not relate back to the date of contract between broker and owner (or buyer or tenant).  770 ILCS 15/10.

6.  Timing/When To Record:  In the case of a lease, the lien must be recorded within 90 days after the tenant takes possession of the premises,  Exception: if broker is given written notice of the planned lease signing at least 10 days before the intended signing date, the lien claim must be recorded before the lease signing date.

For a purchase, the lien must be recorded before the property is transferred to a buyer. The broker has 10 days from the recording date to mail a copy of the recorded lien to the owner of the property by registered or certified mail, with return receipt requested, or to personally serve the notice on the owner.  The broker’s lien shall be unenforceable if mailing of the copy of the notice of lien recording does not occur at the time and in the manner required by this Act. 770 ILCS 15/15.

7.  How to Enforce the Lien:  The broker enforces the lien by filing suit to foreclose it.  The broker must sue in the Circuit Court for the county where the property is located by filing a complaint and sworn affidavit that the lien has been recorded.  The lawsuit must be filed within 2 years after recording the lien.

8. Contents of the Lien Notice:  The lien notice shall state the name of the claimant, name of the owner, a description of the property upon which the lien is being claimed, the amount for which the lien is claimed, and the real estate license number of the broker.

9.  Q: Can the Liening Broker Recover Her Attorneys’ Fees?  A: Yes. The losing party must pay the winning party’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.

10.  Q: What About Priority? A: Prior recorded liens and mortgages against the property shall have priority over a broker’s lien.  770 ILCS 15/15.  These prior recorded liens include mechanics liens recorded after the broker’s lien notice but which relates back to a date prior to the lien recording date and prior recorded liens securing revolving credit and future advances of construction loans as described in Section 15-1302 of the Mortgage Foreclosure Statute.